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Technology of power

Abdurakhman Avtorkhanov
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"Technology of Power" is one of the most famous and popular books in the world by a prominent Russian political scientist abroad. The author explores the functioning of the mechanisms of the Soviet party machine authorities.

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One

BUKHARIN VS. STALIN I. THE

BEGINNING OF THE END

Even at lunchtime, we were informed that an urgent and very important lecture would be held at six o'clock in the evening. The topic of the lecture was not named, and the name of the lecturer was kept secret. However, we were warned that the attendance of all students of the Institute of Red Professors (IKP) is mandatory. Lecture pass - by party tickets with an additional presentation of student IDs. Such a strict order of

listening to the lecture and the lecturer's incognito aroused general interest. They began to guess, judge and dress up. Some even applied personally to the rector of the IKP, Mikhail Nikolaevich Pokrovsky, but in vain. The building of the IKP itself (before the revolution it housed the Lyceum named after Tsarevich Nikolai - Moscow, Ostozhenka, 53) began to take on a solemn look. Slogans were hastily composed, and they were diligently printed with white paint on red panels. Portraits of the founders of Marxism were hung out, filled with oil paints and borrowed, apparently on such a solemn occasion, from other high institutions. The cleaners washed and rubbed "out of order" the floors. Workers cleaned the yard. The librarians exhibited the best books. The chimney sweeps climbed the roofs, the professors queued up at the hairdresser's. We continued to guess: in connection

with what all this "Potemkinism" is arranged. The old-timers-cleaners tell us that such a commotion occurred with them in the event of a "highest visit", but after all, Zinoviev, Bukharin, Uglanov come here easily, therefore, none other than Mikhail Ivanovich "Kalinych" himself comes, the cleaners told us. However, if in the eyes of the "common people" Kalinin was the "red tsar", then

we, the "red professors", measured the leaders of the revolution on a somewhat different scale - political and theoretical. And, from the point of view of this scale, it seemed to us that "Kalinych", although a nice old man, was an alien shadow as a politician, and a round zero as a theoretician. However, the visit of the "president" is also an event for the Institute. We were ready to listen condescendingly to Kalinin.

I occupied a room in the IKP dormitory on Pirogovka. In order not to be late for an important lecture, I arrived half an hour early. And unexpectedly found the Institute in great mourning.

The corridors were crowded with students and quietly, almost in a whisper, talking about something mysterious. The professors managed to shave, but that didn't make them any more fun. The solemn sadness of the moment they were living through was only more sharply emphasized by the look of their freshly shaved faces. They talked about the history of the ancient Babylonians - the "non-partisan" topic seemed to have been deliberately chosen to go further back centuries from unpleasant modernity. Cleaning ladies, already in white coats and red handkerchiefs, glanced surreptitiously first at the students, then at the professors, clearly wondering why people hung up their noses on the

eve of such a great event. Only our universal favorite - the porter Dedodub - stood at his "revolutionary post" calmly and imperturbably. Not without importance, he liked to repeat:

- He honestly served four kings and survived all four. - The last was Nicholas the Bloody. How old are you then, Dedodub? I asked him once. "Lenin was the last," he avoided a direct answer. By the way, when I began to enlighten Dedodub, saying that Lenin was not a tsar at all, but was the most ordinary person whom the revolution had chosen as its leader, the old man smiled maliciously, saying:

- Yes, Nikolai was a man, Lenin was a man, I am also a man. But you scribes, Talmudists. You were born in books, you will die in books, having served neither kings, nor people, nor even yourself ... Oh, miserable people, this bookish people ... But today

Dedodub had a birthday and was preparing with dignity to open the door to the fifth king - Michael Ivanovich Kalinin. The mourning of the Institute obviously did not reach him. Meanwhile, the Institute was increasingly plunged into darkness. After rummaging for some time in the emigrant newspapers in the party office, I headed to the assembly hall. Whispering in the corners, I threw on the go:

- Soon six, let's go to the lecture. But the hall was tightly closed. At the entrance guarded unfamiliar to me face in civilian clothes. I returned to the crowd and asked: - What's the matter? Will there be a lecture?

Nobody paid any attention to the question. Only my friend Sorokin came up to me and in a barely audible voice gritted through his teeth: - It's bad, very bad. - Namely? - I don't know...

- Why do you

think it's bad? - I don't think so, but I know.

- So tell me, what, after

all, is it? - Don't know. Desperate to learn anything worthwhile

from Sorokin, I went to the training section. Our secretary Elena Petrovna, always cheerful and helpful, this time was also clearly out of sorts.

- Toothache? I asked. "Worse,"

she replied. - Will there

be a lecture? -

Don't know.

- Excuse me, Elena Petrovna, but I can't understand anything. What do we have here, a "conspiracy of the deaf and dumb" was organized, whether? Or are we on the threshold of general pandemonium? - You hit the mark - So? I ask. - So: conspiracy and pandemonium.

There was not even a hint in her tone

to irony. Entered the secretary of the party cell of the IKP Orlov

asked to report to Mikhail Nikolayevich that the meeting of the bureau

will be in the party office and that everyone is waiting

only for him. - A lecture? I asked

Orlov. - It will be at

seven o'clock. - May I attend the bureau, Comrade Orlov?

Orlov muttered under his breath something like: "Why are you buzzing like an annoying fly" - and went out. Elena Petrovna went

off to report to Pokrovsky. I, tormented by curiosity, decided to still try my luck and went to the party office. I caught up with Orlov almost at the door of the party office. Orlov

was a senior student, "professor without five minutes," as we jokingly called graduates. He measured me from head to toe, as if seeing me for the first time, but said nothing. We disliked from the start

each other: I him - for arrogance, he told me - for disrespect. I entered the party office. A lot of

people had already gathered there and everyone was sitting in silence. I again began to rummage through the same newspapers in anticipation of what would happen next. It wasn't curiosity that spoke in me, but stubbornness. If Orlov says; leave, stay; if he doesn't say anything, I'll leave myself,

But Orlov, apparently, was not up to me. When Pokrovsky entered, accompanied by the secretary of the Krasnopresnensky District Committee Nikitin, everyone came to life. Orlov asked the bureau members to take their seats and declared the meeting open. His speech was short,

but very venomous. - The greatest atrocity that we have just learned about is the work of the White Guard gang of oppositionists ... It seemed to me that at the words "White Guard gang" he gave me the same evil look as at the entrance to the office. And now, as if out of spite, today I only delve into these damned "White Guard" newspapers! - a thought flashed through my mind.

-...we must hunt down and destroy this gang..It has its own agents in the ICP too...

When Orlov said "agents", our eyes met, perhaps, of course, by accident. However, the

more Orlov got into the excitement of eloquence, the more I became convinced that our eyes met really by chance. He seemed to be addressing everyone individually: "Are you this same agent?" To everyone's PLEASURE, Mikhail Nikolaevich interrupted the speaker and said that before discussing the issue, he considered it necessary to visit the assembly hall for inspection, since not everyone present was up to date.

We moved to the auditorium on the second floor. Now here I am finally understood what was going on.

On the back wall, behind the lecturer's podium, hung a portrait of Stalin painted, it seems, by the famous Brodsky. He was depicted in full growth, but, alas ... beheaded. The head, clumsily carved, apparently by some kind of blunt instrument, lay right there on the floor. On Stalin's chest, right above the hand, laid over the side of the famous overcoat in a Napoleonic way, there was an inscription made of carved newspaper letters:

"The proletariat has nothing to lose but Stalin's head. Proletarians of all countries, rejoice!" At the

meeting of the Bureau, many argued that the "execution of Stalin" was a provocative demonstration by anti-Party groups in the ICP. With regard to organizational measures, it was decided for the time being to confine ourselves to setting up a Party commission to investigate the matter. The secretary of the district committee, Nikitin, even recommended not to take too seriously the act, which, perhaps, is simply a "hooligan act." During these words of Nikitin, I myself fixed my eyes on Orlov. If Orlov were a physiognomist, he would easily read in this look: "You see how you always love to bend, no White Guards, but just hooliganism." In place of the beheaded Stalin, a new portrait was brought from somewhere, in which Stalin is depicted together with Lenin in Gorki in 1922:

a copy from a famous photograph. Therefore, a separate portrait of Lenin had to be removed. Accordingly moved Marx and Engels. There was also a portrait of the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars A. I. Rykov, who was initially absent. The Institute lifted mourning. In the meantime, guests began to come to us: students of the Communist University. Ya. M. Sverdlova, graduate students and researchers of the Communist Academy and RANION (Russian Association of Research Institutes of

Social Sciences). They also had to attend the upcoming lecture. We were not informed in advance that all four high schools would listen to this lecture together. Moreover, interest in the lecture itself increased. The Sverdlovsk and Komacademicians were just as little aware of the topic as we were. Many of them asked us who should read what.

The auditorium was already full. Many had to stand in the aisle and on the sides, latecomers were not allowed at all. My friend Sorokin and I prudently took our seats in the first row, but Mikhail Nikolayevich came in and politely announced that the first row was reserved for guests. - Discrimination of human and civil rights, - Sorokin quipped and, looking angrily at the guests - Sverdlovsk and Komacademics, - got up from

places.

But when the guests moved in a crowd to the front row, Mikhail Nikolaevich explained that the Sverdlovsk and Komacademicians were not guests, but their own, and the guests would soon arrive. In the meantime, we had already managed to seize seats in the third row, which were vacated by the Sverdlovites, who had rushed to the first places. "They're coming," Sorokin

said suddenly. I turned to the door.

There was loud applause. To the first a solemn procession of guests moved along the rows. They shouted in the hall:

Long live the Leninist Central Committee! Hooray for colleagues and students Lenin! Long live the Politburo!

Shouts of "Hurrah" and applause grew more and more. When one of the guests shouted:

- Long live the Institute of Red Professors, the theoretical headquarters of the Central Committee of the

All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks! genuine enthusiasm turned into ecstasy. The guests applauded us, and we applauded the guests.

- Long live the collective leader, teacher and organizer

VKP(b)-Leninist Central Committee! Hurrah, comrades! shouted Orlov from the podium.

- Hurrah, hurray, hurray-ah-ah-ah! we shouted in response. Shaking his gray beard, Pokrovsky stepped onto the podium and

took the chair. The bell rang. The guests sat down, and so did we. There was grave silence. The chairman quietly but

articulately announced: Comrade Stalin has the floor for the report. It was May 28, 1928. The report was

called "On the grain front"¹. For the first time I saw a man about whom I had only heard before that he was the General Secretary of the Central Committee by position, and Georgian by nationality. True, in my time I carefully studied his lectures "On the Foundations of Leninism" in 1924 at Sverdlovsk University. Although Stalin appeared in them as a mere commentator on Lenin, 11. S t a l i n. "Issues of Leninism". From a conversation with students of the Institute of Red Professors, Sverdlovsk

University and the Komakademiya.

but it seemed to me then that this commentator had iron logic in the interpretation of Leninism and dry realism in their own conclusions.

Then no one thought or even imagined that "Stalin is Lenin today," as Henri Barbusse later obsequiously established. If Stalin had died then, he would have long since been forgotten even in his own party. Stalin was not yet not only Lenin, but also himself. From a historical point of view, he had only one clear merit, or, if you like, one clear crime: participation in the October conspiracy, moreover, in a role much lower than Trotsky and somewhat higher than some Shkiryatov. In 1928, Stalin was what Mussolini was on the eve of the Roman campaign, and Hitler was before January 30, 1933. True, in more dedicated circles he was not called anything other than a "barbecue man", alluding not so much to Caucasian cuisine as to the profession of a "butcher". But for the majority there was no Stalin then, there was still Dzhughashvili.

We were disappointed that the conversation was supposed to be on a not entirely academic topic - "On the grain front." We were expecting something like the "Chinese revolution" (this topic was then in great fashion), or "the tactics and strategy of the Comintern", and here we are offered to chew on "daily bread", and even listen to statistical calculations! Alas, two years later this lecture reached the consciousness of the last peasant in the country. It turns out that we were present at a historic event. Stalin presented us for the first time with his plan for the future "collective-farm revolution" and thus marked the beginning of the end of NEP.

Stalin, apparently, took into account our mood and, before proceeding to the report itself, made a number of reservations. - You probably expect from me, - he said, - a theoretical report on high topics. But I must disappoint you... Firstly, I am not a theorist, but a practitioner. Secondly, I adhere to the Marxist rule: "one truly revolutionary step is higher than a dozen theoretical programs" ... And the topic that I have chosen on behalf of the Central Committee for the report here is a practical, but revolutionary topic: bread. On how we solve the problem of grain depends not only the fate of Soviet power, but also of the world revolution. After all, the world revolution can only feed on Soviet bread. These last words stuck in my

memory. Stalin spoke quietly, monotonously and with long pauses, as if trying not so much to choose words and formulations as not to say anything superfluous. He seemed to read aloud

unwritten part of the text of his report. Of course, Stalin had a Georgian accent, which was especially noticeable when he was agitated. In a calm epic story, he knew how to soften his pronunciation. After the introductory

speech, Stalin was already reading the pre-written text of the report. He chose his favorite method of interviewing: "questions and answers." Most of the "questions" were also composed by Stalin himself on our behalf, and many of the questions that were actually asked to him after the end of the report were not included at all in the text of the report published in the press. The main question of the

report was the following: what needs to be done so that the Soviet government receives more grain from the peasants and, if possible, for free? In other words: are there possibilities and ways to turn a peasant, a free worker on a private allotment, into a peasant producer on state land?

In response to this question, Stalin announced for the first time his program of "collective farms and state farms." As usual in such cases, Stalin referred to Lenin and argued that the only way out for the Soviet government to increase the production of marketable grain in agriculture was the transition to collective forms of farming, this was the collectivization of the peasantry. Stalin did not yet speak of the "liquidation of the kulaks," confining himself to the Leninist formula: "reliance on the poor, alliance with the middle peasants, and struggle against the kulaks." In short: NEP is coming to an end. "In the city - socialist industrialization, in the countryside -"

collective-farm revolution "- that was the meaning of the report. He himself hardly imagined then what all this would result in concretely and what the costs of this complex process

would be. But we imagined even less, Stalin spoke for about two hours in a row, often drinking water. And when he once again reached for the decanter, there was no more water. There was laughter in the hall. Someone from the presidium gave Stalin a new decanter - Stalin eagerly drank almost glass and, addressing the audience, he himself laughed slyly: "You see, the one who laughs last laughs best. However, I can rejoice you, I've finished." There was applause.

The chairman announced a ten-minute break. He questions asked to be asked in writing. We left the hall.

"We executed only a portrait of Stalin," Sorokin summarized his impression of the report, "and Stalin buried the spirit of Leninism. This remark infuriated me. I knew Sorokin as an inveterate nihilist, for whom all earthly authorities are nothing when it comes to substantiating his own theory. Even Marx he liked to correct and catch on contradictions. About Lenin, he used to repeat, incidentally and inappropriately, the standard phrase: "Lenin was also wrong." Well, where is Stalin now to compete with Sorokin!

- Brilliant comrade Sorokin! Tell me, how do you see the funeral of the spirit of Leninism by Comrade Stalin? I asked in an ironically official tone. - Didn't you notice? - No. -

Yes, brother, you didn't

notice the elephant. But tell me what is the essence Lenin's "cooperative plan"?

"Stalin laid it out," I replied. - He did not state, but distorted. That is simply falsified. Don't be philosophic, but say articulately what you see as Stalin's falsification! I continued to pursue. - "Cooperative plan" for Lenin -

not collective farms, not state farms and not communes, but workers' cooperatives in the city and peasant trade cooperatives in the countryside, while maintaining the commanding heights in the hands of the proletarian state. Lenin's "cooperative plan" lies in the sphere of circulation, and Stalin wants to transfer it to the sphere of production, for which he had to invent three forms of cooperation: supply, marketing, and production-collective farm. It is this last, third form that the speaker considers Lenin's highest form of cooperation, to which we must now pass. After all, this is a direct mockery of the memory of Lenin and juggling with concepts. After all, Lenin did not even know the word "collective farm", and Stalin now attributes a whole plan to him. Well, this eagle is your countryman, - Sorokin concluded his speech. - Yes, the

Caucasus is the birthplace of eagles, - I answered not without pride. - But on In the Caucasus, it seems, donkeys are also found, my friend noticed.

The bell rang. We moved into the hall. Stalin had a pile of papers in front of him. He divided the questions into three groups: "fundamental", "technical" and "non-substantive questions" (to the last category

the Bolsheviks always classified questions that for some reason they considered unprofitable or inconvenient to answer). Stalin said that he would answer the questions of the first two groups, and dismissed the questions of the third group as irrelevant. But the meeting was most interested in these "non-essential" questions. All questions Stalin was forced to announce. I

now very vaguely remember the content of these questions. All I remember well is that the dispute revolved around the main problem of the report: what are collective farms and how does Stalin imagine their creation? In one of the notes, Stalin was asked something like this:

"If the peasants refuse to voluntarily accept your collectivization plan, do you stand on the point of view of forced collectivization?" Stalin answered this with Lenin's

formula: - "The dictatorship of the proletariat is unlimited power, based on violence.

- So, down with the NEP and back to "war communism"? - shouted someone in the hall.

Stalin did not answer the

remark. Another note, now anonymous, asked:

"Lenin said that we introduced the NEP in earnest and for a long time and demanded 'extreme slowness and extreme caution' in regard to co-operative peasantry, and you demand that the pace of collectivization be accelerated. Which of you is right: Lenin or you?"

To this, Stalin replied sharply and ended his answer with a rude lunge: -

Leninism is not the Bible, but dialectics. A constant value in our politics is our own strategy - the struggle for communism. We have changed tactics and will change even radically when it is dictated by the interests of the strategy. If the author of the note does not understand this axiom, then I recommend that he leave the IKP in order to start his professorial career with the basics of Leninism in a Soviet Party school.

The author of the note was

Sorokin. I remember two of the "not to the point" questions: the author of one of them asked Stalin to tell the contents of the suicide letter of the Trotskyist Joffe, who committed suicide, and the other anonymous asked to explain to him "why

are the organs of the OGPU, contrary to Lenin's instructions, allowed to create their own network of agents in the ranks of the party as well?" Both of these questions, of

course, remained unanswered. , with the good-natured smile of a learned patriarch, warmly and easily shook hands with Stalin. Then he turned to the assembly: - My friends, let us thank Joseph Vissarionovich for an interesting report, and our dear guests, members of the Central Committee, for the visit. Sitting in

the presidium Molotov, Uglanov, the party "Thucydides" Emelyan Yaroslavsky, always concentrated and somewhat dry, the editor of the government "Izvestia"

Skvortsov-Stepanov began to applaud, which was picked up by the first row of Stalin's supporters - Pospelov, Adoratsky, Savelyev, Stetsky, Krinitsky - and supported by all of us in the hall. They applauded in the hall out of courtesy, in the forefront - out of conviction, in the presidium - out of collegiality. Orlov was incomparable: when the whole hall had already fallen silent, he still continued to applaud, blushing with effort ...

Stalin's retinue rushed to the owner. Some admired the depth of the report, while others were indignant at the "non-essential" questions. Stalin smiled courteously, but did not enter into debate.

Molotov stood a little apart with Pokrovsky and tried to prove something to him; Here I learned for the first time that Molotov stuttered slightly. In response to some request from Mikhail Nikolaevich, Molotov turned to Stalin with a question. I did not hear the question, but I saw how Stalin turned towards Pokrovsky and nodded his head approvingly. The rector turned to the hall: - Members of

the bureau of the party cell of the IKP, please come to me!

Sorokin was called by Stalin himself. He knew him from the Civil War and from his work in the Secretariat of the Central Committee. They greeted each other, and Stalin paternally patted on the shoulder of the one whom he had destroyed a few minutes ago, without knowing it himself, with his murderous answer. When the aces of the Institute began to gather around the members of the Central Committee, Sorokin said goodbye to Stalin and departed.

The performance began. Choking from senile asthma and zealous in characterizing the "parade fighters", Pokrovsky began certification:

Economist Orlov! Party cell secretary of the IKP.

Tall, thin, with the habits of an artist and the face of a drunkard, our local leader quickly jumped up to Stalin and, without waiting, was the first to extend his hand to him. Stalin, shaking it, was about to give his hand to the next one, but Orlov still did not let go of his hand. Philosopher Yudin!

Secretary of the party cell of the philosophical department. This was Stalin's first acquaintance with his future theoretician. - Philosopher Konstantinov! Member of the Bureau of the IKP cell. -

Writer and historian Shcherbakov! Member of the bureau of the cell ... The literary activity of this man consisted in the abundant writing of secret reports on institute affairs in the Central Committee, for which he later rose to the rank of member of the Politburo. He never spoke at meetings.

- Historian Pankratov! Graduate of the IKP and assistant in the department of

Russian history. Stalin wanted to talk to her, but she, the "bourgeois liberal," as we called her, thin and frail, completely melted away. Subsequently, this "bourgeois liberal" through a series of victories and defeats, revelations and self-flagellation (I have not yet seen anyone who would castigate himself so talentedly as she did) reached the Stalinist Areopagus: she is a member of the Central Committee of the CPSU. -

Philosopher Mitin!

Nondescript, thin, with a consumptive face, Mitin bent to the waist in front of Stalin, like a court servant before a formidable lord. Now he is also a member of the Central

Committee. Stan, Karev, Mekhlis greeted themselves like old acquaintances.

The parade is over. While we were busy at the coat rack, Stalin came out with his retinue, and the caravan of

limousines set off along the Garden Ring. I remembered Grandfather. With what

importance, how stoically he stood at his post! Well, grandfather? Did you see the king? Sorokin asked him. - Kalinich was not there, I know him personally, - the But Stalin is also a tsar, Sorokin insisted.

Maybe he is the king, but not Kalinich, - Grandfather answered dryly.

II. "Theoretical Headquarters" of the Central

Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks The Institute of Red Professors in its educational research program was the first Soviet graduate school for the training of future red professors - teachers of universities and socio-economic higher educational institutions. It was created on the initiative of the first Marxist historian, a member of the USSR Academy of Sciences under Stalin - Mikhail Nikolaevich Pokrovsky.

Pokrovsky defined himself as a Marxist historian long before the revolution. Privatdozent of Moscow University, he spoke from the very beginning as a representative of the Marxist worldview in Russian historical science. His main work - "Russian history since ancient times" (four volumes) - was published before the revolution. In this work, Pokrovsky radically diverged from all existing historical schools in assessing the historical process. According to his methodology, he was a representative of historical materialism, which he understood in a peculiar way (opponents on the left consider his materialism to be "economic materialism"). In the analysis of historical events, Pokrovsky adopted a class point of view. After the revolution, Pokrovsky, having taken the post of Deputy People's Commissar of

Education (Pokrovsky had been a member of the Bolshevik Party since 1905), also became the head of scientific institutions, leading the State Academic Council under the People's Commissariat for Education. Of course, he was simultaneously recognized as the official head of Soviet historical science. But the supporters of this science from among Soviet specialists in Soviet Russia, apart from Pokrovsky himself, were only single historians from among the party members. Representatives of the old Russian historical schools did not recognize either the authority of Pokrovsky or his historical concept. In fact, this is why historical science had to be temporarily abolished in Russia (the closure of historical faculties at universities, the removal of the teaching of historical science from secondary schools and its replacement with another discipline, the so-called "social science," etc.).

This set before the Soviet authorities a priority task: to train their own scientific personnel not only in the field of history, but also for other social sciences. This purpose was to be served

organized - on the initiative of the same Pokrovsky - new institutions: the Communist Academy, the Institute of Red Professors, RANION and communist universities.

Briefly, but very clearly, Pokrovsky outlined his new historical concept in a one-volume work, Russian History in the Most Concise Essay, which went through ten editions from 1921 to 1931. Lenin immediately appreciated the "revolution" made by Pokrovsky in "Russian historical science" and congratulated him in a special letter on this success. Lenin wrote:

"Comrade Pokrovsky. I congratulate you very much on your success: I liked your new book, Russian History in the Most Concise Essay, extremely much. Original structure and presentation. Reads with great interest. It will be necessary, in my opinion, to be translated into European languages "Let me make one small remark. In order for it to be a textbook (and it should become one), it must be supplemented with a chronological index... The student must know both your book and the index... Your Lenin"2.

Subsequently, Stalin declared this book "anti-Leninist" and withdrew it from

circulation. The decree on the opening of the Institute of Red Professors was signed by Lenin on

February 11, 1921. Here is a brief reference from the Great Soviet Encyclopedia: "The Institute of the Red Professors (IKP). The ICP was first organized in 1921 in Moscow, on the basis of a decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR dated 11 / II 1921, signed by V. I. Lenin. ensure the training of "red professors for teaching theoretical economics, historical materialism, the development of social forms, modern history and Soviet construction" in the higher schools of the republic... and philosophical, from 1924 -

legal and from 1926 - historical and party departments. Sets 1921 - 1929 were given in the ICP annually from 75 to 140 people, most people with higher education ...

2Russian history in the most concise outline. Partizdat, 1933, p.XII.

Educational work in the ICP proceeds in the form of lectures, seminars. The course is three years. At the end of the IKP, students take state exams" (TSB, 1st ed., vol. 34, pp. 600-601).

Among the many reasons that gave birth to our and similar institutions, there was also the simple reason that the old scientific cadres boycotted the Soviet government. Many of the old professors refused to serve the Soviet government and went into "internal emigration." Others openly declared war on Soviet power, fighting in the ranks of the Volunteer Movement, and when the war ended with the victory of the Bolsheviks, they went into exile. The Bolsheviks themselves expelled the third from Russia in order to get rid of future "conspirators".

But the Soviet authorities did not have any confidence in those who remained in Russia either: "No matter how much you feed the wolf, he always looks into the forest!" More than once I heard such a characterization of the old professors from the lips of Soviet religious teachers. And even the most conscientious of the surviving old professors, from the point of view of the Soviet authorities, did not go further than the formula popular in this environment: we are apolitical, and therefore loyal. Mere loyalty, quite sufficient during the civil war, was recognized as completely insufficient after the Bolshevik victory. Besides, the "professor's loyalty" could only teach the youth loyalty. The Soviet government could not allow this in any way. "Communist education of the youth" - such was the slogan put forward by Lenin at the

Third Congress of the Komsomol in 1920. From this, the Bolsheviks came to the conclusion that it was necessary to create their own, red professors, who, while learning Marxist theory from the leaders of the CPSU (b), would simultaneously learn actual knowledge from "loyal" professors. Then, having sufficiently prepared themselves, they will replace their "bourgeois professors." Then the cause of "communist education" will b

By the beginning of 1928, the IKP had the following departments: history, philosophy and natural science, economics, history of literature and criticism, world politics and world economy, general department. Subsequently, these departments (faculties) were reorganized into independent institutes of red professors in specialties. Among the professorial staff were the most prominent party and

non-party scientists of the country, leaders of the CPSU (b) and the Comintern. I will point

out some names: Non-Party scientists: Rozhkov, Platonov, Sergeev, Gratsiansky, Bakhrushin, Tarle, Grekov, Struve, Krachkovsky, Marr, Meshchaninov, Rubin, Groman, Bazarov, L. Axelrod, Deborin, Preobrazhensky, Mishulin, Kosminsky, Timiryazev (son of) and etc.

Party professors: Bukharin, Pokrovsky, Lunacharsky, Yaroslavsky, Radek, Krumin, Kviring, E. Preobrazhensky, Vyshinsky, Krylenko, Pashukanis, Berman, Varga, Mif, Bela Kun (Eastern Europe), Erkoli-Tolyatti (South-Western Europe), V. Kolarov (Balkans), V. Pik (Central Europe), Kuusinen (Finland), Strakhov (China; Russian pseudonym of a Chinese communist), several more Chinese and Japanese. Periodically, reports within the walls of the ICP were made, in addition to the named persons - Stalin, Kaganovich, Kalinin, Manuilsky, Bubnov, Eideman and others.

The IKP made rather high academic requirements for applicants. The admission itself took place in the order of selecting the best candidates at competitive examinations from among persons admitted by a special resolution of the Credentials Commission of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. As a rule, it was required that the candidate had an education in the scope of the university or the corresponding faculty of another higher school. A precondition for admission to the oral examinations was the submission of a written admissions paper, in which the candidate had to demonstrate his ability and vocation for research work. After reviewing the written work and conducting oral examinations, the examination committee of the IKP issued its opinion on which of the candidates and to what extent satisfies the academic requirements of the Institute. This

conclusion went to the same Credentials Commission of the DC. The Credentials Commission reported the entire mandate material to the Organizing Bureau of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, which made the final decision on the admission of a candidate to the ICP. ". In the future, any changes in the life of this "leading activist" - transfer, business trip, assignment to work, removal, arrest - could only take place with the knowledge and by order of the Central Committee "Theoretical Headquarters" of the Central Committee - ICP - gave

really a lot of shots for both Stalin and his opponents. How and under what circumstances some Ikapists turned into "comrades-in-arms and disciples of Stalin", while others into "enemies of the people" and "monsters of fascism", I will tell further. I will only mention a few of those and others.

They passed through the ICP, became enemies of Stalin and died on death row of the NKVD or in the isolation wards of concentration camps - Slepkov, Astrov (editors of the Bolshevik magazine and Bukharin's collaborators on the Pravda newspaper), Aikhenwald, Maretsky, Kraval (Bukharin's secretary), Stetsky (head of Department of Agitation and Propaganda of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, member of the Central Committee), Stan (member of the Central Control Commission), Karev, Bessonov, A. Kon, V. Kin (Commander Academy), K. Butaev, K. Tabolov, Samursky, Mikhailov (secretaries of regional committees), Magyar, Lominadze, Shatsky (Comintern). This list can be extended to hundreds of names. A. Shcherbakov (died as a member of the Politburo in 1945), Mekhlis (member of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and former Minister of State Control), Abalin (chief editor of the Kommunist magazine), Fedoseev (former editor-in-chief of the Bolshevik magazine), Alexandrov (member of the Central Committee and former propaganda chief), Suslov (secretary of the Central Committee), Pospelov (former editor-in-chief of Pravda, director of the Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute, secretary of the Central Committee), Ilyichev (former editor-in-chief of Izvestia and Pravda, candidate of the Central Committee), Mi ting (member of the Central Committee), Yudin (member of the Central Committee and editor-in-chief of the Cominform organ, ambassador to China), Konstantinov (head of the Propaganda and Agitation Department of the Central Committee), Surkov (one of leaders of the Writers' Union). This list could also be continued. Already these names indicate that the ICP was really a kind of "theoretical headquarters", where with equal zeal both sides (Stalinists and anti-Stalinists) developed, so to speak, an "ideological strategy" for future

III. STAFF OF THE

RIGHTS I was introduced to the environment of the rightists by my friend and senior student of the IKP Sorokin. We often gathered at the apartment of the well-known

Queen in those circles. Zinaida Nikolaevna Koroleva did not belong to those famous "cooks" whom Lenin urged to "learn to govern the state." She was a noblewoman by origin,

upbringing as a genuine "grand lady", but in her political views she became the most extreme revolutionary from the institute's bench. In 1916, she left the

medical institute for the front as a nurse. The February revolution found her in one of the hospitals near Kiev. Soldiers' revolutionary committees soon began to form, and she was drawn into the work of one of the local committees. Being only a technical secretary, she performed very important functions - she edited and herself composed appeals, orders and demands of the local committee to the soldiers, people and government.

The soldiers fell in love with her for her simplicity of character, although they treated her with some distrust. "She is a potbelly stove herself, but she hides the bourgeois on what the world stands, something is wrong here, brothers!" When one day such a soldier's conversation reached Zinaida Nikolaevna, she asked the chairman of the soldier's committee to convene an emergency meeting in order to provide useful information. "There is a revolution in Russia. All of Russia is a rally," Artyom Vesely wrote about this time. So it was on the front lines. The soldiers lived in rallies, chewing on them the two slogans of the day: "war to the

bitter end" on the right and "peace to the huts - war to the palaces" on the left. Both slogans seemed too extreme, and the average front-line soldier felt with an inner instinct that some kind of average and reasonable solution to the question of war and peace was missing. With the greater willingness, the mass of soldiers listened to new decisions and proposals. This, perhaps, explained why the rally called for Zinaida Nikolaevna turned out to be so crowded that she at first hesitated about abandoning her idea of speaking to such a large audience. But her friends on the soldiers' committee encouraged her, and the chairman of the committee also made an introductory speech, ending it with words that caused a cheerful animation: "So, Revolution Nikolaevna, the former Queen, has a word!" Ground

contact has been found. Zinaida Nikolaevna spoke. I don't remember a single word of what I said then.

It was my first revolutionary debut and you can't imagine how terribly worried I was! When I suggested calling a rally, I was going to tell the soldier

Russian "revolutionary bourgeois women" - about Vera Figner, Sofya Perovskaya, Vera Zasulich, Ekaterina Kuskova, the "grandmother of the Russian revolution" Breshko-Breshkovskaya, in order to dispel all these prejudices about "women" and "bourgeois women". And what I said, I don't

remember, kill me, I don't remember! I only remember that from that memorable day my friends began to call

me simply: "Revolution Nikolaevna!" This is how Zinaida

Nikolaevna herself told about this episode. At the time I am talking about, she worked in the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs and enjoyed great influence among its leaders. The relationship between her and Sorokin, whom she had known since the Civil War, was completely friendly. He talked to her about politics as easily as he did about the "sexual question." I will note here that even in the subsequent years of the reaction, when every old Bolshevik or hero of the civil war was hunted by half a dozen Stalinist secret agents, relations between the old comrades-in-arms remained close, which later hurt them a lot. I often visited her with Sorokin and treated her with the

reverence with which a young enthusiast can treat the heroes of the revolution. I got to know the Queen closely at her evening, at which there were

few invitees - one military man with rhombuses, whom those present simply called "General", his lady with a pale face and impudent eyes, a member of the MK Reznikov bureau, whom many prophesied to become a member of the Politburo, People's Commissar N. (he was, in fact, the deputy people's commissar, but for the sake of decency they called him "People's Commissar") with his wife and Sorokin and I. The table was laid purely in Russian: hearty and plentiful, but without pretense of sophistication. The first toast was proposed by

"The General": - I was taught as a

boy: never ask two questions - to a military man about the secrets of his department and to an elderly lady about her age. But since then, these two questions have occupied me. I invariably asked the military man what he was doing and whether he would soon take the place of his boss, and I asked the lady the same question - is she satisfied with "our brother", and if not, how old is she. I confess that I am not successful only with Zinaida Nikolaevna. Us men she counts

women, but still a girl. And I agree with her - it's better to be a beautiful girl than a woman with a mustache. For everything that our Zinaida Nikolaevna is dear to us, for courage, youth and daring, let's drink these glasses.

Everyone clinked glasses together and drank in one gulp, except for me and the lady with impudent eyes. The lady, apparently, looked askance at the "General", and I at a too full glass of vodka. The evening quickly took its turn. Toasts alternated with toasts, and the vodka drowned out cross speeches. If it were not for the hostess herself, who had a sobering effect on the drunk and intoxicating on the sober, the balance would have been disturbed long ago. She sensed

the emerging threat just in time and, solemnly handing each a bottle of narzan, invited us into the living room to listen to music and sat down at the piano herself. - What do you play, friends? she turned to us, sorting through notes.

- Dead March! Sorokin answered calmly. His words were drowned in merry laughter, and the "General" was still saying - "brilliant, brilliant!"

- Willingly, Vanya, just tell me who are we
Are we going to mourn, the hostess asked, half annoyed, half sympathetic.

- The miserable death of the great revolution! - answered half-sober Sorokin.

It was the first call to complete sobering up. People immediately became thoughtful. The cold shower of Sorokin's words seemed to have washed away the hops of the forty-degree "rykovki". Even the military man became despondent, shaking his head.

- This is a bitter truth! - I read on his face. Zinaida Nikolaevna succumbed to the general mood and, starting with Mozart's Requiem, moved on to Beethoven's Prometheus Overture. But the

ladies protested. The wife of "People's Commissar", one of those whom the immortal Gogol called "a lady pleasant in all respects," said: "What is it, are we going to celebrate the birthday of Zinaida Nikolaevna or arrange a cemetery concert?" At these words, she went up to the hostess and imperiously

she added: "Come on, dear, don't torture the piano and the guests, but rather

listen!" She took a seat at the piano. To her own accompaniment, she performed several romances by Borodin and Tchaikovsky. She played, indeed, virtuoso, and each time she was awarded with a noisy applause from the guests. We are back to life again. The wife of "People's Commissar" also performed several revolutionary songs. In conclusion, the "Letter to Mother" was performed by the general choir of all those present. Yesenin's "Letter to Mother" was forbidden for performance, but it was performed more often than other Soviet works. These were the years of mass youth enthusiasm for Yesenin; this passion was passed on to the "fathers". Yesenin's four-volume book (already banned) was listed on the black exchange at a hundred times its face value. The violently mournful pessimism of Yesenin's lyrics was a social balm that soothed the grave pains of the birth of the Stalinist empire. Yesenin's recklessly dashing, even drunken-tavern, and therefore bold manner of speaking the lyrical truth about the regime in which he already felt himself a "foreigner" ("I'm like a foreigner in my country," the poet said) acted captivately. I remember how I myself chewed "Capital" during the day at the Institute ("Under any weather, of course, I did not read this book," Yesenin wrote about him), and in the evening I reread Yesenin. Of course, unrecognized Don Juans were also fond of Yesenin,

and many of them committed suicide according to Yesenin's prescription - a cut in a vein for a farewell verse and a rope around his neck - but Yesenin became a banner among political rebels among young people. As often happened in such cases, the poet's illegal pamphlets on the regime went through the hands of these young people, which, perhaps, Yesenin never wrote, but which were quite in Yesenin's spirit. Dead Yesenin threatened to become the ideological leader of the peasant Vendée. The Stalinist authorities dealt more vigorously with his memory.

Not only in poetry, but also in drama, theater and music, the intelligentsia tried to "revenge" the Bolsheviks. "Running" or "Days of the Turbins" by Bulgakov showed anti-Soviet heroes on the Soviet stage in a positive way. Conductor of the Bolshoi Theater Golovanov, with the unanimous support of the entire staff of the theater, not without success

fought for the preservation of this majestic temple of Russian opera art against "Proletkult" and party ignoramuses. If it weren't for the influence of Golovanov, Nemirovich-Danchenko, the authority of Stanislavsky, Kachalov, Moskvina, if it weren't for Gorky's support, if it weren't for the well-known weakness for the art of the then People's Commissar of Education Lunacharsky, the Bolshoi Theater, in connection with the "Golovanovism", would have been closed. The members of the Central Committee were little interested in art, although some of them were quite fond of actresses. Many knew about the adventures in Leningrad of Kirov, who, for convenience, arbitrarily appointed himself the honorary chief of the opera house there (the Soviet government later immortalized this inclination of Kirov by naming the Leningrad Opera and Ballet Theater after him). Voroshilov successfully competed with him in Moscow, bumping into this field first Lunacharsky, then Budyonny (his wife was an illiterate peasant woman from the Kuban, but, having become a marshal, he abandoned her, gave his children to an orphanage, and he himself went "to scene"). Let's go back to our evening. When we moved from the musical part to the business part, I realized that I was present everywhere, but not at the usual birthday celebrations. The vodka disappeared without bringing anyone to the heat, strong tea was served, and the hostess, after a few introductory

remarks, gave the floor to Reznikov, a member of the MK bureau. I must say a few words about him. I saw Reznikov only for the second time, but I knew him, according to Sorokin, as an outstanding party worker with an "independent opinion." During the October coup, he was an authorized representative of the Military Revolutionary Committee under the Petrograd Soviet in the Navy, received direct instructions from Trotsky on the military line and from Lenin on the party line. "Lenin is the brain, Trotsky is the soul, and Reznikov is the body of our revolution" - such was the formula of the "General" when he spoke about the driving forces of the Bolshevik revolution (ideologically, the "General" became a "right-leftist Trotskyist"). During the civil war, Reznikov fought with Kolchak, being twice wounded and both times seriously, was taken prisoner, but due to Lenin's personal intervention, he was literally saved from execution, exchanging for ten Kolchak officers captured by the Bolsheviks. There was only one spot in his party biography -

during the Kronstadt uprising in 1921, Reznikov opposed Trotsky's ultimatum to the rebels and his threat to destroy Kronstadt if they persisted: "Every shot at Kronstadt is a shot at the revolution," Reznikov argued. When the Central Committee decided on the preliminary sending of parliamentarians in order to persuade the Kronstadters to a peaceful settlement of the conflict, Lenin again remembered Reznikov. He was informed that Reznikov was in the Cheka as a "moral accomplice" of the rebels. - Well, you know, comrades, if people like Reznikov are listed as counter-

revolutionaries, then we are all counter-revolutionaries! Lenin said. So, the second time right from the execution, Reznikov was saved by Lenin. From that

day on, harboring a deaf rage at both Trotsky and the Cheka, Reznikov swore allegiance to Lenin. Therefore, it is understandable that during the struggle against Trotsky and his opposition, Reznikov was in the forefront of the anti-Trotskyists. The pro-Stalin Central Committee was not slow to respond

gratitude, and Reznikov was introduced to the Moscow party leadership. So, we were ready to listen

to Reznikov. "Zinaida Nikolaevna asked me," he began, "to share with my friends information about the inner-Party situation, in particular, about the position of our Moscow organization. I readily agreed, especially since the party press is deprived of the possibility of informing its own party. After such an introductory word, Reznikov took out a notebook from his briefcase and,

leafing through it, made almost an hour of information about behind-the-scenes events in the Moscow and Central Committees. What Reznikov told me was completely

new.

It turns out that already from the very beginning of 1928 (that is, immediately after the liquidation of the "lefts"), both in the Politburo and in the leadership of the Moscow Committee, there was a dull but very stubborn struggle over almost all the main issues of the internal and foreign policy of the party. The dispute began, in fact, because of Trotsky, who was already in exile in Alma-Ata³. Trotsky continued to disturb the Central Committee in exile with his articles and proclamations, which penetrated the interior of the country.

Reprinted in Moscow, on a rotator, Trotsky's materials were widely distributed not only among party members, but also among the non-party intelligentsia. I myself received one of these articles by Trotsky at the Communist Academy, where there was an illegal cell of Trotskyists. Let me note right away that this article by Trotsky remained with me for almost ten years. Only in 1937, filtering my archive from anti-Stalinist literature in case of a possible search and arrest, I came across it, read it carefully

On the way from Alma-Ata to Constantinople, Trotsky clearly saw from the Soviet newspapers that his expulsion was not so easy for Stalin: "The newspapers on the way bring us the echoes of a new big campaign against the Trotskyists. The Stalinist faction is in a hurry. It has enough reasons for this. It has to overcome not only political, but also physical difficulties" (L. Trotsky, "My Life", part II, p. 316. I quote Trotsky everywhere from the Russian edition of "Granite", Berlin, 1930) 4During April - October 1928, we sent 800 political letters from Alma-Ata, including a number

of major works. About 550 telegrams were sent. About 1000 political letters and about 700 telegrams were received, most of them collective" (ibid., p. 305). Once again, mentally bowed to Trotsky for his prophecy about the "Epigones" and "Thermidorians" and burned it. In

view of Trotsky's incessant "counter-revolution", Stalin put the question of the trial of Trotsky before

the Politburo. Everyone understood that this time Stalin was seeking the physical destruction of his opponent. Of the members of the Politburo, only Molotov and Voroshilov supported Stalin. Rykov, Bukharin and Kalinin opposed the trial of Trotsky. Finally, a compromise solution was reached: send Trotsky abroad. Stalin did not make this compromise for a long time, until he was assured by the head of the OGPU Menzhinsky that whether Trotsky would be in

Alma-Ata, in the Lubyanka or in Madagascar, it does not play a role for his department - "everywhere Trotsky will be with us," Menzhinsky reassured Stalin. As you know, he was not mistaken. The second dispute took place around the so-called "Shakhtinsky case." At the end of 1927, the OGPU plenipotentiary for

To the North Caucasus, Efim Georgievich Evdokimov presented to the chairman of the board of the OGPU Menzhinsky a very detailed undercover case, from which it was clear that in the city of Shakhty in the North. In the Caucasus there is an illegal counter-revolutionary wrecking organization, consisting of a group of old specialists. According to the data of this case, it turned out that this group, being connected with the old owners of mines abroad, aimed at putting the mines out of action by systematic wrecking. Lubyanka was very skeptical about the report. In view of the importance of the case and, moreover, knowing well the habit of his employees to build a career on mythical cases, Menzhinsky suggested that Evdokimov present him with material evidence. Then Evdokimov went himself to Menzhinsky, taking with him "evidence", among which he brought private letters intercepted by his institution addressed to some of the accused specialists from abroad. Menzhinsky did not find any "wrecking installations" in them, as Evdokimov claimed. The latter began to insist that these letters were encrypted. - Okay, so you deciphered them? asked Menzhinsky. - No, - answered

Evdokimov. - Why not? - The keys to the cipher are in the hands of the defendants. -

Means? - So,

we are asking for the sanction of the collegium for the

arrest of several of the leaders of the mines, - Evdokimov reported.

- I give you a two-week deadline: either

you decipher these letters without preliminary arrests, or I will judge you and your agents for sabotage! - at these words, Menzhinsky directly put Evdokimov out of his office, like a Chekist. Now it became clear to Evdokimov that if he did not prove the counter-revolution of the Shakhty people, his Chekist career would come to an end. And he decided to try the last chance: to turn to Stalin himself.

Evdokimov reported to him the essence of the matter and, of course, the conversation with Menzhinsky. But since Stalin did not then hold an official post in the government, Evdokimov asked Stalin to influence Menzhinsky through Rykov. Rykov was then chairman of the government.

- Nonsense, - Stalin answered, - go to your place and immediately take all the measures that seem necessary to you. In the future, inform only me, and with Menzhinsky we will somehow agree on our own (Stalin was also a member of the OGPU collegium from the Central Committee).

With such carte blanche in his pocket, Evdokimov rushed off to Rostov (regional center). On the second day, mass arrests were made in Shakhty among the most prominent specialists, then the arrests spread to the Donbass, but the case was conducted by the North Caucasian PG OGPU. In

Moscow, this caused a whole stir - the Supreme Economic Council, the OGPU and the Council of People's Commissars themselves demanded an immediate explanation from the North Caucasian OGPU. Evdokimov was silent. When Rykov, Menzhinsky and Kuibyshev (Kuibyshev was chairman of the Supreme Council of National Economy) suggested sending a special commission of the Central Committee and the Council of People's Commissars to the North Caucasus, Stalin vetoed it. The game fired up. The question was moved to a meeting of the Politburo. At this meeting, Menzhinsky and Kuibyshev joined Rykov, who accused Stalin of "arbitrariness", but Stalin reported to the meeting a telegram from Evdokimov, who not only assured the presence of a counter-revolution in the city of Shakhty, but also hinted that its threads were going to Moscow. Kuibyshev quickly retreated, Menzhinsky fell silent, and Rykov only looked inquiringly at Bukharin, then at Tomsy. No decision was made, but Stalin's victory was undeniable.

Now Stalin was also responsible for the "Shakhty case" itself, at least morally. He knew this and therefore from the very beginning took him under his direct supervision. Stalin and Evdokimov were now bound by mutual responsibility. Evdokimov personally entrusted the leadership of the investigation to his assistant Kursky. Kursky was given the task of obtaining a "sincere confession" of the accused at any cost and giving the case a nationwide character. Here we are present for the first time at the birth of the notorious "methods" of the GPU. Before proceeding to the investigation on the merits, Kursky's headquarters (Kursky's assistant at this headquarters was another "talent" in the Chekist world - Fedotov) developed the general mechanics of conducting an investigation. It also provided for the use of "methods" in the forms now known to all, which basically boil down to torture - this is, first of all,

physical torture: various forms of torment and beatings that bring a person half to death and even death, prolonged sleep deprivation (average rate: from three to ten days); chemical torture: introduction into food or directly into the body by injecting will weakening substances or tablets, powders, drops; mechanical torture: continuous reading aloud by alternating investigators of the future testimony of the person under investigation, and then their continuous repetition by himself until they are thus mechanically recorded on the plate of his subconscious. Political tortures join this: threats or repressions of relatives, friends of the interrogated person, spitting on his political ideals (if they were even purely Soviet or Stalinist), psychological torture: creating and strengthening in the victim a sense of his own insignificance, the aimlessness of life and its doom, bringing it to the thirst for self-flagellation, when in this self-flagellation, repentance or in stories about imaginary crimes, already mechanically fixed in the consciousness or subconsciousness, there is a need for self-discharge, confession and even "self-purification".

This procedure, from a mechanical process in the first stage of the investigation, turns in its last stage already into a process of "creative", the person under investigation adds details and touches to his old, forced and mechanical testimony, this time completely independently of the investigation and, of course, of his own will. With the same willingness, he answers the questions posed, rarely getting into trouble. He himself already believes in his own or the KGB legend, and when he sees that the investigator, the court, the parties, the listeners believe him, for the first time in his entire time in prison

feels like some valuable cog in a common mechanism, moreover, a "hero of the day." Physically driven to extreme exhaustion, he soars in the sky, and mental alcohol-anesthesia has already brought him to self-forgetfulness. His body is still here among people, but spiritually he no longer lives among them. He is free from himself, and therefore he is ready for anything - for verbal self-flagellation and for physical death. Such

were the "methods of Kursky", which subsequently formed the basis of the investigative technique of the "Yezhovshchina". Kursky's methods are quite

justified themselves. The defendants told things about monstrous crimes, which at that time were taken for granted by almost everyone. Only one person in Moscow, Stalin, knew the real value of the "frank testimony" of the defendants, and only one institution in the provinces - the headquarters of Evdokimov, Kursky, Fedotov in Rostov-on-Don. On the other hand,

Stalin's triumph was complete: neither the Soviet government, nor its chairman Rykov, nor the "rotten" theoretician Bukharin, nor even the supreme chief of the OGPU Menzhinsky himself unraveled the counter-revolutions of the Shakhty people, and Stalin, with the "brilliant instinct" of a professional revolutionary, uncovered the "conspiracy of bourgeois specialists." With Menzhinsky, Stalin "somehow agreed", but the members of the Politburo, like schoolchildren, made it clear: you sabotaged, and I saved you, you will continue to persist, I can do without you! The Central Committee, in a closed letter to the party organization, paid tribute to Stalin's "vigilance" by diplomatically circumventing the "government's" sabotage in disclosing the "Shakhty case." When Stalin prepared a new case, the "case of the Industrial Party" prof. Ramzin, the "saboteurs" could only agree.

However, Stalin's victory had the least "moral significance" for him, although it discredited his future opponents from the "Right Opposition". Even less important was the liquidation of hitherto unknown people, Shakhtins or Ramzins, little known in wide circles. The victory lay in the fact that Stalin had found the magic key to the public destruction of even imaginary enemies of the regime - Evdokimov's laboratory with Kursky's methods. And Stalin generously thanked: Evdokimov received two Orders of the Red Banner in a row (for the Shakhtinites and for the Ramzins) in addition to his already available three, was appointed first secretary of the North Caucasian regional committee of the CPSU (b) (a rare case in the then party practice), - was introduced into the composition of the plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, being completely unknown in the party, and all the security officers of the Kursk headquarters were awarded the Order of the Red Banner and the badges of "honorary security officers". Running a little ahead, I will say that when Stalin began to prepare Yezhovism throughout the country, he remembered Kursky: still a provincial middle-ranking Chekist, Kursky was appointed in 1936 Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR! After some time, a brief obituary appeared in the newspapers - "suddenly, the fa

Kursky". The oral version from official circles said that he committed suicide on a nervous basis. Of course, there was something to lose his head - now it was necessary to formalize and destroy not some miserable dozen Shakhty residents, but about five million "enemies of the people", from of which more than a million used to belong to the Communist Party. These

and similar "organizational disagreements" between members of the Politburo, as Reznikov said, gradually grew into political disagreements. Rykov, Bukharin, Tomsy saw in Stalin's tactics a desire to lead the country and the state through the apparatus of the OGPU and the party, bypassing the Soviet government and the trade unions. On this basis, two groups

were formed in the Politburo - the Bukharin group and the Stalin group. Initially, Kuibyshev, Kalinin, Rudzutak and Ordzhonikidze joined the Bukharin group, in addition to Rykov and Tomsy. The Stalin group included Molotov, Voroshilov, Kirov, Kaganovich and Andreev. Reznikov called the position of Kosior, Chubar and Mikoyan "buffer": they either reconciled both parties or abstained in the decisive votes. Stalin refused for the time being from open attacks against the Bukharin group, and concentrated all his forces on its internal disintegration, very cleverly setting some of its members against others. I well remember Reznikov's story about this internal Politburo policy - "divide and

rule" - regarding two cases. In the first case, this policy was applied to Tomsy-Kuibyshev. The fact is that, in addition to "organizational

disagreements" in the Politburo, there were also constant frictions between different departments, sometimes on the most insignificant issues. When it came to important people (people's commissars, members of the Central Committee), it was customary even under Lenin to refer such disputes to the highest arbitration for the decision of the Politburo. When the Politburo made a decision, the disputing parties had to comply. After Lenin's death, Stalin only expanded this practice in order to play the convenient and advantageous role of permanent arbiter as general secretary of the party, although Stalin was not the chairman of the Politburo (Lenin was the permanent chairman of the Politburo, after his death

the Politburo was chaired by all members in turn, after the liquidation of the right, the permanent chairmanship passed to Stalin, and in the Orgburo - to Molotov). One of these constant disagreements took place between the Supreme Council of National Economy (Chairman Kuibyshev) and the All-Russian Central Council of Trade Unions (Chairman Tomsky), as between the employer (All-Union Economic Council of National Economy) and workers (All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions). The trade unions still harbored the illusion that they were called upon to defend the interests of the workers, even before the Soviet authorities. But the state-Stalinist interests demanded precisely what Trotsky was condemned for, the complete subordination of the trade unions to the interests of the state, that is, their "nationalization" of them. Things by their proper names, however, were not called. In the next five-year plan, which was developed by Kuibyshev, trade unions, of course, were assigned only the role of technical bodies of state administration, while maintaining external independence from the state. All current measures - "economic regime", "invention", "collective agreement" - were considered and carried out from the same state point of view. In this regard, Tomsky accused Kuibyshev of "Soviet Zubatovism" at the direct prompting of Stalin. Kuibyshev, Stalin suggested a formula for Tomsky as well - a "rotten trade unionist"! The undoubted oversight of Stalin and his assistants in the publication of Stalin's "Works" makes it possible to confirm what was said with documents. We are talking about Stalin's letter to Kuibyshev dated August 31, 1928, now published for the first time. In this letter, Stalin writes about Politburo member Tomsky to another Politburo member Kuibyshev as follows:

"I heard that Tomsky is going to offend you. He is an evil person and not always clean. It seems to me that he is wrong. I read your report on rationalization.

With Stalin's letter in his pocket, Kuibyshev boldly 5 I.
Stalin. Works, vol. 11, p. 220. blunts
against Tomsky. Stalin was silent, but Kuibyshev found himself
outside Bukharin's

group. The second case concerns Rykov and Bukharin. The famous conversation between Bukharin and the disgraced Kamenev in the summer of 1928 was interpreted by Stalin as a conspiracy against the Soviet governn

(Rykov) and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (Stalin). The relevant intelligence data allegedly confirmed this. The case was deliberately given the character of Bukharin's rebellion against Rykov, for which Stalin and his group attacked Bukharin. "Rykov is not just a member of the Politburo, but he is also the head of the Soviet government. Therefore, we cannot allow even Rykov's friends to conspire against him," Stalin reasoned. Rykov did not fall for this bait. It remained to look for other options. The press organs, which

were not under the direct leadership of Bukharin and Rykov, were given the task of beginning "on their own initiative" criticism of Bukharin's theoretical works. Attempts were made to stage this attack along the line of the Bolshevik magazine, but Bukharin's students, Astrova and Slepko, were sitting there. They informed Bukharin that Stalin's personal secretary Poskrebyshev was pressuring them to publish critical articles on Bukharin's works "Economy in Transition" and "The Theory of Historical Materialism" (the corresponding articles were already in the editorial portfolio). Indignant, Bukharin made copies of the articles and rushed straight to Stalin. The latter quite coolly replied that he had no idea about these articles, nor about Poskrebyshev's order. Immediately called by Stalin, Poskrebyshev also calmly declared that he was hearing this story with articles for the first time. - If any of our employees called the editors from

my name, I don't see a crime in this," Poskrebyshev said.

- Do not forget that I am not your employee, but a member of the Politburo of the Central Committee!

Bukharin flared up. Poskrebyshev said nothing, and Stalin asked Bukharin to leave the articles with him for review (Stalin, of course, not only read them in the original, but they were also written on his personal instructions).

Some time later, Astrova and Slepko received a "severe reprimand" from the Organizing Bureau of the Central Committee with a warning for their attempts to discredit the authority of the Central Committee. It is true that the articles against Bukharin have not yet been published, but the Bukharinites have received a serious blow.

More successful was the experience with Komsomolskaya Pravda. Here Stalin acted simply - he summoned the secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Leninist Young Communist League Chaplin to himself and directly ordered: "Instruct your editor to print this article (the editor, it seems, was Kostrov), without referring to me or the Central Committee. If there is a scandal, he will answer personally editor,

but he must not give your name either." Chaplin understood exactly the meaning of the task. A day later, Komsomolskaya Pravda published a thundering article about the theoretical sins of "right-wing opportunism", which were put in a veiled form in connection with the concept of Politburo member Bukharin. For the party it was a complete sensation - just as it was for Bukharin himself. Bukharin again turned to Stalin. The latter made surprised eyes and immediately demanded that he be given copies of Komsomolskaya Pravda (contrary to his usual, on that day there was not a pile of newspapers on Stalin's table). "Yes, indeed! It's

outrageous! Well, what do you advise, Nikolai Ivanovich, to do now? - Stalin asked in an almost friendly tone. Bukharin demanded that the issue be discussed at

the Politburo. "I also think so," Stalin answered. At the next meeting of the Politburo, the

executive editor newspaper Komsomolskaya Pravda received a severe reprimand for publishing a Trotskyist article "without the permission of the Central Committee." But the Central Committee considered it "tactically disadvantageous"

to issue a refutation. Stalin had to endure a more severe and for himself completely unexpected struggle in the Moscow organization. Undercover intelligence of the GPU and intelligence of the Central Committee itself unanimously testified that it was in the Moscow organization that Bukharin, Rykov and Tomsy wielded the strongest influence. The efforts of Stalin's agents to recruit the secretaries of the districts of Moscow or even members of the bureau of the Moscow Committee against the Bukharin group were not crowned with the slightest success. In hindsight, at the end of 1938, when the Bukharinites had already been

liquidated and physically Stalin wrote in his "Short Course"⁶: "At the same time as their political speeches, Bukharin Rykov's group carried on organizational "work" to gather their supporters. Through Bukharin,

they knocked together the bourgeois youth like

Slepko ⁶ "History of the CPSU (b). A Short Course, 1945, p. 281. va, Maretsky, Aikhenwald, Goldenberg and others (note that the main editorial board of the theoretical and political organ of the Central Committee of the A

the trade union (A.), through Tomsy bureaucracy "Bolshevik" .-A. elite (Melnichansky, Dogadov, etc.), through Rykov - the decayed Soviet elite (A. Smirnov, Eismont, V. Schmidt, etc.) ... By this time, the Bukharin-Rykov group received the

support of the top of the Moscow party organization (Uglov, Kotov, Ukhov, Ryutin, Yagoda, Polonsky and others). At the same time, part of the rightists remained disguised, not speaking openly against the party line. "Without being aware of the matter (or, perhaps, on the contrary, because of awareness), the

leadership of the districts of Moscow and the Moscow Committee began a campaign against the "left", who are trying to discredit Lenin's Central Committee under the guise of criticizing "Bukharin's mistakes". The aforementioned decision of the Central Committee served as the installation of the "general line"! This seems to be the only case when Stalin made a major mistake, but he quickly understood it and threw out the famous slogan: "for criticism and self-criticism, regardless of faces" and surreptitiously prepared early elections for the Moscow district committees.

Running a little ahead, I note that already at the October plenum of the Moscow Committee in 1928, Stalin decided to deal an open blow to the "rights" in the Moscow Committee itself, which also meant a blow to the "rights" in the Central Committee. But it turned out to be not such an easy task. A number of members of the plenum openly accused Stalin that "under the guise of a struggle against some mythical right deviation" Stalin and his friends are engaged in artificial breeding of "intrigues and squabbles" (Zapolsky), the Central Committee grossly interferes in the affairs of local party organizations, violating the party charter (Berezin). Ryutin directly accused Stalin that "the right deviation is his personal invention in order to crack down on the members of the Politburo who are objectionable to him."

Then the members of the plenum put the question before

Stalin: -Tell me, are there rightists in the

Politburo? "There are neither right nor left in the Politburo," Stalin

replied. When the members of the plenum, dissatisfied with Stalin's answer, began to demand the announcement of the Politburo protocol, which discussed Frumkin's July letter against

line of the Central Committee, Stalin announced the resolution of the Politburo of the Central Committee on "unity in the Politburo", signed by "all members of the Politburo"⁷. To the question: "Which of the members of the Politburo was present then?" - Stalin answered in Solomon's way: "Everyone who was there!"

Reznikov said that just from this meeting of the Politburo, Bukharin, Rykov, Tomsky and the secretary of the Moscow regional committee Uglanov defiantly left in connection with the discussion of Frumkin's letter. The history and essence of this letter is as follows. The author of the letter, Moses Frumkin, belonged to Lenin's Bolshevik Guard,

actively participated in illegal work in Tsarist Russia, was arrested and exiled many times, and took a prominent part in the Bolshevik coup of 1917. After the victory of the Bolsheviks, he held a number of responsible positions, and by the period described, he was the Deputy People's Commissar of Finance of the USSR. His position made it possible to closely study the state of affairs in agriculture and industry. Based on a thorough analysis of the state of agriculture, supported by official data from his department, Frumkin addressed in July 1928 with a special letter, first to the Politburo, and then to all members of the Central Committee. The main theses of

Frumkin's letter were: 1. The country's agriculture is undergoing a process of degradation. 2. Village, with the exception of a small part of the poor against us. 3. "Policy of measures" extraordinary policy of forcible seizure of grain from the peasantry), the Central Committee, which may end with the death of Soviet power.

(That There is

leadership

Therefore, Frumkin demanded a radical turn of the Central Committee towards a liberal agrarian policy. In the absence of this liberal policy, in the return to the methods of "war communism", in the open robbery of the middle peasantry under the guise of fighting the "kulaks", in the artificial setting of some peasants against others under the guise of "unfolding the class struggle" and, finally, in Stalin's invention of the time of his business trip to Siberia for the grain procurement campaign of the latest police method ⁷¹. Stalin. "Issues of Leninism". Moscow, Ogiz, pp. 203-213. ⁸¹. Stalin. "Issues of Leninism". Ed. XI, p. 271.

coercion of the peasants to give grain for nothing to the state - the so-called "Siberian-Ural method" - that is the reason for our grain crisis, wrote Frumkin. - We demand an expansion of the sown area - the peasants expand it, and then we write them into fists! We demand the expansion of trade, people open small stalls, and we write them down as speculators! We demand an upswing in industry and people open shoe shops, and we write them down as Nepmen! We demand Soviet democracy, people point out to us that we are anti-democratic, and we put them in the GPU, - Frumkin argued. Since Frumkin distributed his letter to the members of the plenum of the Central Committee, Stalin

wanted to prevent the reaction of the plenum by a special decision of the Politburo. The draft decision provided for a "strong condemnation of the right-wing opportunist anti-party speech" by Frumkin with the corresponding organizational conclusions, that is, the removal of Frumkin from the post of Deputy People's Commissar of Finance of the USSR. Bukharin's group refused to sanction such a decision. When Bukharin,

Rykov and Tomsy saw that Stalin had secured a majority in the Politburo for his decision, they simply left the meeting. Stalin defined this departure as "conciliation" to the right deviation, but Frumkin was convicted for this deviation, although he was not temporarily removed from work. Thus, following his letter, the members of the Central Committee received "a unanimously adopted resolution of the Politburo concerning Comrade Frumkin's letter." The fact that three members of the Politburo opposed this decision and their defiant departure from the meeting was hidden not only from the party, but also from the members of the Central Committee. And being bound by party and collegiate discipline within the Politburo, these three could not bring their views to the attention of the party and members of the Central Committee. Taking advantage of this, Stalin very cleverly played the card of "unity in the Politburo," and the people who were guided in domestic politics by Rykov, Bukharin, and Tomsy were deeply disappointed by their "unanimity" with Stalin.

IV. STALIN'S SIBERIAN PLAN The

practical plan for the collective-farm system was born, as a matter of fact, not in the Politburo and not even in Moscow, but in Siberia. True, already the 15th Party Congress decided to keep

course towards the development of collectives⁹, but this decision was still on paper until Stalin himself got down to business. When in the fall of 1927, contrary to Bukharin, Rykov, Tomsy and Uglanov and, it seems, Kalinin, the Politburo decided to apply emergency measures ("extraordinary measures") to grain procurements, the leaders of the Central Committee and the government were sent as "extraordinary representatives" to the main grain regions of the country - to Ukraine, Central Black Sea Region, North Caucasus and Siberia. Usually such representatives had the right to single-handedly resolve any issue on the ground on behalf of the Central Committee and the Council of People's Commissars. At their disposal was a whole staff of employees, from Chekists, specialists, propagandists, and up to and including typists, which was completed in Moscow by each of the "extraordinary representatives."

At the beginning of 1928, Stalin was sent to Siberia as such a representative, and Siberians Malenkov and Sorokin were among his staff "specialists". Stalin's powers also extended to the Urals, but Stalin was not going to go to the Urals, confining himself to calling the local leaders to his future Siberian headquarters - to Novosibirsk.

The Siberian and Ural activists were warned by a government telegram about the forthcoming arrival of Stalin with emergency powers. While Stalin was racing in the armored car of the Siberian Express, a commotion reigned in Siberia, bordering on the panic of Gogol's heroes from The Inspector General. Sorokin was

already in Novosibirsk in the "patrol brigade" of the Central Committee, when the secretary of the Siberian Regional Committee Syrtsov established order: regular classes began in schools, disinfectants in hospitals took off their ties ("Stalin, they say, organically does not tolerate ties"), and the free orchestra of the local garrison rehearsed revolutionary hymns (at that time there were no hymns about Stalin yet). Finally, Stalin arrived

with his retinue and, bypassing the "Potemkin" villages, went straight to real villages in search of only one sight.

9 The corresponding passage in the resolution of the 15th Party Congress read: "At the present time, the task of uniting and transforming small individual peasant farms into large collectives must

be set as the main task of the party in the countryside" ("VKP(I in the resolutions and decisions of congresses, conferences and plenums of the Central Committee", PIII, p. 251. V. Molotov. "On work in the countryside, XV Congress of the CPSU(b)").

Siberia: bread. Sorokin said that at first Stalin asked Syrtsov to give him a local map showing the most grain-producing regions and a summary of the fulfillment of the plan for grain deliveries. He was given both. Stalin traveled only to those areas that were mapped

as small-bread. He stopped by random villages, talked familiarly with the peasants, under the guise of inspecting the economy, went into barns, stables, and the threshing floor. He asked what the peasants were complaining about, whether the local authorities treated them well, and each time the conversation ended with the same question: but, I see, your bread is wasting for nothing, why don't you want to sell it to the state? To such a question, Stalin in one village received an answer: but, I also see that your manufactory is wasted in Moscow, why don't you want to sell it to the peasants? Stalin "did not hear the question." On the other hand, he not only "heard" another question, but also firmly remembered it. He spoke about this a year later, at the April plenum of the Central Committee in 1929, but diplomatically transferred this case from Siberia to Kazakhstan, and instead of himself he put in some kind of impersonal "our agitator." However, even in Stalin's corrected presentation, the case was very characteristic¹⁰: "When our agitator, for example, in Kazakhstan, spent two hours persuading the holders of grain to hand over grain to supply the country, the fist came forward with a pipe in his mouth and answered him: "And you dance, boy, then I'll give you two

pounds of bread." The entire plenum knew that this "guy" was Stalin himself. Then Stalin toured the regions where the grain procurement plans had been fulfilled. which makes it possible to draw certain conclusions. The conclusions regarding Siberia were that

the "poor regions" are in fact the most grain-producing. The peasants of these regions do not give bread because they ask for it, instead of taking it away!

As regards those regions in which the plan has been fulfilled, the situation is even worse: the plan has been fulfilled because it was "underestimated." These districts can and must give as much more bread as they have handed over. Like this

10 I. Stalin. "Questions of Leninism", p. 260. to

do? To hold poor-middle peasant meetings on self-taxation. Kulaks must not be allowed into these meetings. At these meetings, decisions must be made on the "voluntary surrender" of all grain surpluses by the peasants to the state. At the same time, the kulaks are to be given "solid assignments," the failure to fulfill which always entails the application of Article 107 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR. After all this,

Stalin decided to inform the bureau of the Siberian regional committee and the Ural regional committee of the CPSU (b) about further tasks and plans. In one of the speeches, which was then hidden from the country, he declared: "I have

been sent to you in Siberia for a short period of time. I have been instructed to help you fulfill the grain procurement plan. plans for the expansion of the construction of collective farms and state farms in your region... You say that the grain procurement plan is strenuous, that it cannot be carried out. Why is it impossible, where did you get this from? because of the lack of places for storage ... I saw several dozen representatives of your prosecutorial and judicial authorities. Almost all of them live with the kulaks, are parasites of the kulaks and, of course, try to live in peace with the kulaks! To my question they answered that the kulaks the apartment is cleaner and better fed. It is clear that one cannot expect anything worthwhile and useful for the Soviet state from such representatives of the prosecutorial and judicial authorities. It is only incomprehensible why these gentlemen have not yet been purged and replaced by others. I propose: a) to demand from the kulaks the immediate surrender of all surplus grain at state prices; 107 of the Head Code of the RSFSR and confiscate their grain and surpluses in favor of the state so that 25 percent of the confiscated grain is distributed among the poor and low-powered middle peasants"11.

In order to make things go more successfully, Stalin proposed removing from responsible posts and expelling from the party those communists who "humble" with kulaks and NEP mans. To this category, he attributed all the communists living with the kulaks, married to their daughters,

having 11 I. Stalin. Works, vol. 11, pp.

1-4. other family ties with "alien elements" or those originating from a "socially alien environment." The alarmists

turned out to be right: before Stalin had even left, a campaign began in Siberia and the Urals against "reborns" and "strangers", who were fired in batches from work and expelled from the party. No discounts were made to anyone: former honored partisans, "Red Guards", "revolutionary sailors", communists of the "Lenin call" (young communists admitted to the party in connection with the death of Lenin) were excluded. The reasons for the expulsion are the same everywhere - "merging ('melting') with alien elements," "blunting revolutionary vigilance," and sabotage of grain procurements. No former "revolutionary merits" were taken into account. Then, in fact, the well-known formula was born: "thank you for the past, answer for the present!"

In place of the expelled, people were appointed who had no past or had a "very dark past", even from the point of view of the Bolsheviks themselves, but who were ready to do whatever the party, that is, Stalin, demanded of them. And so far he demanded only one thing - bread! Bread at any cost and by any means!

These organizational arrangements were only one side of the matter. By themselves they could not be successful unless the peasantry itself was thoroughly "shaken". In "building up" this peasantry, Stalin embarked on the path of stratification of the peasantry along group or class lines. The village was divided into six groups: 1) farm laborers, 2) poor peasants, 3) weak middle peasants, 4) middle peasants, 5) wealthy and 6) kulaks. When the

grain procurement plan was distributed, the first two groups were exempted from the delivery of grain, the third group made a "symbolic contribution", the fourth category handed over the "legal norm" (about one fourth of the available grain), the fifth and sixth categories - all the bread. Not

less original were the methods of confiscating grain proposed by Stalin: "self-taxation" and "firm task". First of all, the so-

called "meetings of the poor" were convened. At these meetings, lists were approved of which of the peasants of a given village should be assigned to which category. After the approval of the lists,

"komsody" (assistance commissions) were elected. Their task included:

1) to approve on behalf of the peasants the grain procurement plan proposed from above

2) collect this grain from the peasants (bypassing peasant households, searches, confiscation of grain). In order to encourage the poor to fight the bulk of the peasantry, now called the "kulaks" (the kulaks included, in essence, the "prosperous"), Stalin proposed giving the poor "a number of benefits, by virtue of which the poor received at their disposal 25% of the confiscated kulak bread"¹². Thus, part of the peasants, mostly poor and negligent, just the part that the Bolsheviks themselves later called "loafers", became, as it were, contractors of the state on interest: with the help of the police and the GPU, they took away bread from wealthy peasants, receiving 25 % of the taken bread in their favor. If wealthy peasants resisted, they were tried by a criminal court. Subsequently, Stalin wrote with good reason¹³: "Extraordinary measures had their effect: the poor and middle peasants joined the decisive struggle against

the kulaks, the kulaks were isolated, the resistance of the kulaks and speculators was broken." The main goal of Stalin's mission, however, was not this. Ever since disagreements arose in the Politburo on questions of policy in the countryside, in

particular on questions of further prospects for the development of agriculture, the Soviet government faced one, far from theoretical task: evolution or revolution, peace with the peasantry or repression against the peasantry. In short: "who wins?" - this is how Stalin formulated this task in a Leninist way. Stalin held to the point of view that the time had already come when the Soviet power was so strengthened that it could repeat the experience of the October Revolution against the capitalists and landlords, this time against the prosperous and middle peasantry in the countryside. Stalin substantiated this idea as follows¹⁴:

"... for the strengthening of the Soviet system and the victory of socialist construction in our country, the socialization of industry alone is absolutely not enough. For this, it is necessary to move from the socialization of industry to the socialization of all agriculture." In what form should this socialization of the peasantry be carried out? In the same speech in Siberia, Stalin replied¹⁵:

12 "History of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks.

A Short Course", p. 279. 13 Ibid. 14I. S t a l and n.

Works, vol. 11, p. 6. 15Ibid. "... it is necessary to cover all regions of our country, without exception, with collective farms (and state farms) capable of replacing, as a deliverer of grain to the state, not only kulaks, but also individual peasants."

But at the 15th Party Congress, which took place exactly one month before this speech by Stalin (December 1927), there was still no talk of "collective farms", and even more so there was no directive: "to cover all regions of our country, without exception, with collective farms" . It said only¹⁶: "to take a number of new measures to limit the development of capitalism in the countryside and to lead the peasant economy in the direction of socialism." It was this question of "complete collectivization" and "liquidation of the kulaks as a class on its basis" that Stalin put before the Siberians. When discussing it at a meeting of the Siberian regional committee, Stalin was supported by: Syrtsov (secretary of the Siberian regional committee), Shvernik (secretary of the Ural regional committee), Kabakov (chairman of the Ural regional executive committee) and Sulimov (Urals). Leaving Siberia, Stalin carried in his pocket the resolution of the Siberian and Ural Committees of the Party, demanding an accelerated course of collectivization according to Stalin's method. Soon this decision was joined by the Central Black Earth Region (Secretary Vareikis), the Nizhny Novgorod Territory Committee (Secretary Zhdanov), the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) U (Secretary Kaganovich) and after a while the North Caucasian Territory Committee (Secretary Andreev). However, following Stalin, countless letters and telegrams from peasants and the workers of Siberia and the Urals themselves poured into Moscow, complaining about the "coup d'état" that Stalin carried out there in the form of an experiment. When the "Ural-Siberian method", as Stalin called his experiment, began to be imitated, on Stalin's direct order from

named after the Central Committee, and in other areas, there were serious symptoms of a possible peasant revolt on a large scale. This forced the Bukharin group to again raise the issue before the Central Committee in order to call Stalin to order. As a result, the Politburo adopted a decision, signed by Stalin himself, which explicitly stated¹⁷:

"Talking about the fact that we are allegedly canceling the NEP, introducing surplus appropriation, dispossession, etc., are

16 "VKP(b) in resolutions ...", 1933, part II, p. 17260. I. Stalin. Works, vol. 11, p. 15
17 I. Stalin. Works, v.11, p.15.

counter-revolutionary chatter against which a
decisive struggle is necessary. NEP is the basis of our economic policy, and remains
so for a long historical period.

By signing this decree, Stalin was deceiving his own party: a year later he announced the abolition of the NEP, which was designed for a "long historical period"! Recalling Stalin's trip to Siberia and his role in carrying out the "Siberian experience,"

Sorokin subsequently gave me some details about the people from Stalin's headquarters and about the Siberian and Ural leaders - details that shed light on the future career of these people. First of all, I first heard the name Malenkov. The latter worked then, continuing his studies at the Moscow Higher Technical School (Moscow Higher Technical School), in the apparatus of the Central Committee, in Stalin's personal secretariat. Even during his studies, Malenkov came to the fore as an "activist" in the fight against the Trotskyist opposition, and already in 1924 he became the head of the party organization of the school. When this MVTU organization almost unanimously supported Trotsky's platform,¹⁸ Malenkov was one of several communists who fanatically advocated the "Leninist leadership" of Stalin-Bukharin. The party meeting of the school qualified his position as "opportunistic" and "sycophantic" and decided to remove Malenkov from the post of secretary of the party organization. Malenkov complained to the district committee of the party (it seems to be Krasnopresnensky), but there he was told that the Republic of Kazakhstan could neither cancel the decisions of the meeting, nor reinstate him as secretary, since this would be a violation of the party charter. Malenkov appealed to the Moscow Committee, but again to no avail. Then he wrote a complaint to the Central Committee,

in which he accused the RK and MK of not helping him in exposing the "Trotskyist conspiracy" at the Moscow Higher Technical School. After some time, Malenkov was summoned to the head of the organizational and instructor department of the Central Committee, L. Kaganovich. So there was a "historic meeting". Malenkov told Kaganovich about things that the Central Committee guessed about, but could not establish. The cells of the higher educational institutions and the cells of the MVTU party are "holding on to the Trotskyists, mainly because," Malenkov reported, "that the "Trotskyist students" enjoy "special

privileges" from the district

committees and Moscow 18 L. Trotsky. "My Life", part II party committee; the latter do not allow "malicious Trotskyists" to be expelled from the party, demanding their "education", and Khodorovsky (Glavprofobr of the People's Commissariat of Education) puts directors from "inveterate Trotskyists" at the head of universities. , all sorts of helpless "proletarians from the machine tool", while the Trotskyists send speakers from the Communist Academy and the Institute of Red Professors and even workers of the Comintern. To Kaganovich's question: "How do we, in your opinion, clear the university organizations of Trotskyists?", Malenkov answered with a concrete plan : "It is necessary to walk with an iron broom not only in the classrooms of universities, but also in the offices of university chiefs. Here's a plan for you to carry out this whole event, "- with these words, Malenkov took out detailed "Proposals for the purge of university party organizations" from his student portfolio. It was a memorandum addressed to the Central Committee. Kaganovich did not read the memorandum, but promised to look through, and he asked Malenkov himself to come to him again in a week (sufficient time for making inquiries about Malenkov in the special sector of the Central Committee and the OGPU). There can hardly be any doubt that the young Malenkov (he was then only 23 years old) made the most positive impression on Kaganovich Receiving Malenkov for the second time, Kaganovich surprised him with the news: Comrade S

Stalin accepted Malenkov easily ("Already at my first meeting with Stalin, I felt in him my own father," said Malenkov to Sorokin), asked him about academic success, about food, about the hostel, whether his parents were alive and everything like that. Not a single business or political issue. The end of the conversation came for

Malenkov with a complete surprise: "Lazar Moiseevich and I agreed to take you to work in the apparatus of the Central Committee. Do you mind, Comrade Malenkov?" Stalin asked. "I live for the party," answered Malenkov.

This was at the beginning of 1925. Malenkov's "suggestions" formed the basis of directives for the purge of university and institutional cells in 1925, and Malenkov himself became one of the leaders of this purge. In 1925 alone, 92,000 students and Soviet officials were expelled from the party¹⁹; Malenkov has since become the "apparatchik" of the Central Committee

and the Moscow Committee of the All-Union

Communist Party of Bolsheviks. 19 "History of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. Short Course", pp. 257, 263. At Stalin's headquarters, Malenkov served as his personal adjutant. He carefully kept a diary of Stalin's impressions from various trips, wrote down his questions and answers, instructions and orders, attended all closed meetings of Stalin with the leaders of the region, drew up a parallel protocol of these meetings for Stalin, and at some departmental meetings where Stalin did not have the opportunity attend, Malenkov represented him as an observer. But nowhere and never did he speak in the debate, although he very often asked questions on the matters under discussion, unless Stalin

Many of his personal qualities make him related to his teacher. Absence of talkativeness, inner concentration, alienation to academicism and theorizing, brightly conspicuous rough realism, bordering on outright cynicism, practical utilitarianism in solving the most abstract problems, an amazing ability to adapt and maneuver if personal interests or business interests require it. If we add to them two other qualities that he inherited from his teacher - a deep-seated cunning and a capacity for the most extreme treachery, up to betrayal even to Stalin, then we get a general idea of Malenkov's psychological profile. It has already been said that theory is not his forte. And this is no coincidence. One of the senior officials of the Central Committee, after a long time, told me that once, in a friendly conversation, Malenkov said to him: "You theoreticians all boast of your knowledge of Marxism, but I read Stalin in full, not all of Lenin, and only

The "Communist Manifesto" of Marx and Engels, and I know Marxism as well as you, waste theorists!" It may

very well be that Malenkov did not admit so openly his ignorance of Marxism, but that this actually corresponds to reality, I have no doubt of this even now "There is nothing surprising in this. I knew many members of the Central Committee - practitioners of their field, even party leaders, who justified their ignorance in the field of Marxist theory by the difficulty of understanding Marx's "Capital" or Engels' "Dialectics of Nature. Even more. Who carefully studied so called "theoretical works" of Stalin, he is downright struck by Stalin's school mistakes (and this unconsciously!) in the field of philosophy and political economy.

But then all this was passed off as "the further development of Marxism." Weakness in theory, or, in any case, the absence of a pretentious inclination to theorizing in the absence of a natural gift for this, is, perhaps, a plus for people like Malenkov. It was precisely the Russian revolution that devoured all its theoreticians, and its Bolshevik stage (Plekhanov, Bogdanov, Trotsky, Bukharin, Preobrazhensky, and others) sinned most of all in this. Before the victory of the revolution, they gave the tone, program and ideology of the movement, but after the victory, when it was necessary to move from theory to practice, they proved incapable of anything but theorizing in the future. Therefore, the steering wheel of the new state ship ended up in the hands of sober captains who do not recognize either sinlessness, or old dogmas, or the authorities of their prophets. In this sense, Stalin was the greatest utilizer and enemy of dead dogmas. "There is dogmatic Marxism and creative Marxism. I stand on the point of view of the latter," he said several months before the Bolsheviks came to power. These are the "creative Marxists" Stalin picked around him when he occupied the captain's cabin on the Bolshevik ship. Malenkov turned out to be such a "Marxist" without even reading Marx. Another important quality of Malenkov is the ability to penetrate into someone else's soul. Everyone who knew him closely told that Malenkov needed to talk for a while with a stranger - and he could make an unmistakable diagnosis - "how he breathes" and what this person is capable of. In this sense, Malenkov was even less mistaken in assessing people than Stalin himself.

There is a well-known case when Malenkov perfectly testified to his superiority over Stalin in recognizing people - this is the story of the nomination of Syrtsov to the post of chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR instead of Rykov in 1930. Stalin got to know Syrtsov more closely only on his trip to Siberia. Since at that time a struggle with the Bukharin group was already planned and Stalin was mentally developing a project, by whom and how it would be necessary to replace his future victims, he decided to study the Siberian leaders as candidates for a possible nomination. On the eve of his departure from Novosibirsk, Stalin agreed, of course, under the greatest secrecy, that Syrtsov might be recalled to responsible work in Moscow. Stalin did not hide from Syrtsov what a designation is.

he connects the value with his loyalty to the Central Committee (in other words, to Stalin). Syrtsov did not yet know exactly what the matter was, and gave his consent. However, Malenkov politely, albeit rather insistently, warned Stalin that Syrtsov would "let you down"! Stalin did not attach much importance to Malenkov's remark, and Syrtsov was appointed chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR and even included in the list of candidates for membership in the Politburo. Some six months passed and Syrtsov "let me down"! He was withdrawn from the Central Committee, and Malenkov's star rose.

V. THE FIRST ARRESTS IN THE

ICP "Better late than never," the students joked when the first arrests took place in the ICP. Among those arrested there was not a single professor, they were all students of the historical department and the department of philosophy and natural science, mostly senior courses, little known to me. At a party meeting convened on this occasion, the secretary of the Orlov cell and a representative of the Central Committee (he was, if I am not mistaken, B. Tal) explained the reasons for the arrests: The ICP to the Leninist Central Committee. The valiant Chekists uncovered the plot and secured the ICP from the conspirators in time. Let us help the OGPU uproot the roots of "Trotskyism" to the end. "Counter-revolutionary Trotskyism has been crushed both physically and ideologically, its right-wing rivals must be finished off," was his brief speech.

After such contradictory information from Orlov and the representative of the Central Committee, we, in fact, did not understand who these arrested people were - "left or right"? The representative of the Central Committee, of course, knows better, but Orlov, as secretary of the party organization of the ICP, was directly subordinate to the Central Committee and received directives from there. The meeting immediately took on a stormy character. Numerous questions rained down, either to Orlov, or to the

representative of the Central Committee: - Who, after all, are those arrested - counter-revolutionaries or just deviators, "left" or "right"? - In what connection

are the arrests with the "portrait of Stalin"? - Where and when is it heard that honored Bolsheviks were driven into the cellars of the Bolshevik GPU even without a preliminary discussion of the question of their party membership?

- Do the Central Committee know that almost all

those arrested were active participants in the revolution and civil war?

- All those arrested are honored communists who fell victim to the conspiracy of the Orlov group. Where then is the guarantee that all of us sitting in this hall will not be arrested tomorrow on the denunciation of Orlov, if these arrests are sanctioned, or, on the contrary, where is the guarantee that we will not be arrested today on the denunciation of the same Orlov, if we do not approve? The last question was asked by Sorokin. He, in

essence, blew up Orlov. Furrowing his brows, fixing his large gray eyes directly on Sorokin, he said in the hoarse voice of a tavern drunkard:

- Comrade Sorokin, your crafty sophistication does not testify to your courage. If you are in solidarity with the arrested bandits, then state it with the directness characteristic of the Bolsheviks, and there is no place for demagoguery and provocation at a party meeting! Sorokin calmly got up from his seat, went to the podium and, without

asking the chairman for a word, turned to the assembly: - If a bandit, a provocateur and a coward has ever been in these walls, it is Orlov himself. Perhaps this is not known to the assembly, but provoked by Orlov to explain, I must be frank: in those difficult years of the revolution, when I worked underground for Denikin on the instructions of the Central Committee, Orlov was an adjutant to General Erdeli and sold me

the secrets of his boss, however, only for cash. Here are the documents. Sorokin threw a pile

of faded documents - receipts, reports, newspaper clippings - right in the face of the representative of the Central Committee. There was a stormy movement in the hall,

accompanied by loud cries for and against Orlov. The representative of the Central Committee called the meeting to order. Sorokin continued his speech about Orlov's career with the Whites.

"My short stay with the Whites in the Central Committee is known," Orlov retorted. "But,

unfortunately, it's still unknown in the Central Committee," Sorokin continued in a raised nervous voice, that you remained true to your old profession of informer, provocateur, careerist ... Not the party, not the Central Committee, and not even the GPU, but you, Orlov, imprisoned your enemies to the basement ... Unfortunately, you are not alone, a whole army of professional Malinovskys has gathered you ...

The audience listened with rapt attention to Sorokin's words. For most, this speech was a revelation. Without allowing Sorokin

to finish, the representative of the Central Committee asked for the floor for an emergency statement. Sorokin left the podium. The assembly was worried. - Not because the party

dealt with Trotsky, Zinoviev and Kamenev because they were less deserved than Comrade Sorokin, but because, using their past merits, they harmed today's general line of the party. No wonder our people say - thank you for the past, but answer for today! Soviet power is not a trading company called Trotsky & Co., but a state system of the dictatorship of the proletariat. The brain of this dictatorship is the Leninist Central Committee, those who are against the Central Committee are against the Party, those are against the proletariat, because our Party is the vanguard of the proletariat. Therefore, let Comrade Sorokin, whose merits we all recognize in the past, do not forget that now the Party measures people by a different standard!

"Long live the White Guard Bolsheviks!" a slogan rang out in the hall. "Wait,"

continued the representative of the Central Committee, "and I will tell you about it.

Yes, we know that in the ranks of our Party there are Mensheviks, Socialist-Revolutionaries and

even faces that happened to be on whites. Many of them have proven and continue to prove in practice that their entire past was erroneous and accidental. But past mistakes and delusions are forgiven when they now demonstrate boundless devotion to the Leninist Central Committee. Therefore, to speak of "White Guard" or "Menshevik" Bolsheviks is to oppose the Party. The party will not tolerate such speeches, just as it will not tolerate the desire of the right to turn it off the Leninist path, and here no merits in the past will be taken into account. With a bandit who cocks his weapon and aims straight at your heart, you must not enter into negotiations, you must prevent his shot. That is why the party, and not Orlov, seized the counter-revolutionaries from the ICP. Yes, as if there is a violation of the party charter that we do not allow you to discuss the issue

on the exclusion from the party of those arrested before their arrest. But here it should be noted that, firstly, the Rules of the Party are not the statute of some knightly order, but an instrument of the will of the Party, and secondly, why should the enemies in the Party have the advantage of warning about impending repressions over enemies outside the Party. It is not the knights of a false concept of honor who sit in the Central Committee, but the revolutionaries of the cause ... The Central Committee, as the highest executive body of the party, has the right to expel any member of the party itself. He excluded the arrested persons, in absentia, even before their arrest.

The representative of the Central Committee suggested that the meeting confirm "the only correct decision of the

Central Committee." The question was put to a vote without further debate in the following wording: "Who is for the Central Committee's decision to expel enemies of the party and the

people from the party...?" A weak majority voted for this wording, no one seemed to vote against it. About three dozen abstained. Some simply did not vote. Those who abstained were asked for reasons. - I personally abstained not because, - said Sorokin, - that

I am against the Central Committee, but because the Central Committee does not observe the order of the queue - first you need to put the Orlovs in the GPU, then the hidden Trotskyists, and then we will talk about imaginary or real "rights".

- Whom do you mean by "hidden Trotskyists"?

someone replica from the presidium.

- You know them better than me, - Sorokin answered and sat down. This caused the obvious anger of the presidium. The allusion to "hidden Trotskyists" hurt loyal Stalinists painfully. In wide circles, the parties watched with undisguised alarm as Trotsky's most radical demands were internalized (peasantry, NEP, industrialization) by the program of action of the anti-Trotskyist Central Committee.

V respect Some even agreed to seriously discuss the issue of Trotsky's "voluntary resignation" from the Politburo and Stalin's acceptance of the Trotskyist plan to liquidate the NEP. Trotsky knew Stalin's ambition too well to play successfully on this weakness. Sacrificing personal ambition, Trotsky decided to win the idea. If he does not give in now, Stalin's thirst for power will overpower any idea, and then Stalin will perish, Trotsky will perish, and the entire revolution will perish. To Stalin his task is in the ultimate interests of the revolution. However, Trotsky not only had an extensive platform of "super-industrialization" and "permanent revolution", which are well known to Stalin and to his liking, but Trotsky worked out to the finest details and methods for putting it into practice. The platform is on the table in the Politburo, and the methods are in Trotsky's brain safe.

Trotsky will open this safe only on the second day after the failure of Stalin with the Trotskyist platform, when the party removes Stalin and solemnly invites Trotsky to the throne.

The practice of "extraordinary measures" in the grain procurement campaigns of 1927 and 1928 testifies precisely to the fact that Stalin has already quarreled with the

class.

Stalin is rapidly rushing towards disaster, while Trotsky is confidently sitting out his last days in Alma-Ata. In all this illusion there was one truth - Stalin accepted,

with some external decoration, Trotsky's platform, but in order to bury Trotsky ideologically with it. But how great is the power of illusion!

It turns out that even more serious people are captured by the latter. Here is what Trotsky himself later said about this:

The Times later printed a report to the effect that I had left for Constantinople by agreement with Stalin in order to prepare here a military takeover of the countries of the Middle East. The six-year struggle between me and the epigones was portrayed as a simple comedy with predetermined roles. "Who will believe this? Some optimist will ask - and he will be mistaken."

Strictly speaking, the whole difference between Stalin and Trotsky was not in programmatic issues, but in tactics. If Lenin had lived, this difference would have disappeared. When it was necessary to make a sharp, sometimes completely unexpected turn in politics, Lenin, being at the head of the party, and then the state, himself became in opposition to all his yesterday's policy - "either we will change our policy and tactics, or we will all perish, as party," he declared at the turning points of the Russian revolution and Soviet power. So it was in 1906-1907, so it was after the February Revolution (April 1917), so it was in 1921

(NEP). 20L. Trotsky. "My Life", Part II, p. 319.

This is the greatest tactical flexibility - "Lenin's dialectics" - Stalin learned firmly, Trotsky did not understand it until the end of his days. When Stalin had to go to war with the "Rights" and therefore, logically, draw his ideological food from the Trotskyist cauldron, he did not allow himself to be intimidated by the noise of the "Rights" about "Trotskyism".

Stalin was well aware that he would not succeed in ruling a country with a predominantly peasant-democratic population of 170 million unless he economically strangled this peasant democracy. Having crushed it economically, he could easily rule it politically. That is why Stalin just as boldly went for the liquidation of NEP as Lenin boldly introduced it five years ago. The NEP was a great element of freedom, which the peasants forced from Lenin, forced because Lenin was weak, but Lenin could rule the country even in the presence of the NEP, since he relied on the majority in the party. Stalin, taken from the very beginning by both Lenin ("a political testament") and the party (Trotskyists, rightists, "national deviationists"), is in doubt,

as a leader, he could not strengthen himself in power, allowing Lenin's "intra-party democracy" in the party, and peasant liberties in the country. Now, after the Trotskyists had been eliminated with the obvious sympathy of the peasantry and the support of the peasant mass of members in the party, it was necessary to ideologically kill the Rights in order to put an end to both the NEP and "inner-party democracy" at the same time. There was no other way to personal dictatorship. Here Stalin wrote a new chapter in the history of Lenin's political tactics. The task was difficult, the danger was great, there were many enemies, but Stalin did not risk his head in this case either - he knew his enemies too well not to be afraid their.

The enemies (rightists) will win, Stalin will repent and this will be the end of the matter, or, in the worst case, he will be removed from Moscow and put at the head of some kind of cooperative union in Georgia. If he wins, he will bury both the "rights" and the "lefts" in order to personally govern the country.

On this thorny and bloody path to power, Stalin turned out to be both a virtuoso tactician of the Leninist school and the greatest strategist of the party strategy, and Stalin's students showed themselves everywhere worthy of their teacher. This happened within the walls of the IKP. When Sorokin wanted to get away with the phrase that "you know the hidden Trotskyists better than I do," one of the members of the presidium, a tall

a man with red hair, gray as Orlov's eyes, in a sonorous bass voice declared: - Comrade

Sorokin, either you prove that I know the "hidden Trotskyists" in the party (the remark, it turns out, came from him), or you will answer for slander. Sorokin must remember, he continued, that whoever questions the line of the Leninist Central Committee has only one road - to the camp of counter-revolution. In this case, the party will talk to them in the language of the Chekists. This is what the Party has done with those now arrested, and this is what it will do with everyone who opposes it. Let Sorokin not comfort himself with the thought that he has like-minded people, vain hopes. Either with the party or against the party! There is no middle! The "Right" will face the fate of the "Left" if they do not understand this truth. The stake of the "rights" on the ICP, as on their headquarters on the ideological front, is beaten, and now we must unmask their proteges in our midst as well. I propose to raise for discussion the question of Comrade Sorokin's anti-Party behavior...

He ended his speech amid loud protests from the assembly and minority applause.

This was the secretary of the party cell of the department of philosophy and natural science, P.F. Yudin (now a member of the Central Committee). The chairman could not calm the meeting for a long time. Each demanded a word. Groups ran up to the table of the presidium, someone even rushed to the oratory, trying in vain to start a speech, but the assembly was furious. The majority stood up and several groups formed, not so much arguing as shouting. Some forced themselves if not to listen, then hear.

- It's a critique of criticism! - A state of siege in the IKP! - Yudin's demagoguery! - Remove Orlov from the presidium! - Sorokin is a conspirator! Finally, the chairman shouted into the raging hall: - I declare a break until

tomorrow ... The meeting postponed for tomorrow resumed only after three days. In the meantime, all members of the bureau of the general institute cell and secretaries of the cells of all departments were summoned

to the Central Committee. Among those called were from the audience, in addition to Orlov, Yudin, Shcherbakov, Sorokin, and former students, later professors Stan, Mitin, Vanag, Karev, Luppel, Troitsky and rector Pokrovsky. They were received by

Kaganovich in the presence of Krinitsky, Stetsky and B. Tal. Sorokin said that Kaganovich already had a verbatim record of the general meeting of the IKP cell on his desk. This report he, apparently, had previously studied. Many places, covered with red pencil, were marked with numerous signs in the margins. Kaganovich, who was usually always in a good mood, in connection with this incident, put on feigned displeasure, acrimony and the importance of a man who knows his own weight. He leafed through the report, now making a surprised face, as if he were reading it for the first time, then knitting his brows, he wrinkled his forehead when he wanted to comprehend the hidden meaning of what he was reading. This went on for about a quarter of an hour with deathly silence from those present. Everyone continued to stand, except for Pokrovsky. When he had finished reading, Kaganovich glanced at him from under his brows.

standing with a dry look and invited him to take places around a long table set perpendicular to his work table. The conversation went on for about an hour. Its content was reported to us by the deputy head of the Agitprop Stetsky. The Central Committee decided to recall Orlov ahead of schedule from the ICP to the disposal of the Central Committee (later he was appointed instructor of the Organizational Department of the Central Committee). The party cell of the IKP was "recommended" for a new composition of the bureau in the person of Yudin, Mitin, Shcherbakov, Petrov, Konstantinov, Sorokin, Pokrovsky, and others. Yudin was proposed as secretary of the cell of the Central Committee. Who won? This remained a mystery until new events played out. They didn't keep themselves waiting long.

IV. The "Theoretical Brigade" of the Central

Committee The removal of Orlov was interpreted as an undoubted victory for Sorokin, but at that time it was not clear that Yudin had been appointed secretary of the cell. The introduction of Sorokin to the bureau was completely incomprehensible. Everyone knew that these two people were not only hostile to each other, but also direct opposites in character. Yudin is a dogmatist, a "talmudist", an opportunist and a careerist. The primitiveness of his theoretical judgments and the mediocrity of his research abilities affected only the training seminars, and he had few competitors in the party life of the Institute. People like Yudin possessed one quality, with the correct application of which one could make a dizzying career: the gift of correct interpretation of those already adopted and the ability to foresee future decisions of the Central Committee. Anticipating party weather under Lenin was not a particularly difficult task, but keeping track of it, and even deriving unerring forecasts from the fluctuations of the Stalinist barometer, was an extremely difficult task. One had to feel both ideologically and physically an invisible part of Stalin himself in order to be in contact with the work of his brain. "I am not Lenin, but I am in Lenin too," wrote the poet Bezymensky in his "Party card." The Yudins could say the same about themselves, "we are not Stalins, but we are in Stalin"! That is why the Yudins set the tone at party meetings, and the opportunist party professors gave them the highest academic marks on the sole basis that they were the future "stars of the party."

The Sorokins went in theory, just as in the civil war, ahead of them, in a frontal attack, with little regard for the conditions of the terrain and

"meteorological reports" of party weather, and inevitably stumbled.

I remember two vivid examples of this. First:

at a seminar on the history of the revolutionary movement in Russia in the 19th and 20th centuries. discussed the prospectus "History of the CPSU (b)" Em. Yaroslavsky, Mints and Keane. In order to more clearly emphasize the significance of Lenin's "April Theses" and to demonstrate the "confusion and vacillation" in the party on questions about the attitude towards the Provisional Government of Lvov-Kerensky, the authors of the prospectus argued that before Lenin's arrival from abroad, Russian Bolsheviks were former Duma deputies, a Russian bureau The Central Committee, the Petrograd Committee of the Bolshevik Party, the newspaper Pravda - stood on a semi-opportunist conciliatory point of view. All these higher organs of the party adhered to the slogan - "we will support the Provisional Government insofar as", that is, insofar as the Provisional Government will carry out the will of the people, the Bolsheviks will support it to the extent that it was stated in the prospectus that "even Stalin did not have a clear point view on this issue." Only Lenin's "theses" put an end to the "and": "no support for the Provisional Government." Some of the students and professors like Yudin categorically protested against the assertion "even Stalin." present time, and at the present time Stalin is Lenin's successor in leadership of the party. "Even Stalin" casts a shadow over Stalin: this part of the "prospect" must be thrown out. Yaroslavsky-Mints counterargument: history is science, science must be objective. Besides , there is nothing surprising in the fact that the genius of Lenin saw further and better than the rank and file leaders of the party. The decision is to accept the prospectus as a whole. The Yudins fell silent, the Central Committee remained "neutral", but what the Yudins foresaw happened a few years later: in 1931, in a letter to the editors of the journal Proletarian Revolution, Stalin rejected The History of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, edited by Yem. Yaroslavsky for "fundamental and historical mistakes". The Yaroslavskys and Mintsy repented, while the Yudins triumphed.

Second example. In 1928, a former student of the IKP and a teacher of philosophy at the Academy of Communist Education. N. Krupskoy M. B. Mitin presented for discussion of the department

The newest philosophy of the ICP is a treatise under the then unusual title: "Lenin and Stalin, as continuers of the philosophical teachings of Marx and Engels." The head of the department A. Deborin, Professor Luppol and Professor Karev rejected the work and even ridiculed Mitin, who dared to call Lenin and Stalin "philosophers": Lenin's only work on philosophy "Materialism and Empirio-Criticism" is not a philosophical treatise, but popular critical notes, and Stalin in general wrote nothing on philosophical topics. The secretary of the cell of the philosophical department, student Yudin, turned out to be of a different opinion - he resolutely rebelled against his professors and brought the matter to the Central Committee.

A rather cryptic reply followed from the Central Committee: - Inform Yudin and Mitin that the topic is very interesting, but not relevant.

But three years later it became relevant - chapters from this work began to appear on the pages of Pravda, Under the Banner of Marxism and Bolshevik, signed by Mitin, Yudin and Raltsevich. But we are getting ahead of ourselves a little.

Be that as it may, Sorokin was introduced to the bureau of the all-institute cell and was supposed to work together with Yudin. I don't know if the Central Committee guessed that in his critical attitude towards the current official course of the party, Sorokin began to overstep the bounds and contacted many of the rightists in the Moscow Committee and the Central Committee on this basis. I have no doubt, however, that Yudin repeated his accusations against Sorokin in the Central Committee, and nevertheless Sorokin was recommended to the party leadership of the institute. Even more, it became known to us that in the Central Committee it was Yudin and Orlov who were lectured for their "excess", and not Sorokin. This was also reflected in Yudin's relationship with Sorokin - if it was impossible to notice any external changes in Sorokin, then Yudin became very helpful and correct. He ran after Sorokin, pleased him, consulted with him, and the listeners, observing this

incredible metamorphosis in Yudin, said: - Yudin fell victim to the second law of H. quantity "exploded" into quality and he fell in love with Sorokin!

Since Sorokin did not respond with a special "reciprocity", we, who knew both Sorokin and Yudin, foresaw new "explosions", but so far everything went fine. A month later, we were again faced with a riddle - the new bureau of the cell disappeared, as if in water

sunk. It turns out that some of the teachers are also missing. Various rumors and rumors went around the institute. Pokrovsky did not give any information, and the wives of those who were absent themselves asked us if we knew where their husbands were "seconded". Rumors grew: - They sent to Borodin, to China, to work in the headquarters of Zhu De ... - The Comintern seconded to the West ... - The OGPU arrested ... The alarmists were nervous: if things continue like this, then in the wild only Grandpa will remain!

Finally, Pokrovsky decided to reassure people: Bureau members and some of the teachers were on vacation. The height of the school year, and the whole bureau on vacation - of course, no one believed this. I was not particularly worried about Sorokin, knowing that in such a company he, at least, did not get into the GPU. I guessed that Sorokin's departure was sudden, otherwise he would have told me what was the matter, but why are there no letters from him?

I visited Zinaida Nikolaevna. When I told her about In the absence of Sorokin, she turned pale and asked in bewilderment:

- Do you think he's under arrest? I

answered her that although there were similar rumors at the Institute, I did not believe them, since not only Sorokin was absent, but the entire new staff of the bureau. Zinaida Nikolaevna noticeably calmed down, but nevertheless called Reznikov and gave him the news. Reznikov, apparently, was aware of the matter and gave the reason for Sorokin's absence. Zinaida Nikolaevna only repeated the same word in response: "Incomparably!". The conversation ended, and I saw that she had completely calmed down.

- Reznikov says that our friend is outside Moscow and is busy with important business. Come and tell...

I did not ask what was the matter, and left. A

month and a half later - this was at the end of October 1928 - almost all the members of the bureau returned. Sorokin also returned. I was struck by the drastic changes in him. He became thoughtful, lost weight, the natural blush of the Siberian disappeared from his face, his cheeks were sunken, and it seemed that he was even a little haggard. I was not slow to give him my

impression.

- Force before the jump, - he replied meaningfully and quickly moved on to the topic of institute affairs. Hearing

from me that some assumed that they arrested, Sorokin burst out laughing:

- Yudin and Mitin arrested?! No, better fire the GPU! Sorokin did not say a word about his affairs. I did not inquire, being convinced that he himself would tell. And so it happened. In the evening he invited me to his place, and from him we went together to Zinaida Nikolaevna.

She, apparently, was already expecting guests. We arrived first. Soon Reznikov and the "General" arrived one after the other. Zinaida Nikolaevna served tea, but the "General" demanded vodka, but there was none. I

volunteered to go get vodka. When I returned, the conversation was already in full swing. From the further story, I understood that Sorokin was absent

"on mobilization" of the Central Committee. It happened like this. Shortly after the appointment of a new bureau, the Central Committee called in a

group of senior students (almost the entire staff of the new bureau) and some teachers. With those summoned, with each personally, the head of

the press department of the Central Committee, I. Vareikis, had a

conversation. Under the strictest confidence, he told them the reason for their summons: the Central Committee decided (in fact, no such decision

was made by the Central Committee, but there was an instruction from

Molotov, undoubtedly coming from Stalin) to create a "theoretical brigade" to review and critically analyze all articles, speeches and books written by

N. I. Bukharin before and after the revolution. The Secretariat of the Central Committee also worked out a detailed topic for the forthcoming work. Each

of the members of the "team" was obliged to take on one of the proposed topics. The topics were varied. Some of the works named by Sorokin, I

remember, were later published as separate pamphlets: The Philosophical Foundations of Right Opportunism, The Kulaks and the Right Deviation,

The Right Restorers of Capitalism, The Class Struggle and the Theory of Equilibrium, Social Democracy and Right Opportunism ", " The Comintern and the Right D

N. Bukharin was a member of the Politburo, and nothing was known in the party about the struggle that took place within the Politburo between the

groups of Bukharin and Stalin. As I already mentioned, back in September 1928, Stalin categorically denied the existence of rightists and even

"conciliators" in the Politburo.

It turns out that there were rightists there, but not being prepared theoretically (exposures) and organizationally (repressions) for immediate reprisals against them, Stalin did not make this fact public and gradually prepared for the upcoming

fight. Since Bukharin was considered the official and chief theoretician of the party, the first blow had to be struck from this theoretical side. The ICP as a whole was strongly influenced by the "Bukharin school", but there were individual professors and senior students who could be useful to the Central Committee in the fight against Bukharin. These half-educated "red professors" did not differ in talent, much less in scientific training, but this shortcoming was easily made up for by their pretentious "omniscience", and most importantly, by

order of the Central Committee. - It is required to prove, - Vareykis told me, - Sorokin told, - one simple axiom: Bukharin is theoretically nothing, but politically

- rubbish! Apparently, he repeated the same thesis to other professors. A week later, all those summoned, including Sorokin, disappeared from the ICP to carry out this "special task

of the Central Committee. Under pain of being expelled from the party, the bureau members were warned not to disclose either the nature of their work or the location of the "brigade". The brigade was seconded to Leningrad and worked under the direct supervision of S. Kirov and B. Pozern. Of the members of the Politburo, apart from Stalin and Kirov, only Molotov and Kaganovich knew about the work of the brigade. A month and a half later, the work was basically completed and the results were reported to Stalin - up to ten large articles

on the above topics and a complete list of "Bukharin's writings" with a detailed subject index: when, where and what Bukharin wrote or said on this or that issue. In this regard, a special "index" was developed to the works of Marx, Engels and Lenin, so that it would be easy to compare Marxo-Lenin's statements with Bukharin's statements. All this material was not yet intended for publication, but for Stalin personally. The members of the brigade undertook to continue their work individually for the publication of individual pamphlets in the future, but again observing the necessary precautions.

Even before his departure, Sorokin informed Reznikov, and through him Bukharin, what kind of "bomb" Stalin was preparing for him at the next plenum of the Central Committee. Bukharin did not attach much importance to this fact, it seems that he even questioned it. He did not allow Stalin to be engaged in settling theoretical scores with him when the disagreements within the Central

Committee were along the lines of politics, not theory. Reasonable and very well-founded warnings by Reznikov, as well as Uglanov, a candidate member of the Politburo, that Bukharin will be beaten just for "theory" in order to debunk his glory as one of the leaders of the party, and therefore it is necessary to prepare for a counterattack precisely in the field of "theory" had no effect on Bukharin. After detailed information from Sorokin, Reznikov decided to arrange a date for Sorokin with Uglanov, who was not only a like-minded person, but also a personal friend of Bukharin. This meeting took place at the apartment of D. Maretsky, a member of the editorial board of the Bolshevik magazine and a student of Bukharin. Uglanov did not show up for the meeting, but Bukharin himself did. Sorokin reported to Bukharin in detail about the work of the "theoretical brigade" in Leningrad. Bukharin was interested, in fact, only in the role of Kaganovich and Kirov in this matter. Sorokin spoke about this

"Can you tell me in writing what you have told me?" asked Bukharin. Sorokin handed

over to Bukharin the already finished letter, warning him that he had signed this letter, on Reznikov's advice, with a pseudonym in order to avoid possible troubles. Bukharin expressed obvious dissatisfaction with Reznikov's advice, but did not demand a signature.

However, Reznikov turned out to be right: a few months later Sorokin's letter was in Kaganovich's files.

VII. A PARTY IN THE

PARTY The future historian of the Bolshevik Party, having conscientiously studied all the stages of its history, ideological strife, organizational "demarcations", splits and splits, unifications and disengagements, and finally, the dynamism of the Bolsheviks in October, the triumph in the civil war and the pathos of the New Economic Policy, will stop perplexed at the threshold its radical new stage - 1924. And the further, the more this bewilderment will grow. Having reached the jungle of the late twenties and early thirties, he will generally shrug his hands: the leading act

dramas begin to stutter, mute extras, on the contrary, acquire the gift of speech, and the backstage crowd of the theatrical lumpen-proletariat rudely and forcefully fills the stage ...

- The director of the Russian revolution has died - long live the director! - shouts the lumpen proletariat. He, greedy for power and unscrupulous in means, leads his idol to the director's booth of the revolution, which was empty after Lenin.

The leading actors leave the stage one by one, the extras take on the main roles, the lumpen-proletariat receives "bread and circuses", and the director, with an imperious hand and iron will, turns a new page in the bloody drama. Why does he succeed? This is the cardinal question that the

future historian must answer. In vain he will look for an answer in the genealogy of Bolshevism, in the psychology of the Bolsheviks, in the messianism of the "Russian soul", in the temperament of the Georgian character. It will be in vain to search for it in the dusty archives of the revolution, in party resolutions and even in the protocols of the Politburo. The social conditions of the time themselves could explain little to him. Stalin's intellectual genius he will question. Gramophone records with Stalin's speeches and thirteen volumes of his works will generally disarm the future historian: he will be convinced that Stalin is a nauseating orator and a handicraft theoretician. Then how could this mediocre man become formidable

ruler of a great state and a bright symbol of an entire era?

There is no single answer to this question. One must know all of Stalin and all his enemies. One thing is certain: Stalin is a great psychologist of the lumpen proletariat and a brilliant Machiavelli in politics. February gave

power to the people, October to the plebs, and Stalin to the lumpen proletariat. October nationalized the rich, but did not enrich the poor. "War Communism" pre-proletarianized the city and proletarianized the countryside. NEP turned to face the strong, giving nothing to the plebs - "facing the countryside", "learn to trade", "enrich yourself!". The plebs descended a step lower - they became a lumpen-proletariat and took a turn at the "Labor Exchange" not to go to work, but simply to

threaten: - What did we fight for, what did we shed blood for?

- Hang Lenin, Trotsky - against the wall! At the top of the party, too, there was a muffled ferment and differentiation. Some pulled "to the left", others "to the right", others swung "without a rudder and without sails" between the one and the other.

The vacant seat of Lenin continued to be empty, but, like nature, it did not tolerate emptiness. Trotsky's slogan "Let's make up for the loss of Lenin with the collective will and collective mind of the Leninist Central Committee" turned out to be empty talk. The interregnum continued only until Stalin had mastered the masses of the lumpen proletariat and the technique of the great Florentine. Having destroyed the "left" hands of the "right", the "right" - the hands of the "repentant", "repentant" - by a conspiracy of the lumpen proletariat from Yezhov to Malenkov, Stalin surpassed Lenin. He succeeded because he managed to create a party in the party. This "inner-party party" was recruited from professional political dealers who were supposed to possess all human qualities, except for one: a moral brake. If the idea itself was prompted by Lenin ("the core of professional revolutionaries" - "What is to be done?"), then its technique and rules were developed by Stalin not during the period of his coming to power, but long before that.

In this regard, I involuntarily recall the story of an old Georgian Social Democrat who, together with Dzhughashvili, studied at the seminary, spent time with him in the royal prison in Kutaisi, and 35 years later lived out his last days in Stalin's prison.

He said: "Once a teacher of ancient history asked us 21 In the mid-twenties, a satire well-known to Muscovites was played in the state circus in Moscow: portraits of Lenin and Trotsky are lying around the arena. One clown turns to another and orders to remove them. ?" - "Lenin hang, and Trotsky - to the wall!". A topic for written work. The topic was called "The Reason

for the Death of Caesar." Dzhughashvili wrote the most original essay. Answering a direct question about the reasons for the fall of Caesar, he conscientiously outlined the school concept and he added on his own behalf - the real reason was that Caesar did not have an apparatus of personal power that would control the apparatus of state (senate) power.

In the diagram of the organization of the power of Caesar, the Senate and provincial governors, attached to the essay, Dzhugashvili deduced "white places" covered with red ticks. "White places" are vulnerable points for delivering blows to Caesarism, and "red pincers" are defensive measures to prevent them. In the comments to the scheme, Dzhugashvili argued that the provincial governors were too autocratic so that they could feel over themselves not so much the power of the Senate as Caesar's sword of Damocles. The struggle with the Senate nobility ended with the pardon of the enemies and the preservation of the collective symbol of the power of the Senate, which made the rights of the "eternal dictator" illusory. In addition to all this, Caesar was looking for friends to share power with them, and not performers who are obliged to obey. Therefore, he died at the hands of friends (Cassius and Brutus), not protected by iron tongs of loyal performers. The teacher asked his student: - Doesn't your scheme look like an absolute monarchy? The

student replied: - No, the personal power of the monarch is based on the apparatus of state power, and according to my scheme, the apparatus of state power itself is supported

by the apparatus of personal power. Subsequently, Stalin called such and similar judgments about the "dictatorship of the proletariat" judgments of "a Marxist who has not yet fully formed" (compare the preface to the first volume of "Works of I. V. Stalin"). But it always seemed to me and now it seems that in these seminary writings Dzhugashvili is the whole future Stalin.

If we had no other evidence on this score, then only Trotsky's memoirs "My Life" - do not leave the slightest doubt that since April 1922, that is, from the day of his appointment as General Secretary of the Central Committee, Stalin methodically and persistently is working on the implementation of his seminar scheme. First of all, Stalin recreated the entire party apparatus

from top to bottom and placed it above the party. Trotsky was the first person to unravel the mystery of Stalin's "new course" during Lenin's lifetime. In a letter to the Central Committee, in October 1923, Trotsky openly accused the apparatus leadership of the Central Committee of "group politics". The same accusation was made in

"Statement 46". Trotsky saw Stalin's group policy in the fact that "the party apparatus, despite the ideological growth of the party, continues to think hard and decide for everyone," but "the party must subordinate its apparatus to itself"²². However, neither these warnings by Trotsky, nor the "Statement 46", nor the deaf demand of the ailing Lenin "to be careful on the turns" could deter Stalin from the course he had already taken. Trotsky testifies²³: "Lenin summoned me to his place, to the Kremlin, spoke about the

terrifying growth of bureaucracy in

our Soviet apparatus and the need to find leverage in order to properly approach this issue. He proposed the creation of a special commission under the Central Committee and invited me to take an active part I answered him: "Vladimir Ilyich, in my opinion, now in the fight against the bureaucracy of the Soviet apparatus, one must not forget that both in the localities and in the center a special selection of officials and specialists, party and non-party, is being created around well-known party leading groups and persons, in the province, in the district, in the center, that is, in the Central Committee. By clicking on an official, you stumble upon a party member, in whose retinue the specialist is, and, in the current situation, I could not take on such work."

Lenin agreed with this assessment of Trotsky and offered him a bloc Lenin-Trotsky against Stalin²⁴.

This already shows how far Stalin went, and most importantly, what his apparatus became a force even before Lenin's death!

The perfectly coordinated mutual work of the head of the Cheka F. Dzerzhinsky and the head of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of Stalin helped Stalin here too. When Trotsky's accusation of establishing a dictatorship of the party apparatus could no longer be ignored, Stalin proposed to the Politburo that a "neutral party commission" be set up under the leadership of Dzerzhinsky to consider the complaints of Trotsky and "46". This commission did everything to whitewash "Stalin's apparatus" and discredit Trotsky, but L. Trotsky. "New Course", 1923. ²³ L. Trotsky. "Stalin's school of falsifications", 1932, pp.

85-86. ²⁴ Ibid., p. 86.

October Plenum of the Central Committee (1923) decided to propose The Politburo should take all measures to ensure friendly work.

"I must say, comrades, in the period since October we have taken all measures to ensure that friendly work with Comrade Trotsky is established, although I must say that this is far from an easy matter. We had two private meetings with Comrade Trotsky, went through all the questions of economic and party order, and arrived at well-known opinions that did not raise any doubts. The continuation of these private meetings and these populists to establish friendly work within the Politburo was, as I already reported yesterday, the creation of a subcommittee of three. This subcommittee worked out a draft resolution that became subsequently the resolution of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission on democracy. That was the case. It seemed to us that after the resolution was adopted unanimously, there were no more grounds for disputes, there were no grounds for an inner-Party struggle. The day after the publication of resolution 11, carried out independently of the Central Committee and over the head of the Central Committee, which upset the whole matter and changed the situation in a radical way.

This is how Stalin complained about Trotsky, at the same time recognizing the significant fact that the "October Plenum proposed", in essence, not to Trotsky, but to him, to stop the practice of creating his own party in the party, although the Dzerzhinsky commission came to the plenum with Stalin's theses "on slander Trotsky" to "the party apparatus and Leninist cadres of the party". Trotsky's speech "over the head of the Central Committee" was due to the fact that, having put the decision of the plenum in the safe of the Central Committee, Stalin, as if nothing had happened, continued his work of creating and strengthening the "dictatorship of the party apparatus." After this appeal of Trotsky, the

grassroots party mass, despite the terror and pressure of this almost completely formed apparatus of Stalin-Dzerzhinsky, reacted very sharply to Stalin's behavior. At the meetings of the "proletarian cells of Moscow", these fortresses of Stalinism, Stalin and Dzerzhinsky, using the name of Lenin, collected only 9843 votes against Trotsky. Trotsky's accusations against Stalin were supported by 2,223 people who voted to condemn Stalin

25 Stalin's speech at the 13th party conference in 1924.

a greater number of party members did not participate in the discussion, so that tomorrow they would not find themselves, if not in the basements of Dzerzhinsky, then in lines at the Labor Exchange,

like the unemployed. Stalin suffered a catastrophic defeat in the party organizations of higher schools in Moscow. Of the 72 higher education cells, 32 (2790 people) voted for the Central Committee, 40 cells (6594 people) voted for the opposition²⁶

Things were even worse with Stalin in the provinces. Many provincial organizations resolutely demanded a change in Stalin's "new course". If there was still no unanimous revolt in the party against its own apparatus, this was mainly due to the colossal personal authority of Lenin, who, due to his illness, was deprived of the opportunity to give an explanation to the party. The party was waiting for his recovery. Stalin was waiting for his death. But already at the XIII Party Conference, Stalin also took preventive measures to change the composition of such a disobedient party - at his suggestion, the conference decided to attract new 100,000 members from the working machine to the party, blocking the path to the party for petty-bourgeois elements. The "petty-bourgeois elements" included the provinces (peasants) and universities (students). Stalin invited the proletarians from the machine tool and the lumpen proletariat in order to more accurately put an end to the "saboteurs" of creating a party within the party. On January 21, 1924, Lenin died. Same day emergency

The plenum of the Central Committee issued an appeal stating:

"Let our enemies be angry about our loss. Unfortunate and miserable! They do not know what our party is. They hope that the party will fall apart. And the party will go forward with an iron step! Because it "Leninist Party. Because it has been educated and hardened in battles! Because we have in our hands the testament that Comrade Lenin left for it!"²⁷

In this "testament" published after the 20th Congress of the CPSU, Lenin wrote that Stalin was rude, capricious and disloyal and therefore demanded that Stalin be removed from the post of "Secretary General" of the Central Committee. There is no doubt that if Lenin had survived even a few more months, Stalin would have ceased to exist politically. In this case solution 26 A. Bubnov. VKP(b). TSB, 1st ed., Vol. XI, p.

27 "CPSU in resolutions and decisions of congresses, conferences and plenums of the Central Committee", 1954, part I, p. 806.

Lenin would be final and, as always, unapologetically. Stalin knew this better than anyone else, and therefore prepared Lenin's "apparatus" opposition against the implementation of his will. Would Stalin have been successful? Doubtful. And here the question arises that Trotsky poses in his unfinished (and here Stalin warned him by sending the murderer to Mexico in time) biographical sketch "Stalin", namely, did Stalin himself kill Lenin? Trotsky says that after his next visit to the

sick Lenin, Stalin told the Politburo that Lenin demanded poison from him in order to commit suicide! This report by Stalin was met with indignation by members of the Politburo. Stalin himself did not reveal his attitude to this demand of Lenin. Noticing that Lenin knew very well who was capable and interested in giving him poison, Trotsky tacitly admits such a hypothesis, although he does not insist on it. Could this happen? People who know the character of Stalin and the essence of his system cannot deny such a possibility.

N. K. Krupskaya back in 1927 uttered a well-known phrase in the party: "If Ilyich had lived today, Stalin would have put him in prison!" And as you know, not a single Leninist came out of Stalin's prison alive. Why then not kill Lenin himself? Take the complete list of members of the Leninist Central Committee elected at the Sixth Party Congress in August 1917. Which of them survived? 1. Lenin - died, 2. Kamenev - shot 3.

Trotsky - killed
by Stalin 4. Stalin 5.
Zinoviev - shot 6. Sverdlov -
died 7.

Nogin - died 8. Rykov -
shot 9. Bukharin -
shot 10. Bubnov
- shot 11. Uritsky -
killed (by a terrorist) 12.
Milyutin - shot 13.
Kollontai - died

14. Artem (Sergeev) - died
15. Krestinsky - was shot 16.
Dzerzhinsky - died 17.
Ioffe - committed suicide because of Stalin
18. Muranov - died
19. Sokolnikov - was shot 20.
Smilga - was shot 21.
Shaumyan - was shot (by the British)
22. Berzin - shot 23.
Stasova - arrested (later released) 24. Lomov
- shot death, 11 shot
by Stalin, 1 killed by Stalin, 1 arrested, 2 killed by enemies, 1
committed suicide.

The question is, why did Stalin have to spare Lenin himself, completely destroying the entire Leninist guard? Let's get back to the topic. I have already quoted Trotsky's story about how, right in front of Lenin's eyes, Stalin created his own party within the party. Lenin's death only accelerated this process.

First of all, the Central Committee decided, in response to Lenin's death, to call "workers from the machine tool" into the party - the so-called "Lenin call". Under this slogan, up to 250,000 workers from production, sympathizing with the new Stalinist course in the party, were solemnly accepted into the party. Thus, the party grew by May 1924 to 730,000 people. At the same time, the Stalinists began to purge the party of its members, who during the 1923 debate voted against Stalin for Trotsky. First of

all, this purge touched, of course, the university cells, most of which openly took the side of Trotsky (Stalin and the Central Committee accused Trotsky, among other things, of putting forward the slogan: "The youth is the barometer of the party", he only flatters the youth and contrasts it with the "old shots"). After such a purge, by the end of 1925 there were only 640,000 people in the party. About 100,000 students, professors and university workers, party members, Stalin, according to the already mentioned "Malenkov's plan", expelled from the party for

self-doubt²⁸. Those expelled from the party were immediately expelled from universities.

28 "XIV Congress of the CPSU (b), verbatim report".

This cruel lesson given by Stalin to the "proletarian students" was in the memory of everyone when they began to discuss "right" things within the walls of the ICP. Most of the students of the ICP clearly sympathized with the right, but the Stalinist minority worked in the Stalinist way - it created its own party organization in the ICP on the same principles on which Stalin created his party in the whole party. "Give us an organization of professional revolutionaries and we will turn Russia over,"

Lenin said back in 1902 ("What is to be done?"). This idea of Lenin remained the central guiding idea of Stalin on the path to his personal power in the fight against the opposition. This time it was not about "professional revolutionaries", but about the "active" party. It was not only a magic word, but also a magic idea. Already two decades later, Pravda reminded the party apparatus of the name of the author of this idea and its significance in the history of the Stalinist coup²⁹: "Comrade Stalin points out that an asset, if used skillfully, can constitute the greatest force capable of miracles." Indeed, in the struggle against Trotsky, this asset constituted "the greatest strength" and demonstrated "miracles", so easily discrediting Trotsky's authority in the party and the country, which had previously seemed undeniable. True, many of the old "active" turned out to be Trotskyists themselves, but on the whole the "active" justified itself.

From this, Stalin only drew the conclusion that the "active" must also be selected and organized, just as Lenin selected and organized a group of "professional revolutionaries." Potential enemies of the "general line" should not be allowed in the asset. It is necessary to select him not on the basis of past merits before the revolution, but on the basis of actual signs - what this communist is capable of today.

"The Central Committee was guided in this by Lenin's brilliant idea that the main thing in organizational work is the selection of people and verification of execution," Stalin said of this practice of his³⁰. In clearing out the post-Trotskyite activists, by the end of the 1920s, Stalin made it clear to the party that in this asset he would tolerate only the obedient and would ruthlessly persecute the old "nobles"

29 Pravda, editorial, 7/25/1952. 30 I.

Stalin. "Problems of Leninism", p. 479. Party

committees in the localities received directives on who and how to purge from the "active". Outwardly, this purge of activists was arranged in such a way that the party dismissed only "bureaucrats" and "honest talkers" from work. In fact, they filmed possible allies of Bukharin and the right, about which the broad masses of the party still knew nothing. Thus, persons removed from leading positions mechanically dropped out of the category of active, even if they were well-known party figures before the revolution, during the revolution and the civil war. Thus, they ceased to influence internal party affairs. This was the unspoken purge of the activists, the "selection of people" capable of supporting the Stalinist leadership in the Central Committee against the Bukharin wing, when Stalin decided to bring his disputes with the rightists from the Politburo to the court of the "active" and the party. But who is still considered a member of the asset - local, district, regional, central? The so-called nomenclature workers of district committees, regional committees and the Central Committee of the party, in other words, the bureaucracy of the party, administrative, economic, trade union and military apparatus? But not all members of this bureaucracy were listed as "active", but only a select few. Who elects them? Party apparatus. Only those can participate in meetings of party activists who receive personal invitation cards from the party apparatus (RK, regional committees, Central Committee). To whom does he send invitations? Only to those leading communists who are listed without minuses in the lists of special sectors of the party committees. There were many cases when highly honored communists, who still occupy prominent posts in the administration and economic management bodies, were not invited to party activists if their loyalty to the Stalinist line caused

doubt.

This is understandable, since the asset is the elite of the party, at its meetings the correctness of the line of the Central Committee and Stalin was confirmed on behalf of the entire party. The asset or assets served to create public opinion in the party, just as Pravda played this role in the press. The decision of the party activists was mechanically accepted as the will of the entire party. Therefore, the concept of "activist" simultaneously symbolized both loyalty to the Stalinist line and belonging to the party elite.

To make any career in the party and the state, the communist had to get into this "asset". Thus was created that party within the party that led to such an easy victory for Stalin over the rightists.

Immediately after the return of the "theoretical brigade" of the Central Committee from Leningrad, the first meeting of the activists of the so-called "theoretical front" of the USSR took place in the Communist Academy. Tickets for the meeting were distributed directly by the Agitprop of the Central Committee. I do not remember how many tickets were sent to our IKP, but I remember well that many not only students, but also professors of the "Bukharin school" were not invited. The Bukharinites, who had previously been on the active side and really did a lot for Stalin and Bukharin during the struggle against Trotsky, raised an open scandal. They accused Yudin and Orlov, who had crossed out their names from the list of invitees submitted to the Central Committee, of gangsterism. Pokrovsky undertook to settle the issue in the Central Committee, but from there came the answer that the Central Committee was indeed not to blame for these "unfortunate omissions", but it is now impossible to correct the mistake - "there are no more tickets for the asset." The disgraced "activists" "lynched" Yudin, but still did not "legally" get on the asset. I myself, as a newcomer, was not listed as an asset, but I sympathized with the offended.

If it weren't for the scandal at the ICP, perhaps I wouldn't attach much importance to what they were going to say there. Therefore, when Sorokin offered to get me a ticket, I readily agreed to go with him to the meeting. The meeting took place in the great hall of the Communist Academy on Volkhonka. There were not only members of the Komakademiya, professors and students of the ICP, RANION, but also leading officials of the Central Committee, headed by Kaganovich, who had just been transferred from Ukraine to Moscow and appointed secretary of the Central Committee. From Leningrad, Pozern, Kirov's chief of propaganda, came specially to the meeting. Our rector Pokrovsky presided (he was also chairman of the Presidium of the Communist Academy). The workers of the Central Committee, although not members of the Communist Academy (only Krinitsky and Stetsky were, as far as I remember, members of the Academy), were sitting at the table of the presidium. In the hall and in the gallery, I noticed many of the "brawlers" who still got to the meeting (later I found out that they went through the "pull"). None of those present, with the exception of members of the Central Committee and members of the "theoretical brigade", was in

keep abreast of why or in connection with what the meeting of the asset is taking place today. Chairman of the meeting M. N. Pokrovsky, who was and remained until his death a personal friend of Bukharin (by the way, at the funeral of Pokrovsky in 1932 on Red Square, on behalf of the Central Committee, as an official speaker, it was Bukharin who made a big speech in which he, paying tribute to the deceased as a scientist, called Stalin "Field Marshal proletarian forces"), declaring the meeting of the activists open, announced an unusual agenda: "Theoretical mistakes of Comrade Bukharin and his school." This, probably, also explained the fact that, having violated the usual order in such cases, Pokrovsky did not hold the opening speech as chairman, but immediately gave the floor to L. Kaganovich. The noisy hall of the Communist Academy froze. Kaganovich started from afar. "Lenin did not stand up for any science, but for party, Bolshevik science. Lenin did not recognize any authorities when it comes to the interests of Marxism. Lenin, like no one else, knew how to smash enemies and beat friends in the struggle for Marxist science. Remember "Materialism and empirio-criticism "... If we want to be worthy disciples of Lenin, then we must be merciless towards those from our midst who think to teach not only us, but also Lenin ... After the death of Lenin, no one can claim the role of our teacher in matters Marxism - we have only one teacher - this is Leninism and one laboratory of Leninist political and theoretical thought of the Central Committee. However, in our circles there are unfortunate theorists who think that the keys to Marxism-Leninism are in their own pocket. To this category of unfortunate Bukharin and his school also belong to the theoreticians..." At that moment, several people silently walked along the long hall of the academy to the table of the presidium of the assembly, exchanging greetings

with those present with a nod of the head as they walked. The audience stirred slightly. In some corners, the whispering that had started turned into a loud conversation. Someone from the gallery shouted in a drawn-out bass: "Long live the party's favorite and theoretician, Comrade Bukharin!" - Excuse me, Lazar Moiseevich, - said one of the newcomers in an underlined ironic tone, - it seems that I interrupted your scientific research at the most interesting

place. It was Bukharin.

Not only as a member of the Politburo, but also as a member of the presidium of the Communist Academy, he took Kaganovich's empty seat on the presidium. Pokrovsky was clearly embarrassed, but his assistant in the meeting, Adoratsky, called the gallery and the hall to silence, and Kaganovich, defiantly addressing not Bukharin, but to the hall, shouted rudely and officially:

"You are mistaken again, Comrade Bukharin, if you think that it would be interesting for someone to delve into the haulage without ever finding a pearl there. Bukharin replied: - So

you are bad sewers!

Friendly laughter rang out in the hall. It was evident that the sudden appearance of Bukharin and his friends had clearly spoiled Kaganovich's overture to the forthcoming reports "On the Mistakes of the Bukharin School." Although it was not supposed that Kaganovich would

talk essentially about Bukharin's "mistakes", but would rather confine himself to the politically principled side of the matter, I noticed that Kaganovich began to get nervous, jumping from one question to another. Even during his ongoing speech, one of the members of the presidium, it seems Shkiryatov, left the hall and went to the office of the

chairman of the presidium of the academy. As soon as Kaganovich finished his speech, Shkiryatov, who returned, approached him and whispered something in his ear. Kaganovich took under his arm his heavy "People's Commissar's" briefcase, lying in front of Bukharin, and quickly went with Shkiryatov to the same office. There was a hitch. This time, not only Pokrovsky, but, apparently, Adoratsky did not know what to do next - to give the floor to someone or wait for the return of Kaganovich and Shkiryatov. They started shouting from the gallery:

- Give the floor to Nikolai Ivanovich! - We
ask Comrade Bukharin! Bukharin
smiled good-naturedly, nodding his head to the side.

Cabinet: "Let's wait, they say, for the return of the authorities."

But the authorities did not return, the hall demanded the continuation of the meeting, and the gallery went on a rampage.

- Give the floor to Nikolai Ivanovich! Returning Shkiryatov
calmed the room

- Nikolai Ivanovich, you are asked to answer the phone! Bukharin left the hall.

In Bukharin's office, a rather lengthy telephone conversation with Stalin took place. A record of this conversation was attached to the case of the "group of Rights" when it was examined for the first time at the February plenum of the Central Committee of 1929. I will try to reproduce the meaning of this conversation, without vouching, of course, for textual accuracy. Stalin:

The Central Committee considers your presence at a theoretical discussion inexpedient, lest the latter take on a political character. Bukharin: Kaganovich

has already given it a political character, and besides, the presence of almost the entire apparatus of the Central Committee speaks least of all of its "theoretical" character. Stalin:

Kaganovich is present there not as a representative of the Central Committee, but at the personal invitation of the Komacademy, others also came at the invitation of the academy, of which you are a member.

Bukharin: However, I am also a member of the Politburo, and the Politburo did not pass any decision even on a "theoretical discussion." How could it happen that Kaganovich, without the knowledge of the Central Committee, personally opens any kind of

discussion? Stalin: Apparently, the initiative does not come from Kaganovich, but from the academy itself. After all, the Central Committee cannot forbid a scientific institution to conduct scientific disputes, even if they concern you and me, members of the Politburo. But by your presence there, as a member of the Politburo, you can negatively influence the freedom of discussion, since it has already begun. Therefore, I communicated with other members of the Politburo and we agreed that it would be better for you to leave the meeting so that it would not really take on a

political character. Bukharin: Firstly, are all members of the Politburo of your opinion, and secondly, does this wish also apply to other members of the Central Committee - Kaganovich, Pozern, Krinitsky, Stetsky, Yaroslavsky, Shkiryatov?

Stalin: As you know, Rykov and Tomsy are not in Moscow, Kalinin is ill, and the rest have been requested. They insist that you think about the political consequences of your disobedience to the general will of the Politburo. We did not discuss the issue of Kaganovich and others, but we will talk about this later.

Bukharin: I ask you to give a concrete answer - did you, as secretary of the Central Committee, give instructions to open at least a theoretical discussion

against me? Stalin: Of course not, but I cannot forbid it to anyone, even if it were directed against me as well.

Bukharin: I am staying at the

meeting. Stalin: But then blame yourself for the consequences!

Bukharin, visibly agitated and pale, returned to the hall and took his former place. Kaganovich and Shkiryatov still had not returned. Soon Pozern and Yaroslavsky headed towards them. A few minutes later, Pokrovsky was also summoned there.

There was a break in the hall. Group discussions began. Everyone guessed that telephone conversations were being conducted with the Central Committee. Some approached the presidium table, trying to understand what was going on. Bukharin immersed himself in reading some newspaper and did not answer any questions. Half an hour later the members of the Central Committee

returned to the hall. Pokrovsky said without motivation: - The meeting is declared closed.
VIII. THE DESTRUCTION OF THE MOSCOW

COMMITTEE On the morning of the second day after the ill-fated meeting, walking along the corridor, I, as usual, stopped at the bulletin board of the VKP(b) IKP cell. On the blackboard hung a freshly typed list of students and professors who were "urgently" summoned to the cell bureau. My name was also on the list. After all, I considered my duties as a student to be "urgent" and therefore went to the lecture hall in order to look into the bureau during a break. The lecture had barely begun (there was a philosophical lecture by L. Axelrod-Orthodox), when the technical secretary of the cell bureau came in, interrupted the lecturer, and read out the same list that hung on the blackboard. He added that he needed to come at once. About a dozen people rose from different places. I got up too. Asking each other what this could mean, we moved together to the bureau. A significant group from other courses also

gathered there. In the bureau sat, frowning and importantly going through his thick red hair, the new Cell Secretary. His gray and lifeless eyes, which usually expressed anything but "Bolshevik fire", this time breathed both "fire" and malice at the same time. When one of his fellow students tried with a joke

To dispel the secretary's deliberately feigned, it boss
seemed, importance, the latter rudely interrupted:

- We are not in a tavern, but in the
bureau of the cell. "What, you don't understand jokes, Pavlusha?" the
same fellow student tried to correct his
mistake. "My surname is Yudin," he replied sharply, obviously
dissatisfied with the familiar address to himself as

"Pavlusha." The fellow student was
silent. We were also silent. Yudin made a roll call on the list. All the
students came, but there were no professors. The returning secretary
reported that the

professors were busy with
seminars. - Call, - ordered Yudin. A few minutes later, no less perplexed
professors

appeared. "All the comrades I have called must
appear today at the Central Committee by 6 o'clock
in the evening," Yudin announced. To the questions of students and professors, what
address, Yudin answered briefly: -

You'll find out
there! Various thoughts flooded my
mind. - Orlov's
denunciation? - Return to
the Caucasus? - Participation

in the "execution" of Stalin? Or something better? But what better
way can there be if not to stay in school? I decided to be guided by the
rule - "think about the best, but be prepared for the worst." However, I
did not "execute" Stalin, I was not a Trotskyist - what could be worse?
As always in such cases, I ran to Sorokin. Unfortunately, he didn't show
up today. I tried to find out from Elena Petrovna, Pokrovsky's secretary,
she replied that she heard all this only from me. I returned to the lecture.
Old Axelrod was talking about Nietzsche. There are the elect and the
crowd, "masters" and "slaves". The chosen ones are called to make
history. The crowd is the dung of history. The will to power is the driving
force of human development. Only a select few have it! Original and by
the way!

The fresh thoughts and melodious speech of the lecturer, "the last
Mohican of the philosophy of independent Marxism," as we called it,

acted as a distraction. Other lectures went unnoticed. I often caught myself thinking about Orlov, Yudin and the Central Committee. I dined without appetite, out of duty. Immediately after dinner, having missed a German lesson, I went to Sorokin's apartment. And he is not at home. I went to Zinaida Nikolaevna and found her and him. Reznikov

entered, even more pale and upset than I was. "I will tell you catastrophic news," he said, "today Uglanov and Kotov have been removed from work, the secretaries of the Rogozhsko Simonovsky, Krasnopresnensky, Khamovnichesky districts have been removed. A commission of the Central Committee, chaired by Molotov, was set up to check the entire leadership of the Moscow organization (this was at the end of October 1928). "It's

terrible and incomprehensible!" said Zinaida Nikolaevna in a deaf, sepulchral voice. I noticed tears in her eyes. Reznikov nodded his head in confirmation and sank heavily onto sofa.

"It's terrible and incomprehensible!" repeated Zinaida Nikolaevna, already sobbing from weeping. I felt very sorry for her. I gave her a chair and a glass of water. She sat down, but refused the challenge.

- Yes, you do not understand, comrades, this is the beginning of the real counter-revolution," she said, gradually coming to her senses.

- For some, the beginning, for others, the end! - Sorokin said laconically.

I felt that Sorokin saw further and better the meaning of the events taking place, experienced them, perhaps more and deeper than Zinaida Nikolaevna, but tried not to give himself away. He clearly couldn't do it. - How did this happen

and what is the reaction in the MK? - Sorokin asked Reznikov, holding back his excitement. Reznikov said that

three days ago, quite unexpectedly for the members of the MK bureau, some members of the MK (Voroshilov, Menzhinsky, Bulganin, Karavaev, etc.) and one member of the MK bureau (Bauman) proposed to convene an extraordinary meeting of the bureau together with the leading asset for an important statements. Uglanov, who was also secretary of the Central Committee, tried to find out what was the matter, but he was told that this would be reported at the meeting itself. When Uglanov turned to the Central Committee about this, Molotov (Stalin seemed to be absent), after noticing that the Central Committee was not aware of

affairs, explained each member of the MK, like the Central Committee, has the right to demand the convening of a meeting. The Central Committee, for its part, will gladly send its representatives to this meeting if the named members of the MC have something important to say.

Uglov scheduled the meeting for 10 pm. Stalin, Molotov, Kaganovich and a whole group of members of the MK and "activists" who were not members of the bureau came to the meeting. From the very beginning, the members of the MC raised the question of

allowing the latter to attend the meeting of the Bureau. Kotov and Reznikov rejected this proposal. Bauman (he was also the chief of the village department of the MK) supported. Molotov intervened and said that it was a violation of the spirit of "intra-Party democracy" if the "active" MK, on the basis of the letter of the party order, could not be present here. It became clear that the members of the MK and the activists were not in vain. Reznikov continued to protest, but Uglov agreed and opened "a meeting of the MK bureau together with the leading asset." Bulganin, who at that time worked as the director of the Moscow Electric Plant, but was always listed among the "active Chekists," asked for the floor to "statement by a group of members of the Moscow Committee and the Central Committee about the work of the Rights in the Moscow organization." The statement emphasized that in the Moscow organization, at the heads of the most important institutions and enterprises, in research institutes and universities, in a number of district committees, and even in the Moscow Committee itself, "Right opportunists" were operating, their direct henchmen and students, who were trying to turn the party onto the path of capitalist restoration. Secretary of the MK Uglov, members of the bureau of the MK Kotov, Penkov, Reznikov, Ryutin, ranting about the "general line", are in fact the same rightists. The authors of the statement, on behalf of the district assets and members of the Moscow Committee, demanded: 1) the resignation of the Moscow leadership and 2) the appointment of a special commission to check the party person of the leadership of all Moscow institutions, enterprises and the Soviet and party apparatus. Not only for the members of the MK Bureau, but also for Uglov himself, Bulganin's statement came as a complete surprise. Uglov announced a break and demanded a private meeting with members of the Secretariat of the Central Committee (Stalin, Molotov, Kaganovich were present not as members of the Politburo, but as secretaries of the Central Committee). Kaganovich categorically

rejected Uglanov's proposal. Uglanov appealed to Stalin, but Stalin spread his hands in bewilderment. Molotov spoke:

- Back in February of this year, the Central Committee warned the MK and personally Uglanov about the possibility of such a turn of affairs as it is now. The Central Committee received many signals and even demands from the district organizations of Moscow to improve the leadership of the MK, but we did not want to interfere in your affairs in the hope that the members of the MK bureau would come to their senses, but all this turned out to be futile. Now there is no other way out, the openly posed question must be

discussed openly. Molotov proposed to continue discussing the statement. Uglanov once again suggested to Stalin that the discussion of this issue be postponed to a private meeting of the Bureau of the Moscow Committee and the Secretariat of the Central

Committee, and, if necessary, to a meeting of the Politburo. Stalin replied evasively: "I do not find the situation so tragic that it would be necessary to arrange another special meeting, although there is no

objection in principle." Stalin's speech had an encouraging effect on Uglanov, and he officially resumed the meeting. Debate began. All the members of the Moscow Committee, the Central Committee, and the "activists" who spoke unanimously supported Bulganin's statement. One of the members of the bureau of the MK (I think Polonsky) made a compromise proposal - since this meeting is not authorized to discuss the issue of the leadership of the MK, to convene an emergency plenum of the MK and the IWC to consider the application of a group of members of the MK. Uglanov put the proposal to a vote - all members of the bureau, except for Bauman, are in favor, the entire "active" is "against", the secretaries of the Central Committee do not vote. The resourceful Kaganovich reversed the res

- According to the statute of today's joint meeting of the bureau of the MC and the "active", I consider the proposal to convene the plenary meeting rejected, since the absolute majority of this meeting voted against.

Then the indignant Uglanov jumped up from his chair and loudly asked:

- Who is the secretary of the Moscow Committee - me or you, comrade Kaganovich? - So far, Comrade Uglanov, - Kaganovich replied imperturbably - So allow you to declare that I am no longer such a person.

Now continue your demagoguery. Uglanov quickly grabbed his briefcase from the table and

defiantly left the office. Stalin slowly followed him, but soon returned without Uglanov.

"Where is Comrade Uglanov?" asked Molotov.

- I ran to Bukharin, - Bulganin answered for Stalin.

Kaganovich proposed to continue the meeting in order to make an appropriate decision of the MC on the statement announced by the group of members of the MC. Members of the MK bureau, including Reznikov, began to argue

that in the absence of Uglanov, any discussion is impossible and illegal. Then Stalin spoke. He expressed regret that such heated disputes and passions had flared up here, since, he said, we are not talking about individual personalities, but about a certain ideological and political trend in the party that is very dangerous for the cause, we are talking about a deviation away from Marxism, about the right, restorer-ko-kulak deviation. It is absolutely unimportant, Stalin argued, who leads or reflects in practice this deviation, but it is absolutely necessary that all our communists understand that not the now exposed Left, Trotskyist, but the Right opportunist deviation is now the main danger in the Party. We must expose and eliminate this danger. Stalin also did not agree with Bulganin that the members of the MK bureau, headed by Uglanov, were "rightists." This is an exaggeration and "going too far." But Stalin does not consider it possible under the circumstances that the MK Bureau could wage a successful struggle against the Right danger, all the more so since the Moscow activists, as is clear from Bulganin's statement and from the speeches of the participants in this meeting, are opposed to the current composition of the MK Bureau. Stalin dwelled personally on Uglanov, pointed out his great services in the underground before the revolution, his active participation in the revolution and the civil war, his uncompromising struggle against Trotskyism, his well-deserved and high authority in the party, and ended his speech: "After all, we Bolsheviks are used to listening to the voice of the masses, especially the masses of the party; since the party activists of Moscow want to change their leadership, the Central Committee is ready to recall Uglanov and other members of the MK bureau to its disposal ... "Kaganovich, who continued to actually chair the meeting after leaving Uglanova, began to "forge the iron while it's hot." He made a new proposal: "The participants in the meeting of the bureau of the Moscow Committee, together with the activists 1) regret that Uglanov left the meeting, thereby flagrantly violating any party

discipline, 2) they ask the Central Committee to recall the members of the current leadership of the MK to their disposal, 3) they propose to urgently convene an emergency plenum of the MK to select a new leadership, 4) they recommend Secretary of the

Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks V. Molotov as Secretary of the MK. "- Now we just understand ", - said Reznikov, -

why an "emergency meeting" was convened and why Bulganin invited the secretaries of the Central Committee to it. - It seems to me that you have not understood even now what was the matter and what happened at the meeting, - Sorokin objected. - You think that the initiative comes from the "activist" Bulganin? The game is more subtle, and it was started by the Central Committee itself. It was the apparatus of the Central Committee, the Secretariat that prepared both the meeting of the Moscow Committee with the "active" and the "statement of the group." back of the Politburo) were distributed in advance: Molotov was the "moderate", Kaganovich the "aggressor", and Stalin the beneficent arbiter. But in order to play this whole comedy more successfully to the end, it was first

necessary to get Uglanov out of patience so that he left the meeting. All the hypocritical words of Stalin about his merits are a smokescreen for a more successful attack ... - No, this time Stalin was sincere, - Reznikov intervened. - Yes, just as he was sincere when, on the first anniversary of the October Revolution, he wrote in Pravda that the successful preparation and victorious carrying out of the October Revolution "we owe primarily and mainly to Comrade Trotsky." Where did he now drive the "father of October"? Now Trotsky will write about everyone as about "epigons of October" because Stalin seriously assured him that without him there would be no October. him and then the enemy), enter into his confidence, climb into his fortress and blow up this fortress together with his commander. So he did to Lenin when he became secretary of the Central Committee, so he did to Trotsky when Lenin died, so he is now doing to Bukharin ... Stalin was cunning then in relation to Bukharin: "we will not let our Bukharchik be offended," he shouted then Stalin on Trotsky. With foam at the mouth, Stalin defended Bukharin, erected his merits to the skies, moreover, during the period of th

Trotsky, Stalin artificially created the "cult of Bukharin", the "glory of Bukharin".

"Stalin did

not say a word about Bukharin at the meeting," Reznikov remarked again. -
No, he did.

Everything that he said good about Uglanov is a bomb against Bukharin, and against Uglanov, and against all of us. "From step to step" is Stalin's favorite expression. He does everything carefully, cunningly, but thoroughly. He constantly called Trotsky Judas, but by now it should be clear to us that he then blurted out his own inner being. If he praised you and you loyally did not kneel, then know that you are destined to stand on your feet until he gathers the strength to dump you into the abyss. Will we get on our knees? That is the question we will have to answer shortly...

Sorokin spoke for a long time, sometimes with sharp reproaches against Reznikov. Reznikov rarely and unconvincedly objected, apparently only to object. In the depths of his soul he felt guilty before Sorokin that he had so easily surrendered at the meeting.

"What do you think we were supposed to do?" he suddenly asked Sorokin. -
Leave after

Uglanov, leaving Stalin with his
mercenaries.

- And what would happen? -

There would be a scandal, but Stalin is not ready for a scandal.

Reznikov did not object. Zinaida Nikolaevna sat silent throughout the conversation. I was about to leave, but Sorokin asked me to go near Moscow, to the dacha to the "General". I must tell him that he is expected at Zinaida's apartment. Since it was already late, I was forced to tell Sorokin the reason for the impossibility of fulfilling his request, and therefore the secret of my visit.

- By 6 o'clock in the evening I am called along with other students in
Central Committee, I can hardly have time to fulfill your order," I said.

- This is in connection with what? - he asked in bewilderment. And the purpose of my visit dropped. Sorokin was not aware of the matter. I went to the Central Committee.

IX. DURING THE

INTERROGATION IN THE CC I went to the Central Committee on foot, since it was not far to go. Zinaida lived in the Theater Square area. I needed to get through

Lubyanka to Old Square, where the building of the Central Committee is located. I arrived on time. There were several people in the vestibule, but none of ours was there. On the right side of the elevator is the "information window" for visitors. On the wall there is a large black board indicating the rooms of the departments of the Central Committee and the offices of the secretaries of the Central Committee. Even

the days and hours of reception of visitors by "secretaries" are indicated - "I. Stalin receives on ... (days) from ... to ... (hours) The same is with other secretaries of the Central Committee - Molotov, Kaganovich, Kubyak. No special pass, show your party card - go straight to Stalin's secretariat and demand to be admitted! What democratic times were! When I last visited the Central Committee in 1940, the procedure was different: Chekists in uniform and

without uniform were sitting in the reception the ticket also had to have a special pass with permission to enter the Central Committee and only the department indicated in the pass, but this is not enough - the Chekist had to phone the party bureaucrat you are going to before filling out the pass, and if he agrees at his own risk let you into the building, then a questionnaire is filled out for you and then you enter the "sacred abode." The board "reception of Stalin" and other secretaries has disappeared since the beginning of the thirties. But in 1928 there was a time of the notorious "inner-party democracy", and I freely entered the building. I take the elevator to the third floor and go to Agitprop, to which our Institute was directly subordinate. In the corridor I meet some of our students leaving Agitprop. I ask where we should go and what was the matter. They answer that what is the matter is still unknown, but that I am on the right track, and they will tell me what to do next. I enter the reception room of the chief of Agitprop, I find several more of ours there. As soon as I entered, one of the employees, a red-haired, ugly thin man in pince-nez, turned to me: - Are you, comrade, from the IKP? - Yes! - What's your last name? I call. The red skeleton looks at the list, finds my last name. Against the surname there is some letter and number drawn in red pencil.

- To the fourth floor, an office in such-and-such a consumptive voice he says. I

go up to the fourth floor to the indicated office. The dead silence on this floor is striking. All doors to the rooms and offices are tightly upholstered with leather on felt. Mosaic paths stretch along the corridor in a long ribbon. There are no inscriptions on the doors in this row, only numbers. I knock at the indicated office on the soft leather door, but I know that neither will they hear me, nor will I hear anything. Therefore, hesitantly I enter the office: bah! Orlov is sitting at the table, in a soft but rather worn armchair!

- How did you get here? - I ask completely stupid and inopportunistically. The resourceful Orlov answers quite reasonably:

"Not like you!" Then he goes straight to the point: "Under pain of being expelled from the Party, and therefore from the ICP, I warn you on behalf of the Central Committee that you answer truthfully to the questions I have posed. We know the whole truth, but if you try to hide it from the Central Committee, you will

leave here without a party card. Orlov makes a short pause and begins sorting through the papers in the folder. His impressive tone, the seriousness of the inner-Party situation, and most importantly, his mysterious cabinet in the Central Committee make an impression. I am convinced that this bilious and narrow-minded person can decide my fate. Thoughts about the "execution of Stalin", Zinaida's "birthday", friendship with Sorokin, about today's meeting with Reznikov fly through my head with lightning speed. So Orlov knows everything. And his dilemma is also clear: if I tell you, I will stay in the ICP, if not, they will be expelled from the ICP and from the party. I am agitated, and by this spoiling the matter, because I know that Orlov is watching me from under his brows. I pull myself together and concentrate, or rather, I try to do it. I am ready to answer all questions in the name of Zinaida, Sorokin and Caucasian honor with a categorical "no!" Let them exclude. The way will be sent to

Siberia. Let ... With a sudden question, Orlov interrupts his thoughts: - Were you at a meeting at the Komakademiya yesterday? -

Yes, it was. - Who gave you the ticket? - Dali in the ICP. - Who personally?

- Sorokin.

Why did he give it to you? -

Ask him. - I'm

asking you. - I

answered you.

- Did you applaud Bukharin?

-

Yes. -

Why? - Because he is a member

of the Politburo. - Did you

shout "Hurrah" to Bukharin? - You better tell me why I'm called here. I find it superfluous to answer these

stupid questions. "Do not forget that you are in the Central Committee,

and answer questions," Orlov threatens. But my heart is already lighter. I see that Orlov is carrying out petty police interrogations on me without serious data for this. So I take courage and go on the counterattack:

"Only yesterday I saw Bukharin for the first time in my life, and when everyone applauded, even the presidium, I applauded too. But if during this time something went wrong with Bukharin, then it is not I who is to blame, but the Central

Committee member of which he is. "Did you applaud

Kaganovich?" Orlov suddenly asks. - Yes,

and on the same basis as Bukharin. - Do you share the theoretical views and

political views of Bukharin? I jump up from my chair, feign deep indignation and threaten Orlov that for such provocative questions on his part I will go with a complaint to Stalin himself. My threats don't work.

- Stop throwing me a tantrum here, like a woman, and engage in demagoguery. I can see through your anti-Party soul... Don't scare me with Stalin, too, by working against Stalin... Just think, he hasn't had time to hatch yet, but he wants to teach. So, will you answer the questions put to you on the merits?

Orlov pronounces the last words loudly and almost in syllables. His always bilious face turned into a question mark. But now I'm really beside myself. The words "like a woman" (among Caucasians this is the gravest insult) were struck down with a poisonous bullet

my ego. My eyes literally went black. At that moment it seemed to me that I was ready for murder, for death. - Citizen Orlov, you

were and remain a spy and a careerist who should not have a place in the apparatus of the Leninist Central Committee. Either I'll lose my membership card, or they'll kick you out of here! At these words, I run

out of the office. Forgetting to get into the elevator, I go down the stairs. I had not yet reached the third floor when I heard a cry from behind; someone runs after me, loudly calling my name. I stop. An unfamiliar person of a Caucasian type, middle-aged, in a military suit without signs comes up and, smiling broadly, as if we were old friends, asks me to go into his office. I try to find out what's wrong, but a stranger asks me to come in first. We rise back to the fourth floor, go past Orlov's office and after two or three offices a stranger opens the door for me. We go. The furnishings in the first room are almost the same as in Orlov's. A rather elderly woman is sitting here, typing something. We go into the next room. On the way, the stranger says to the woman: "If someone comes, then I'm busy." The stranger, still smiling, points to a chair for me, and sits down after me in a chair, less shabby than Orlov's. There are two phones on the table (internal and external), indicating a higher rank than Orlov. The stranger introduces himself: - Of course, you don't know me - I'm a responsible instructor of the Central Committee and my surname is Tovmosyan. But I heard about you from the responsible instructor of the Central Committee Comrade Kariba. You know him, he recently instructed the

North Caucasus and Dagestan. He has the best opinion of you and prophesies great success for you. I knew that today the Central Committee summoned you to Orlov on some of your institute business. After the conversation was over, I asked Orlov to introduce me to you, but it turns out that you quarreled with him. What's the matter, what happened?

I did not want to return to the topic of Orlov, but Tovmosyan was very persistent and curious. Then I told the essence of the matter.

- You are absolutely right in form - he personally grieved you, if he knew our "dagger customs" of the Caucasus, this would not have happened, but you are not right in essence. You got too excited and thereby worsened your situation. If this matter comes to the Central Control Commission, then it will be bad not for him, but for you. In Moscow, of course, they know that we are hot people, but our

we must use vehemence against the enemies of the Party, and not against friends.

- If there is an

enemy in the party at all, then this enemy is Orlov, - I noticed right there. -

You are

mistaken, he is not a diplomat and not even a theoretician, but he is devoted to the party with all the fibers of

his soul. - He was "with all the fibers of his soul" devoted to white counterintelligence, - I answer.

- How do you know that? -

I saw the documents...

- Yes, it's an old story. She has been the subject of an investigation by the Central Control Commission more than once. Nothing bad was found on him. After all, in the end, what is important now is not

that someone once was someone, something else is important - who is who today. We have quite a few members in the party with pre-revolutionary experience, but what good are they if they look backwards and not forwards. If you like, such old Party members today are even harmful to our cause.

Tovmosyan at these words looked intently into my eyes. And in those eyes he undoubtedly read the greatest astonishment. In fact, it was only the first time that I heard such a rude and cynical definition from Tovmosyan: "the old members of the party are harmful today." I absolutely could not understand this, I understood even less why and why Tovmosyan was telling me all this, was it really just for this statement that he brought me back.

Tovmosyan was silent expectantly. I had nothing to say, and it was useless to object. Convinced that I didn't have or didn't want to say anything, he apparently moved on to the main point.

- Do you know how right-wing leaders look at the national question?

- he asked.

- I hear about the right leaders for the first time from your lips, - I pretended naive.

- I'm talking about the theoretical school of Bukharin in your ICP -

Tovmosyan clarified the question.

- I declare that I also heard about this school for the first time only yesterday from the lips of Kaganovich.

I don't know how much he believed me, but really I had no idea about the existence of a special concept for

I knew that Lenin criticized Bukharin on a variety of legal and tactical issues (the theory of the state, the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, the national question, the historical and diamat), but I did not know whether Bukharin now had his own special views on the national policy of the party (Previously, Pyatakov and Bukharin had such views on the question of the right of peoples to self-determination, but now it has receded into the realm of history). All the more willingly, I asked Tovmosyan to tell what the essence of the national concept of the "Bukharin school" was. However, in

Tovmosyan's presentation, the national-theory of the "Rights" (further on he spoke of the "Rights") looked like I imagined it when I first encountered Sorokin in the ICP.

The rightists believe, Tovmosyan argued, that the Central Committee had become de-Russified. Previously, there was Jewish dominance, and now it is Caucasian. In other words, they believe that having removed the Central Jews (Trotsky, Zinoviev, Kamenev), the Caucasians - Stalin, Mikoyan, Ordzhonikidze and others - seized power. Therefore, the right-wingers declared war on the Caucasus. The victory of the Rights in our party would mean the victory not only of great-power chauvinism, but also of rabid Russian imperialism. Whoever now goes against Stalin - the founder of the Leninist national policy - goes against his own people. You are still young and politically inexperienced," Tovmosyan repeated, "but this concerns me and you, Caucasians, earlier and more than anyone else. The Russian communist Orlov is fighting with us against this ideology. Therefore, it is unfair to declare him an enemy

and to delve into his biography for this. Tovmosyan ended our conversation with a very specific proposal to tell him about all the tricks of the right in the IKP, about which I know anything significant.

- You mean to say that I know some unknown conspiracy

I'm right and I'm hiding this conspiracy from the Central Committee? - I begin to be indignant.

- No, no, your position is beyond doubt, but everything is fine with your friends, - he reassures me. The

telephone rang on the table. Tovmosyan slowly picks up the phone. Answers with one-syllable - "yes" or "no". Although it seems to me that it is about me, it is difficult to guess what "yes" or "no" means. Tovmosyan

hangs up and, without returning to the previous topic, informs me that there will be an interesting

conversation now. - With whom is this? -

involuntarily escapes from me. - With Kaganovich, - Tovmosyan answers in a tone of indifference, as if we are talking about a conversation with our Grandfather. Then he adds: "Kaganovich is a

smart person, he will never let our brother be offended." My head is so full of today's impressions and my nerves are so tense from excitement that I would be very glad if they told me: "You are free." However, I know that it is useless to refuse "high honor". I dutifully follow Tovmosyan, and a few minutes later we are already in the reception hall of Kaganovich, on the same floor, but at the other end (the offices of the secretaries were on the south side of the fourth floor), and on the inner doors there are inscriptions: "I. Stalin", "L.

Kaganovich", "V. Molotov", "N. Kubiak". In the hall I find all of our summoned: both students and professors, and even Yudin along with Orlov. All those present are silent, only in the other corner of the hall, standing by the window, Yudin and Orlov quietly whisper something to each other. Krinitsky and Kaganovich enter the hall from the office. We all get up. Kaganovich invites to sit down. He himself does not sit down and delivers a short speech, the meaning of which lies in the fact that the ICP has been and remains the most reliable theoretical support of the Central Committee in the fight against all the enemies of Leninism. He calls on those present to be worthy of this high calling of the red professors. Referring to his busy schedule, he says that he must leave us, but that Krinitsky will set out to us the specific goals of today's meeting. At these words, he gives the floor to Krinitsky and, bowing to us, leaves the

"Yesterday's demonstration in the Communist Academy against the Central Committee," Krinitsky began his speech, "definitely testifies to the trouble in the ICP. Most of those present are somehow involved in this demonstration. You must remember that we cannot keep within the walls of the ICP people who, in questions of the struggle for the purity of Marxism-Leninism, take the point of view of falsifiers. What is excusable to the worker from the machine, we cannot forgive the future theoreticians of the party. Perhaps some of you are misled as to the personality of Comrade Bukharin, but there is nothing against Comrade Bukharin as the personality of the Central Committee.

It has. We have fought and will fight against the anti-Leninist ideology and theory of Bukharin, although he is a member of the Politburo. Now is too serious a time for us to look with indifference at the revision of Leninism by the representatives of Right opportunism in the Party. Comrade Bukharin is the head of this opportunism. Of course, it is much easier to expel Comrade Bukharin from the Politburo and even from the Central Committee, but Right opportunism is an ideology that cannot be mechanically excluded. It has the ideologies of the old, restoration classes. It must be burned out with the red-hot iron of Leninism. We urge Comrade Bukharin himself to this and hope that sooner or later he will take this path. But the Central Committee cannot wait until Comrade Bukharin himself is about to do this. The Central Committee is responsible to the entire Party and the Comintern for any distortion of Leninism by its members. That is why the Central Committee has now declared the Right danger the main danger in the Party, and all conciliation to it an anti-Party crime...

Krinsky ended his long speech with an indication that sounded both like an order and like a threat: either all of you, students and teachers of the ICP, must join an active struggle against the right danger in the ICP itself, in the press and at the party and workers' meetings of Moscow, or the Central Committee is compelled to will discuss the question of the personnel of the ICP. It was already

about eleven o'clock in the evening when we left the building of the Central Committee.

X. RECONNECTIVITY IN THE BUKHARIN CAMP

Quite unexpectedly for us, the IKP found itself in the center of attention of the Central Committee. Of course, there were very good reasons for this. Firstly, the best propaganda forces of the party were gathered here, and secondly, Bukharin was recognized within these walls as an unquestioned authority in the field of Marxist theory. After the removal of the Trotskyites, the teaching staff from among the party members was considered purely Bukharin. From the very beginning of the organization of the ICP, Bukharin himself was listed as one of its leading professors on political economy and the theory of the Soviet economy. Therefore, it was important for the Central Committee that Bukharin's disqualification as a theoretician should begin "spontaneously", from below, and precisely with the ICP. Only later did I understand why the Central Committee, instead of simply declaring Bukharin

a heretic and anathematize his school, took this roundabout and more difficult path of reprisal. In the end, Krinitsky was right - the point is not in Bukharin's personality, but in how great his influence is in the theoretical and academic circles of the party activists and what are the forces that need to be dealt with along with Bukharin. The speeches against Bukharin were not so much a trial balloon, but rather a deeply calculated reconnaissance in the camp of the real and possible army of the Bukharinites. The Central Committee, or rather its Secretariat, fought for a sharp differentiation of the party - "for" and "against" Bukharin. The lower party masses were already in the hands of the Stalinist party apparatus, but at the top of the party the balance of power was far from being determined. Bukharin's preliminary "study" so far, only along the line of theory, was intended to introduce an artificial split into the party's active. The meeting of the Communist Academy served this purpose, meetings of the activists of Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, Minsk, Sverdlovsk, Baku, Tiflis and other large party centers were planned for the same purpose. However, our first "experimental" and undoubtedly very important, from the point of view of the Central Committee, meeting clearly failed. It is clear what a negative impression it made on the Stalinists for us. As soon as it was noticed in the Central Committee that Bukharin had more forces and presumably more sympathy in activist circles than the optimists from Stalin's entourage thought, the first measures of organizational influence and political pressure followed. The first blow was dealt to the Moscow leadership. Without announcing the motives, on November 27, 1928, the leading group of the MK of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, headed by Uglanov, was officially removed (its fate was sealed at the end of October, as I said above). At the same time, it was announced that Molotov had been "elected" Secretary of the Moscow Committee, concurrently retaining the post of Second Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. Already a year and a half later (April 1930) in the "Appeal of the Moscow Committee to Party Members" it was said, not without reason: "it was in the Moscow organization that the right opportunists, who tried to attack the general line of the party, received the first decisive blow." But neither in 1928 nor until the end of 1929 did the party press write that the leadership of the MK was removed for right-wing opportunism. It was said and written that there were "conciliators" to the right in the Mo

USSR (if I'm not mistaken, People's Commissar of Labor of the USSR). Ukhlanov, chairman of the Moscow Soviet, held his post until the end of 1930, when he was replaced by Bulganin, the "hero" of Ughlanov's exposure, but it was known within the party, at least among party activists, that the leadership of the Moscow Committee had been dispersed for supporting Bukharin with a temporary granting to its members, although it prominent, but less dangerous government posts for the Central

Committee. All this was a formidable warning and at the same time really the first blow against the Bukharin opposition. True, everyone guessed that the defeat of the Moscow leadership was a victory for the Central Committee apparatus and could become a Pyrrhic victory if a free poll of the party masses was carried out. In addition, the alignment of forces at the plenum of the Central Committee remained a complete mystery, when the question will openly and sharply arise: is there a right danger in the party in the person of Bukharin and Ughlanov (on the position

Rykov and Tomsy did not yet know anything), who had fought so resolutely yesterday, together with the entire leadership of the Central Committee, against the left deviation, against the Trotskyists. From this point of view, the struggle against Trotsky was a double-edged sword. Wide circles of the party attributed the relatively easy victory over Trotsky to the theoretical power and Leninist consistency of Bukharin, not Stalin. In the same struggle against Trotsky, Bukharin's prestige as an orthodox party theorist grew colossally. How, then, can this party be convinced that Bukharin is a worthless theoretician and an anti-Party deviationist? How can one harmonize with human, even with Stalinist logic, the retroactive declaration of everything written by Bukharin in the struggle against the Mensheviks and Trotskyists as anti-Leninist writings, especially since all these works were published under Lenin, many even with the approval and under the editorship of Lenin himself? What, finally, should be done with Stalin's repeated statements during the discussion against the Trotskyists that he would not let Bukharin offend anyone? What happened to Bukharin today that makes the Central Committee apparatus declare him the most dangerous person for the party? The point is not in Bukharin's past works, but in his present position within the Politburo, - argued in the party activists. And then they asked, what then is this position? At a meeting of party activists at the Communist Academy

Bukharin was not given a word. What Kaganovich said was irrelevant to the case, and what happened at the meeting of the bureau of the Moscow Committee and the Moscow "active" of the party was not known and was carefully concealed. The appointment of disgraced MKs to other, legally more responsible, government posts could only disorient not only the party, but also the "disgraced" themselves (the latter goal, of course, was also pursued for the time being). One thing was indisputable: a new crisis was brewing in the Central Committee. Stalin or Bukharin? - that's the formula for the crisis. Who is behind Stalin is more or less known, who is behind Bukharin is unknown. The true causes of the crisis are even less known. The soothing formula launched by the Agitprop of the Central Committee read only: "Vote for Stalin - you will not be mistaken!" The most zealous of us responded to this with Trotsky's formula: "Not a party, but Stalin's voting herd!"

The apparatus of the Central Committee, however, worked intensively and in an organized manner, recruiting the townsfolk, intimidating the "conciliators" and terrorizing the "deviators." Educational life in the IKP has been suspended for almost a long time. Non-Party professors and academicians sat out their hours in offices and libraries, while Party members, together with students, fought at Party meetings and discussions. The failed general meeting of the activists at the Communist Academy was decided to be held first at individual educational and scientific institutions - at the IKP, Komakademii, RANION, Sverdlovsk University and KUTV. Stalin. At all meetings, the same standard question was discussed: "Lenin's cooperative plan, the class struggle and the mistakes of the Bukharin school." Keynote speakers - members of the "theoretical team". L. Mekhlis, who was confidently going uphill, was the speaker at the IKP. The meeting was deliberately extended over two or three days in order to allow more lecturers and students to speak. Mekhlis performed his task brilliantly. Not a single statement, not a single thesis was "taken from the ceiling" - all this was substantiated by an endless number of large and small quotations from Marx, Engels and especially from Lenin. Mekhlis devoted the last part of his report to the so-called "two ways" of agricultural development - capitalist and socialist. The speaker argued, but less successfully and less confidently, that the Bukharin school was pushing the party onto the capitalist path.

development. Longest quotations from Bukharin's books "The Economy of the Transitional Period" and "On the Question of Trotskyism" were cited as evidence. Mekhlis ended his report by pointing out, just as Stalin did at the plenum of the MK and MKK of the CPSU(b) at the beginning of 1928, that there are neither right nor left in the Politburo, and that Bukharin's theoretical and political mistakes were in question in the past. But with this statement, Mekhlis spoiled his report, and most importantly, the long-range policy of Stalin Molotov-Kaganovich. This mistake of Mekhlis was immediately taken advantage of by the open and "hidden" students of Bukharin. In connection with this, I well remember the speeches of the then member of the Central Control Commission Stan and Sorokin. Stan open "shared the current views of Bukharin, but Sorokin in the eyes of the Ikapists and the Central Committee was still listed in the orthodox ranks. But today the day came when you had to put your cards on the table. How will Sorokin do this? Very few of us knew that he was indignation and protest against the now emerging "pro-Trotskyist" course

Central Committee. Many believed that with his direct character, morbid idealism and personal courage, anything could be expected from him, but not a cowardly flight from sensitive topics or calculated double-dealing for deep conspiracy. Several days have passed since we last saw each other at the apartment of Zinaida Nikolaevna. Before the beginning of the meeting, I ran into him face to face in the corridor of the Institute, but he passed without saying hello. This puzzled and offended me. Does he really think that I said anything about him in the Central Committee, or, perhaps, he was informed that I "pointed" at him? I was offended on both occasions and ran after him to demand an explanation. But I lost him in a crowd of students, and soon the meeting began. I took a seat in one of the last rows, not knowing how Sorokin would behave at today's meeting. With all the more tension I expected his speech. He was one of the first. Sorokin first of all questioned the theoretical value and good quality of the report itself.

Sorokin's introductory thesis still sounds fresh in my ears: "I did not expect such a gray, theoretically mediocre and politically miserable report even from Mekhlis," Sorokin said. This introduction riveted everyone's attention to Sorokin's speech. There was an expectant silence. Sorokin

Point by point, he began to analyze the report, accusing the speaker either of deliberately falsifying the Marxist-Leninist theory, or of obviously ignorant interpretation of it. When Mekhlis began to persistently protest against the "demagogic methods" of the speaker, Sorokin replied that he was ready to apologize to the speaker if the speaker explained the following provision to him - with these words, Sorokin read a rather long quote with clearly Marxist arguments about the development of modern capitalism and, having finished quote, defiantly turned to Mekhlis: - Tell me, Comrade Mekhlis, do you agree with the provisions set forth here?

"Of course," Mekhlis replied. -

Then I congratulate you, Comrade Mekhlis - this quote is from Mussolini, Sorokin said to the general laughter of the assembly.

Sorokin, deftly taking advantage of the impression he had made (we always spoke of this case later as a "quotation incident"), pathetically exclaimed: "A person who cannot

distinguish red from black, Lenin from Mussolini, wants to teach us the wisdom of Marxist theory!" How low our theory has fallen, if all sorts of half-educated people like Mekhlis were allowed into it! But I find, continued Sorokin, that Mekhlis consciously or unconsciously misleads us when he declares that we have gathered only to discuss Bukharin's "archival" mistakes and that these past mistakes of his have nothing to do with the current state of affairs in the Politburo. No, they have, and they have a thousand times! Bukharin was wrong on the question of the state in 1916, Bukharin was wrong on the question of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk in 1918, Bukharin was wrong on the question of trade unions in 1921, Bukharin could be wrong on some question today, in 1928, but then we have the right to criticize Bukharin not for imaginary or past, but for real and political mistakes. The past can serve only as an illustration, but not as a characteristic of Bukharin's present political face. Besides, name at least one member of the Politburo who has not made mistakes in the past? Revolutionaries make mistakes, but not the revolution. But not a single archivist like Mekhlis has yet been a revolutionary. He cowardly rummages through the archives instead of analyzing Bukharin's current position. Tales about the white bull are not worthy of the Bolsheviks. Or or. Or

Comrade Bukharin is really pushing the Party onto the path of restoring the capitalist order, then his place is not in the Politburo, but on some financial exchange, or Comrade Bukharin finds the current course of the Central Committee erroneous, then we must demand that he state his point of view openly and before the whole Party, as this has always been the case in such cases, relieving this overwhelming task of screamers from a theory like Mehlis. The game of hide-and-seek in politics is fraught with disaster, especially if it is played among like-minded people.

Sorokin ended his speech with an unexpected proposal: 1) to ask the Central Committee to invite Comrade Bukharin to speak in the press with an exposition of his views on the current policy of the party, 2) to ask the Central Committee, in case of Bukharin's refusal to comply with this demand, to raise the question of expelling him from the Politburo.

As soon as Sorokin finished his speech, violent protests erupted in the hall. -

"Breaker", "surgeon", "butcher", "Trotskyist", - they shouted in the hall. Even Mekhlis, already experienced in intrigues in internal party affairs, was clearly taken aback by such an unexpected end to Sorokin's speech.

The presiding Yudin, instead of seizing on Sorokin's radical proposal, spoke colorlessly about Bukharin's merits. Always unprincipled, but the most cunning of

the opportunists, Mitin, fully agreeing with Sorokin's assessment of Bukharin's mistakes, called the proposal to expel Bukharin from the Politburo "Trotskyite" "at the current stage of the discussion." The poorly oriented Luppel, Vice-Rector of the Institute for Academic Affairs, qualified Sorokin's speech as "catastrophic." Konstantinov, Leontiev, Fedoseev and Gladkov argued that Sorokin's speech was irresponsible and harmful. But Sorokin achieved his goal - confusion among the Stalinists. Of the ICP teachers, I remember the speeches of Varga and Stan (Mitin was then not allowed to teach at the ICP, he was a teacher at the subordinate Academy of Communist Education named after Krupskaya). Varga, in a monotone, grammatically flawless, but with a strong Hungarian accent, read a whole essay on Marx's theory of crises, which seemed to have nothing to

do with the topic under discussion. Stan, a tall, slender man with red hair

head of hair, like Yudin, the strongest orator and irresistible dialectician in theoretical debates, turned the meeting's attention to Mekhlis's report. - When people who only yesterday were not only Bukharin's first

students, but also his personal squires, like Mekhlis, begin to talk to us about the fall of their teacher, without revealing the reasons for their betrayal of him, they always make a vile impression. If the theoretical emptiness of such people is compensated by their unerring political instincts of opportunists, this, however, does not testify to their moral purity. You all know, and I also know that literally up to these days Mekhlis and Stetsky swore within these walls, by the way and inopportunistly, by the name of Bukharin more than by the name of Lenin. As for Mekhlis personally, for him Lenin as a theoretical authority did not exist at all. The God of Mekhlis was and always remained only Bukharin. Today Mekhlis made a 180-degree turn, but then it is permissible to ask him - what is the secret of your so wisest "transcendental apperception"? There are no words, Bukharin is a sinner, we wrote and talked about this even when (forgive me for the unphilosophical expression) you licked his heels, but tell me - whose heels did you like today? Nature does not like to offend the weak, she endowed the chameleon with all the colors of the rainbow, the hedgehog with thorns, the turtle with a shell, but she did not give a horn to a vigorous cow. If you want us to believe your childish talk about Bukharin's mistakes, then start

with the history of your own chameleonism in the party and defection in the group. Bukharin. Throughout Stan's speech, Mehliis shifted uneasily in his chair and ruffled his hair nervously. When Yudin asked if there were still those who wished to speak, Sorokin stood up and asked that his proposal be voted on and thus end the discussion of the issue. Protests against Sorokin's proposals were heard again from the hall. Someone demanded to give the floor to Mekhlis to explain about the speeches of Sorokin and Stan.

Mehliis asked for a break until tomorrow, but the meeting did not agree. Then Mehliis refused the word, which caused a commotion in the hall.

"Weak, weak, that means," they began to shout from the hall.

- He should consult with new heels, a new voice was heard.

Completely bewildered, Yudin did not know what to do, and meanwhile passions flared up more and more. Then someone made a new proposal: "In view of the refusal of Comrade Mekhlis to make a final speech, the meeting proceeds to vote Comrade Sorokin's proposals." Yudin looked inquiringly at Mekhlis, but even without Yudin Mekhlis guessed that even one vote on such a proposal would mean political death for him in the eyes of the Central Committee. He was not afraid of Stan's speech, he could, if not convincingly, then at least very deftly answer it, but Sorokin's proposals went beyond his powers at this meeting: "to ask the Central Committee to expel Bukharin from the Politburo"³¹, but also to oppose such a possible decision of the assembly, he did not have enough courage. However, guided by ³¹ Well-informed

Mekhlis, he knew that "the snag is precisely that Bukharin has been striving for a long time, and the Central Committee categorically refuses to allow Bukharin to speak openly in the press defending and substantiating his theoretical and political views. "The Central Committee cannot take the path of political hara-kiri," Kaganovich once cynically admitted on this occasion.

the wise formula of those days - "it is better to go too far than not to bend", - Mekhlis, probably for the only time in his life, took the risk. He spoke. Yudin breathed a sigh of relief, and a tense silence again settled in the hall. Mekhlis, of course, unleashed all his fire and anger on Stan. "I," he said, "was both a student of Bukharin and, perhaps, his squire, when this weapon accurately hit the Trotskyists, but I threw it away as soon as it rusted, and you, Stan, picked it up at that moment, when it clearly aims at the heart of the party. You can't blow up parties with such weapons, but they can explode on your own head." Regarding Sorokin, Mekhlis called his speech demagogic, incomprehensible in the part in which Sorokin demanded Bukharin's open speech. But unexpectedly both for the meeting and, as I later became convinced, for Sorokin himself, regarding the second proposal of the latter, Mekhlis stated:

- I fully and completely subscribe to Comrade Sorokin's proposal to raise the question of Bukharin's stay in the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Party! An incredible turmoil rose in the hall again: - We are not judges for members of the Politburo! - This is not a meeting of the Central Control Commission! - This is against Lenin's will! - Bukharin is not Sorokin, not Mekhlis, but the leader of the party!

to your tried and tested tool:

- Comrades, I announce a break until tomorrow, because in a few minutes there will be my general course lecture "Trotskyism and the

Russian historical process" (on this part everyone was unanimous). Of course, we had no time for the lecture,

but Pokrovsky, as the rector, was in a hurry to save the face of the Institute. Yudin and Mekhlis were saved, and the Institute was saved too. We left the stuffy room, mentally thanking the savior. Dedodub still continued majestically to stand at his post, Elena Petrovna, like a swallow, fluttered along the corridors. There, outside the windows, a healthy Nekrasov autumn was visibly striding into late winter, and the moon, so pale and unhappy, forcibly escaping from the tenacious embrace of thunderclouds, slowly crawled somewhere far, far away, into infinity ... Where were we crawling to?

XI. STALIN CREATES THE "RIGHT" Central

Committee stubbornly, consistently and methodically continued his line of exposing, or rather creating, "Right opportunism" in the Party. At first, it was sharply emphasized that this was not about specific individuals in the Central Committee, the Moscow Committee and in the localities, but about the ideology that exists both in the party and in the country. All oral and already beginning printed propaganda hit this point. The purpose of such empty, pointless, nameless propaganda was not clear to the middle party peasant, not to mention the average layman. Many, even here at the Institute, asked themselves and each other in bewilderment - if there are no Right opportunists in the Central Committee and in the Party, then where did this harmful Right opportunism come from? Wouldn't it be more correct

to say that a certain group of people in the Central Committee developed a persecution mania, frightening with imaginary rightists, or a political hallucination of "right-wing opportunism"? But the apparatus of the Central Committee was inexorable. "The left danger is a past stage, but there is another, now the main danger for the party - the right danger. All the fire and all the anger of the party and the people are against right opportunism" - this is how the secret letters of the Secretariat of the Central Committee to the party organizations began and ended throughout 1928 of the year. If these letters had not been signed by Stalin, then the mass of the Party would doubtless have thought that the first Right opportunist was apparently Stalin himself. In fact, he, Stalin, criticized Trotsky from the right positions: after all, it was he, Stalin, who opposed the "permanent revolution", after all, it was he, Stalin, who defended the NEP and peasant economic freedom against Trotsky's desire to "rob the peasantry", after all, it was he, Stalin, defended the sacred right of trade unions to protect the professional and material interests of workers before the bureaucratic apparatus of the Soviet state against Trotsky's demand for the "nationalization" of trade unions, because it was he, Stalin, who demanded entry into the League of Nations, an alliance with Persil (trade unions) and Chiang Kaishi, who could be right among the Bolsheviks, if not this Stalin?

But Stalin demands a fight against "right-wing opportunism", which means he is not right. Then who is? They sorted through all the members of the Politburo, the Secretariat, the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission, and finally, the Comintern, the Profintern, the Krestintern, but they did not find

anyone to the right of Stalin. Even more chaos was brought into the minds of the Communists by Stalin himself in October 1928, when, as already mentioned, at the plenum of the Moscow Committee and the ICC he declared: "We have neither right nor left in the Politburo!" Were there rightists somewhere in the republican Central Committees or regional committees? No, it was not. In a word, there were no rightists anywhere, but there was a rightist, mortal danger. From where? After all, all the communists are registered, all the leaders are in plain sight! According to Stalin, it turned out that any of them is a possible right, therefore - a merciless struggle against these possible right! Since no one wanted to be this future candidate for Siberia, everyone tried to "insure" himself: the entire party, almost a million strong, shouted with one voice: "Catch the

By the end of 1928, every speech by a communist at a party meeting, any article in the press, another radio broadcast, folk ditties on the stage, clown jokes in the circus were accompanied by one invariable morality: the right-wing danger is the main danger! The unknown right-wing danger was made so much negative publicity in the USSR in one year that the most orthodox began to shout furiously: stop talking endlessly about the right-wing danger, give us the right-wing ones - we will exterminate them!

At the same October plenum of the MK and MKK, Stalin drew attention to the mass psychosis that he himself created in the party. Stalin said³²:

"Those comrades are also wrong who, when discussing the problem of the right deviation, sharpen the question on persons representing the right deviation. Point out to us the rightists or conciliators, they say, name the persons so that we can deal with them. This is an incorrect formulation of the question. ", of course, play a certain role. But the point here is not in persons, but in those conditions, in that situation which give rise to the Right danger in the Party. One can avert persons, but this does not mean that by doing so we have undermined the roots of the Right danger in our party. Therefore, the question of persons

does not decide matters, although it is of undoubted interest. It is impossible not to recall, in this connection, one episode in Odessa that took place at the end of 1919 and the beginning of 1920, when our troops, having driven Denikin's soldiers out of Ukraine, 32 I. Stalin. Works, vol. 11,

p. the war will end." However, the goal of psychosis was achieved - Stalin named the first victim: Bukharin. In this case, even the "active" gasped: this

theoretician of Bolshevism, Trotsky's favorite thunderstorm of the party, Stalin's savior, the "leftist" of the "left communists" in 1918, turned out to be a right-wing restorer of capitalism, an ideologist of the kulaks and an enemy of the party! This was not believed even after such preparation. This was the case towards the end of 1928. But it was too late to retreat. Either Stalin - or Bukharin - so the question became already in itself. Bukharin enjoyed

the trust of the party, the sympathy of the government (Rykov), the support of the trade unions (Tomsky) and had a learned head. Stalin had none of this. But he had something more than a party, trade unions, government and a scientific head - an iron will to power and a well-organized apparatus of professional conspirators within the party and the state. The further work of this apparatus followed two lines: the mobilization of the "active" against Bukharin and the provocation of Bukharin to "anti-Party" speeches. Because of some old mistakes, known and forgiven by Lenin himself, it was impossible to destroy Bukharin. What was needed were new, fresh mistakes or the "discovery" of Bukharin's old, hitherto "unknown" crimes (which, as we know, later happened - "Bukharin wanted to kill Lenin, Stalin, Sverdlov in alliance with the Socialist-Revolutionaries" in 1918!)

On the first line, they acted the same way as we do at the Institute. In our country, of course, as in the Communist Academy, things were not going well with the apparatus of the Central Committee. But this was explained by the specific composition of the ICP and personal influence and personal connections of Bukharin with these institutions. The situation was simpler in other institutions and organizations, especially in areas obedient to the center. By the end of 1928, the apparatus of the Central Committee was able to hold in all the major centers of the country, first narrow (for intelligence!), And then wide assets with

speakers from the Central Committee itself. At all meetings of the activists they discussed the same report - "The Righteous Danger and Mistakes of Comrade Bukharin." The speakers had not only ready-made theses, but also a ready-made text of a resolution from the Central Committee, which had only to be put to a vote. And it went! "We strongly condemn Comrade Bukharin's mistakes..." "We strongly support

Leninist Central Committee..." "We resolutely demand the disarmament of Bukharin..." "We resolutely demand that the Central Committee hold Comrade Bukharin

accountable..." Of course, the Central Committee was not able to obtain such resolutions everywhere. , Kharkov, Ivanovo Voznesensk), threw the Central Committee's cheat sheet into the basket, escorted the envoys of the Central Committee far from politely and issued clearly anti-Stalinist resolutions.

Kabakov), Ivanovo-Voznesensky (secretary of the regional committee, it seems, Komarov), resolutions were passed in which they demanded "the preservation of unity and the cessation of apparatus intrigues against the honored leaders of the party." In the Politburo itself and in the Presidium of the Central Control Commission, at first, apart from Rykov and Tomsy, Bukharin was supported by Ordzhonikidze, Kalinin, Shvernik, Yenukidze and Yaroslavsky. N. K. Krupskaya, the widow of Lenin, who had already burned herself on Trotsky (Stalin at one time almost expelled her from the party because of her support for Trotsky), at meetings of the Politburo and the Presidium of the Central Control Commission, during the discussion of the right, she was gloomily silent, and after the meeting, as they said then, she came to Rykov's apartment, then to Bukharin's and cried for hours, saying:

- I keep silent because of the memory of Volodya (Lenin), this Asian monster will still drag me to the Lubyanka, and this is a shame and shame on the

whole world ... And then, gradually coming to her senses, she repeated her famous phrase of the

Trotskyist times: - What am I? Indeed, if Volodya lived today, he would have planted him too. Terrible scoundrel, taking revenge on all Leninists because of Ilyich's political will about him!

The second line is, as I call it, the line of provoking the actions of future rightists on the most important issues of the current policy of the party and government. This policy was mainly predetermined by the last two party congresses - in the field of industrialization by the XIV Congress (1925) and collectivization by the XV Congress (1927). What Stalin later attributed to the Rights, that they were against this general policy in the development of industry and agriculture, was without any basis. The Rightists disagreed with Stalin not about the need to lead things towards socialism, not about the need to carry out industrialization, not about the need to steer the course towards socialist agriculture, but

how and by what methods to do it all. Stalin did

not give absolutely no specific answer to the cardinal question, "how and by what methods" until December 1929, but he demanded an answer from the right as early as June 1928, immediately after his speech at the Institute of Red Professors. Two commissions of the Politburo were created, an industrial commission under

chairmanship of the head of the Soviet government Rykov with deputy Kuibyshev and a village commission chaired by the second secretary of the Central Committee V. Molotov with deputy Yakovlev. Stalin and Bukharin were members of both commissions. The industrial commission developed the first "five-year plan", and the village commission - a plan for the collectivization of agriculture.

Both commissions had at their disposal a huge apparatus of specialists from the State Planning Commission (Chairman Krzhizhanovsky) and the Central Statistical Bureau (Head Osinsky). On the question "what to do?" both commissions came to a unanimous decision - to carry out both the five-year plan and collectivization, but on the most important and decisive question, "how and with the help of what methods", the speakers were appointed: Rykov in his commission, and Bukharin - in the Molotov commission. Both speakers, relying on the data, consultations and conclusions of specialists from the institutions I have already mentioned, presented written theses, which, as on the first question, were to be considered theses of the Politburo and directives of the Central Committee when they were adopted by the commissions. So, in fact, since then, finally, the desired rightists were born in the

Politburo as well. The quintessence of Rykov's theses is the observance of the correct proportion between the two branches of industrial development - between heavy and light industry. The course - on heavy industry, but light industry - as a stimulus and one of the sources for the development of heavy industry, while maintaining equal rates of development of one and the other branch of industry. Rejection of any form of forced labor as unprofitable in the economy. Rejection of bureaucratic decrees and a broad initiative to the localities for the development of local industry, for the production of consumer goods. Two variants of the five-year plan - optimal and minimal. Optimal is a plan that is desirable for implementation, but far from being real, the minimum is a possible and real plan. Achieve the best by doing the least. Since the five-year plan is the first experience and a grandiose undertaking for the entire national economy, within this five-year plan it is necessary to single out the first two years in particular by drawing up a special two-year plan for the development of agriculture.

economy as the first step towards the fulfillment of the entire five-year plan. This is basically the meaning of Rykov's theses.

Bukharin's theses are a course towards the development of socialist agriculture, towards the co-operation of agriculture in all three forms: production, trade and marketing. Equal and even development of all three forms, with a resolute rejection of administrative coercion.

Voluntariness, not government, but voluntariness. Broad state support - real lending and subsidies to those who wish to embark

on the path of production cooperation while simultaneously taxing the kulaks, which can also force them to abandon individual forms of management and embark on the path of collectivization ("peaceful growth of the kulak into socialism"). All-round encouragement - lowering taxes, lowering wholesale prices, credit - to trade cooperation, giving it the opportunity to sell its goods at prices lower than those of the Nepman (private trade). Raising prices for agricultural products and reducing prices for manufactured goods in the state trade network for the development of marketing cooperation and the general rise of agriculture. In a word, throw the slogan "Get rich!"³³ at peasant Russia. Such was the meaning of Bukharin's theses. When these theses were submitted for approval at the next meeting of the Politburo (usually several members of

the Presidium of the Central Control Commission were also present at the meeting of the Politburo with an advisory vote), Kuibyshev and Molotov sharply, rudely and defiantly declared: everything that Rykov and Bukharin are now offering us is the plan right opportunism. In the ensuing heated debate, the roles were played out according to the schedule: Kaganovich, Voroshilov, Mikoyan, Kirov, already prepared in advance by Stalin, not only joined in the assessment of Kuibyshev and Molotov, but also demanded that they be brought to the attention of the Central Committee, and then to the attention of the entire party, that in There are rightists in the Politburo, represented by Rykov and Bukharin. Already the discussion was deliberately conducted not in the plane of acceptance or not

33 N.I. Bukharin. Economist's Notes. "The Truth" (1928(?) ed.).

acceptance of the proposed theses, but the identification and announcement of hitherto nameless right opportunists Stalin, as usual in

In such cases, he played "neutrality" until the balance of forces and the reaction of Bukharin and Rykov were finally clarified. At this meeting, Tomsy openly joined Bukharin and Rykov, while Ordzhonikidze, Shvernik, Kalinin and Yaroslavsky spoke out against the unfounded accusations of Kuibyshev and Molotov, offering a business-like discussion of the theses for acceptance or rejection.

Stalin did not say a word either for or against the substance of the discussion. With approximately the same ratio of votes, the meeting ended in a "draw". A general commission was chosen to discuss the points of both theses. The "neutral" Stalin was elected chairman of the commission, of course, Bukharin and Rykov were also included in it, Tomsy was voted out, and the rest of the commission members were the same people who opposed the "theses" at the Politburo. Now Bukharin and Rykov were dealing with a solid majority against themselves, while the position of the "neutral" chairman was suspiciously "unknown". Although the meeting of the Politburo was closed, on the second day we in the IKP knew the details I had just told. Officially, of course, this was carefully hidden. It was then that the rumor first circulated (deliberately put into motion, or simply a popular rumor, I cannot say this) that Stalin himself was among the "rightists", although under pressure from the majority of the Politburo he allowed the "theoretical processing" of Bukharin on behalf of the Central Committee. The Bukharinites categorically denied this, but for some reason the Stalinists did not refute this for a long time.

Stalin continued to assert³⁴: "We

had occasions to come across carriers of the Right danger in the grass-roots organizations... If you climb higher, to the county, provincial Party organizations... then you could easily find here the bearers of the Right danger... If you climb even higher and to raise the question of the members of the Central Committee, it must be admitted that even in the composition of the Central Committee there are some, it is true, the most insignificant, elements of a conciliatory attitude towards the Right danger ... Well, what about the Politburo? Are there any deviations in the Politburo? We do not have a Politburo of either rightists or "leftists", nor conciliators with them. This must be said here with all categoricalness. It's time to stop gossip..."

December 1928 finally cleared the horizon: Stalin, at a meeting of the general commission, offered his counter-theses against Bukharin and Rykov both on questions of collectivization and on questions of industrialization. These theses were approved by the commission against two votes (Rykov and Bukharin). Stalin's counter-theses radically diverged from the guidelines of Rykov and Bukharin, even more so from the directives of the XIV and XV Party Congresses, precisely on the question of the methods, ways and pace of carrying out the five-year plan in industry and agriculture. The commission, having accepted Stalin's plan, however, gave Bukharin and Rykov the right to present their criticism of Stalin's plan in writing at the next meeting of the Politburo. Rykov was against using this right; Bukharin wanted to prove the unprovable at all costs. Tomskey unquestioningly joined Bukharin. Rykov then surrendered. This is how counter-theses appeared on all the main questions of the Party's economic policy in the name of this troika. The apparatus of the Central Committee reproduced these theses and sent them out as a "platform of the Rights" to local organizations even before they became the subject of discussion in the Politburo. Stalin's theses were attached to them - as a decision of the Central Committee, against which the right-wing troika now opposes. Stalin formalized the "rightists" legally, and the "party activists" began to demand reprisals against the "troika". While Stalin considered it possible to convene

a meeting of the Politburo, a flood of resolutions formed in the Central Committee from the field - "we strongly condemn the right-wing capitulators - Bukharin, Rykov, Tomskey", "we strongly demand their withdrawal from the Politburo", "we strongly demand ... we demand ...". Now, in the midst of this

stream of resolutions and the "indignation of the party" against the rightists, a meeting of the secretaries of the regional committees, regional committees and the Central Committee of the national communist parties was convened to sum up the discussion of the "platform of the rightists". The meeting, with a small number of "against", but with a significant number of "abstentions", submitted a proposal to the Politburo and the Presidium of the Central Control Commission to condemn the "platform of the Rights". Now Stalin convened the Politburo and reported the result of the "discussion" in the local "organizations" of the party and the central meeting of the Central Committee.

The vacillating members of the Politburo and the Presidium of the Central Committee submitted to the "will of the party." Rykov, Bukharin and Tomskey found

the well-known phrase I quoted for the first time in another place:

- How many times have I told Nikolai Ivanovich (Bukharin. - A. A.) - there is no need to draw up written documents!

Subsequently, in February 1937, he repeated this phrase again. Rykov did not understand that Bukharin's restless hand was guided by the invisible will of Stalin.

Stalin needed written documents (of course, he would have done his job without them, but it was easier that way), but Bukharin loved to write. Stalin exploited this weakness.

"Here are the documents signed by you, comrades," Stalin threw them every time the rightists began to resist. And it made an impression.

XII. BUKHARIN IS LOOKING FOR

"ALLIES" The struggle that had begun between the Rights and Stalin's group confronted the Trotskyists and Zinovievites with a difficult decision: what to do? Ideologically, in the current dispute between Stalin and Bukharin, they stood closer to Stalin ("the rightist danger is the main danger in the party and the country"), psychologically they could not support Stalin, since the wounds inflicted on them by Stalin in alliance with the same Bukharin were too great. Politically, their orientation towards Stalin's group would mean a catastrophe for them: complete ideological, this time voluntary, disarmament before Stalin. In this case, the Trotskyites and Zinovievites would have buried themselves in the eyes of the Party as an orthodox "Leninist trend" within the Party, which they have been claiming up to now. Even less acceptable was Bukharin's group. Not Stalin, but Bukharin, was the leading, main ideologist and theorist of exposing the platform of both the Trotskyists and the Zinovievists, and then the "united Trotskyist-Zinovievist bloc" (1926). Without Bukharin's propaganda machine and theoretical laboratory, Stalin would have perished even in the first clash with the Trotskyists, not to mention the united bloc of Trotskyists and Zinovievites. It must not be forgotten that in the early stages of the development of the discussion for "Lenin's legacy," in other words, for power, the center of gravity lay in the realm of theory and program. The apparatus of the OGPU was set in motion for physical reprisal only after an ideological victory. The ideological reprisal against the Trotskyites and Zinovievites ended at the 15th Party Congress (December 1927).

Since 1928, physical reprisals began - Trotskyites and Zinovievites began to be exiled in tens and hundreds to Siberia. Ideologically discredited as anti-Leninists, especially after the anti-Stalinist demonstrations on November 7, 1927 (on the anniversary of the October Revolution) in Moscow (Trotsky) and Leningrad (Zinoviev), the Trotskyists and Zinovievites were easily handed over to the OGPU. Now Bukharin was left face to face with Stalin, and Stalin began to lay siege first to the "Bukharin school" (theoretical criticism), and then to Bukharin's group (political criticism). Under these conditions, one had to answer the question: "how to be"? By the start of the campaign against Bukharin, many of the leading leaders of Trotskyism, including Trotsky himself, had been exiled. But Trotsky still had underground groups in Moscow that continued their illegal work against Stalin. To these groups belonged also some of those who signed the declaration of surrender and therefore avoided exile and were restored to their rights as members of the party. Among the Zinovievites, on the contrary, the rank-and-file members were repressed, while Zinoviev and Kamenev themselves, having unconditionally signed the surrender and recognizing Stalin as the "great leader" and Trotsky as the "historical enemy" of the people, remained in Moscow. Zinoviev and Kamenev, of course, were not sincere, and Stalin did not believe them one iota, but in that period such self-flagellation of the "old Bolsheviks" and their flattering praise of Stalin as Lenin's "most faithful comrade-in-arms" poured water on Stalin's mill.

A new split in the Politburo, completely unexpected for Zinoviev and Kamenev, confronted them with the same question: "what to do, with whom to go"? The Bukharinites themselves perfectly understood that by appealing to the old opposition groups in the fight against Stalin, they themselves risked becoming unprincipled bankrupts in politics. For Stalin, such a turn of the Bukharinites towards Trotskyism provided invaluable tactical trump cards, while Bukharin gained little, since Trotsky's main cadres and Trotsky himself, as already indicated, were not only politically, but also physically isolated.

With all this, the Bukharinites understood that a bloc was possible only on the basis of a single platform on the leading questions of domestic and foreign policy, but such a platform with Trotsky was ruled out. As for Zinoviev, he himself was a very unsuitable person for

illegal negotiations, even more so for the bloc with him. He had already entered into a bloc with Trotsky twice, and both times betrayed him at the most critical moment. An enthusiastic tribune of the revolution, when its victory was certain, he easily panicked if he had to risk his head. So it was with him on the eve of the decisive days of the October coup of the Bolsheviks, when at secret meetings of the Central Committee on October 10 and 16, 1917, he twice voted with Kamenev against an armed uprising. On the night of the October coup, he generally disappeared to no one knows where, creating an alibi for himself, although his friend Kamenev, together with Trotsky, personally directed the course of the uprising from the Smolny Institute. Perhaps this explained the fact that when the Rights decided to negotiate with the Zinovievists about creating a bloc against Stalin, they turned not to Zinoviev, but to Kamenev. Moreover, the Rights were inclined to exclude Zinoviev from the new combination altogether if Kamenev and the Zinovievites agreed to joint action without Zinoviev. In the summer of 1928, Bukharin and Kamenev led these negotiations on behalf of the Rights. The conversation took place with observance of all conditions of conspiracy at Kamenev's apartment. Only one Sokolnikov was present - the "intermediary" and friend of Kamenev. After informing Kamenev in detail about the main points of disagreement within the Politburo and about the mood of its individual members, Bukharin made a concrete proposal for a bloc. Kamenev wrote down Bukharin's confession almost with stenographic accuracy, considering himself morally obligated to bring the contents of Bukharin's conversation to Zinoviev's attention. On the same day, Kamenev showed Zinoviev his "record of the conversation." Pleasantly surprised, Zinoviev saw in Bukharin's revelations completely unexpected prospects for his return to power. But soon Kamenev's handwritten note also ended up in Stalin's possession. One can imagine how delighted Stalin was when he received in his hands such a disastrous weapon for the Bukharinites. "The rightists are already in the coffin, it's only the grave that matters," he triumphantly. After this failure, the Bukharinites were very skeptical about any proposals made by representatives of the former opposition. The Trotskyites enjoyed the best reputation among the Bukharinites both as an ideological force and as anti-Stalinist fanatics. Moreover, the Trotskyists, despite the defeat and exile of their leaders, con

"Stalinist reaction". Courage, fearlessness and willingness to make personal sacrifices favorably distinguished the Trotskyists from the Zinovievites. In this respect, the Trotskyists as allies would have been a very real force, but the ideological abyss between the "Lefts" and the "Rights" was that dead zone into which neither the doctrinaire Bukharinists nor the idealist Trotskyists dared to enter. Rare individuals from both groups have risen above both doctrines in terms of understanding historical perspectives. The struggle was not for Leninism, but for power - neither the left nor the right understood this. Stalin understood this perfectly. Therefore, clinging to the letters of Leninism, both the left and the right were rapidly falling to the bottom, while Stalin was just as rapidly moving towards the pinnacle of power. He reached it exactly one year later, in December 1929, when for the first time the whole country read on the pages of Pravda: "Stalin is the leader of the party and the best student

of Lenin." It was, as it were, legal documentation of a historic upheaval... When mass deportations began, especially those of leading leaders, the Trotskyists radically changed tactics. With or without the knowledge of their leadership, they in their mass stopped the open struggle against the "party" and switched to illegal methods. It was now practically impossible to fight openly against the Stalinist Central Committee. Already the 15th Party Congress declared the preaching of Trotskyism incompatible with being in the Party. Therefore, those who previously belonged to the Trotskyists, and now wanted to remain in the party or return to the party, had to publicly announce (prominent Trotskyists - in the press, privates - at party meetings) that they recognize the "general line" as correct, Stalin as the leader, and Trotsky an enemy of the party. For the Trotskyists, this was a difficult and contrary to their nature task. Still, they were forced to do so, since there was no other way back to the party. Although Stalin was suspicious of their return or repentance, but at that time it was beneficial to him in the fight against the Bukharinites. Therefore, Trotskyists were reinstated in the party in masses, returned from exile, and some of them were again promoted to leading positions. Only Trotsky and a few of his best friends persisted. However, the majority of Trotskyists recognized Stalin only in words, in order to fight further for Trotsky's cause in deeds. Trotskyists of this kind were in almost all levels of the organs

state administration, with the exception of the party apparatus itself and the political police. Despite the total defeat that followed the "Malenkov plan", the Trotskyists had the strongest influence among the Moscow students. Almost half of the teaching staff of social sciences in Moscow universities were former or real Trotskyists, the other half were clearly Bukharin. Least of all was the influence of the Trotskyists among the workers, and even less among the peasantry. Here and there the pro-Bukharin mood prevailed. I have already said that by returning to the party or by openly repenting of their "sins", the Trotskyists changed their tactics in the fight against Stalin. They created their own groups and circles, which were recruited exclusively from communists and set as their goal the development of illegal work both in the party and among the workers. Accordingly, methods of work were developed - in the party to conduct individual indoctrination of party members in an anti-Stalinist spirit, in the working environment to carry out illegal work by mass and systematic distribution of leaflets, leaflets and slogans. The first leaflets of this kind were sent from Alma-Ata, signed by Trotsky himself. They were followed by appeals to the Moscow "Bolshevik-Leninists" from the former commander of the Moscow military district Muralov, to "comrades-in-arms and like-minded people" from Mrachkovsky and others. In Moscow they were reprinted on a hectograph and then distributed throughout the country in a variety of ways through the Union in official publications (through their people); via mail - as registered letters to local party organizations and their leaders; through trade and cooperative organizations - as wrapping paper for trade parcels. Appeals drawn up in Moscow were always of an anonymous nature: "group of Bolshevik-Leninists", "Leninist group", "group of old Bolsheviks", "group of workers' Bolsheviks".

Organized groups of Trotskyists (officially calling themselves "Bolshevik-Leninists" as opposed to "Bolshevik Stalinists") existed in almost all research institutions of the Communist Academy.

XIII. POLITICAL COMMISSIONERS OVER THE RIGHT

After condemning the platform of the "right opposition" in the Politburo, Stalin also made the appropriate organizational conclusions: he took all three leaders under the strict control of his "political commissars", who were supposed to ensure the implementation of the "general line" in the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR (Chairman Rykov), in the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions (Chairman Tomsy), in the newspaper Pravda (editor-in-chief Bukharin) and in the Comintern (Secretary of the Political Secretariat Bukharin - the post of chairman of the executive committee was eliminated after the removal of Zinoviev). "Political commissars" were appointed people close to Stalin, who were provided with places of future members of the Politburo, depending on how they could justify their appointment - not only to control the right, but also to compromise them as leaders. As such political commissars were seconded: to Rykov - Sergo Ordzhonikidze, to Bukharin - Savelyev (later Mekhlis), to Tomsy - L. Kaganovich (as a member of the presidium of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions, who was simultaneously the third secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU / b /). Through the Comintern, Manuisky was appointed to Bukharin, but with stricter control of the entire delegation of the CPSU (b) in the Comintern headed by Molotov (Stalin, Manuisky, Molotov, Kaganovich, Pyatnitsky, Kuusinen, Skrypnik, Shatskin, Lominadze). Bukharin was not formally removed from the delegation, but he was forbidden to

communicate directly with other delegations and sections of the Comintern. These political commissars (they were officially called representatives of the Central Committee) actually led the departments of right-wing leaders. So, for example, not a single order of the chairman of the Rykov government had legal force if it was not signed simultaneously by Ordzhonikidze. Written and signed by the editor-in-chief Bukharin, Pravda could not be sent to print unless Savelyev endorsed it. Not a single decision of the Presidium of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions, adopted by a majority vote of its members, could be sent to the trade unions if Kaganovich imposed his veto on it. Molotov, as the second secretary of the Central Committee, was supposed to develop a system of control of the party apparatus over the Soviet apparatus, in which people worked who had ever been in one way or another related to the right. The latter were placed in such conditions

fruitful work. Being members of the Politburo and heads of departments, they were forced to turn to their "deputies", not members of the Politburo, and coordinate with them every step and every action - from oral orders to the people's commissariats to the next front line in Pravda. These "deputies" constantly

used their "veto" power, which paralyzed any government, trade union or editorial work. On all these issues, then I had to turn to the Politburo as an arbitrator, but the arbitrator, as a rule, always decided in favor of the "deputies." This practice, of course, could not continue for long. At first, the rightists decided on tacit self-elimination. They sanctioned only those orders that were given by their "deputies" or adopted at meetings only those decisions on which they made proposals. But then the "deputies" themselves began to complain to the Politburo about their bosses, who were organizing an "Italian strike". They come to work, but they don't work. The Politburo began to threaten more serious organizational measures of influence. Then the Bukharinites themselves drew organizational conclusions from this: they submitted their resignations from all leading posts:

Rykov - from the post of chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR; Tomsy - from the post of chairman of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions; Bukharin - from the post of editor-in-chief of the Pravda newspaper. Now it seemed that Stalin had achieved his goal - the voluntary departure from the stage of the leaders of the "right opposition". However, the Politburo, at the suggestion of the same Stalin, rejected the resignation, invited them to continue their work, but wrote down a new "article of accusation" for them. It read: "surrenders". The rightists want to "capitulate" before the class enemy, the rightists are frightened of "our difficulties of growth", the rightists are "deserting from the front of socialist construction", the rightists are the "strikebreakers of socialism". For the purposes of this new accusation, the very resignation of the right seemed to have been provoked. In this sense, she really achieved her goal in the circles of the party activists who sympathized with the right. Both the Bukharinites and the sympathizers of the "Right Opposition" expected that the Right leaders, preparing for the next party congress, would hold on to their essentially decisive positions in the state until the general battle was fought at the congress itself. "Bukharin, Rykov, Tomsy are preparing a bomb against

Stalin's conspiratorial group at the 16th Party Congress "- such was a very widespread opinion in the anti-Stalinist activists of the party. Instead, an unprincipled game of parliamentarianism took place - "resignation ". this resignation. It is not too late to draw the appropriate political conclusions. It is necessary to speed up the convocation of the congress at any cost. Moreover, the motivation for the resignation of the rightists should have forced the Central Committee to request a decision of the congress on controversial issues. The rightists resigned, but, in fact, there was no "capitulation" here The rightists declared that since the apparatus of the Central Committee usurped power from them and deliberately created impossible working conditions, they were forced to leave their posts, but that they were still convinced of the disastrous policy of the majority of the Central Committee, which was at odds with all the directives of the party, in particular XIV and XV The Rights reserved the right to present their views to the next congress and to defend them at that congress. "The current line of the majority of the Central Committee will objectively lead to the establishment of the dictatorship of the party oligarchy for state feudal exploitation of workers and military-feudal robberies of the peasantry. We warned the Central Committee and want to warn the party from this path that is disastrous for the party and the Soviet state. Talk about the "right opposition" serves as a smokescreen to lull the vigilance of the Party in the face of this greatest danger... What is the way out? There is only one way out: back to Lenin, to go forward along Lenin! There is no other way out. We are in a position to convince the Party of this. Therefore, we demand the immediate convening of the next Party Congress." That was, approximately, the meaning of the long announcement of the "three" about their resignation. This statement was not made public at that time (for the first time it was made public at the April Plenum of the Central Committee in 1929 as an accusatory document against the Rights), but it became known in the Party. It also greatly contributed to the rapprochement between the Trotskyists and the Bukharinites. The Trotskyists believed that if Bukharin did not "capitulate" to Stalin, then he undoubtedly capitulated to Trotsky, who already in the New Course foresaw the main contours of the current policy of the Central Committee. Bukharin, more than four years late, came with his group to the same conclusions. Hence the rapprochement between the Trotskyists, led by

the famous Soviet philosopher N. Karev, and Stan, the leader of the right-wing group in our Institute. On the theoretical front of the USSR, both of them were stars of the first magnitude. Since the Trotskyists could not speak out openly, Karev had to "surrender" to Stan. He suggested to his group that they stop fighting against the Rights, and that all their theoretical speeches against Stalinism be built in the spirit of the concept of the Bukharin school. The same was done by Trotskyist groups in other educational and research institutions (Magyar - in the Communist Academy, Mif - in the Association for the Study of National and Colonial Problems at the KUTV named after Stalin, Plotnikov - in RANION, etc.). Thus, what Bukharin failed from above, in his

conversation with Kamenev, was easily accomplished by the leaders of the local groups from below. The same contact was established with the former Zinovievites in Leningrad, where Zinoviev's main base used to be (O. Tarkhanov, G. Safarov, Raltsevich, and others), and with Skrypnik's National Communists in Kharkov. In other national republics, the rightists had their own groups in Central Asia (secretary of the Central Committee of Uzbekistan Ikramov, chairman of the Council of People's Commissars Faizulla Khodzhaev, chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of Turkmenistan - Kurbanov), in Azerbaijan (Akhundov, Musabekov, Bunait-Zade), in Georgia (Budu Mdivani - a Trotskyist, Orakhelashvili is a Bukharinian). In the Moscow "fellowship" of the nationalists in opposition to Stalin were Ryskulov (deputy chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR), Korkmasov (deputy chairman of the New Alphabet Committee), Nurmakov (deputy

secretary of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR) and others. As I have already pointed out, many of the secretaries At first, the regional committees openly supported Bukharin's group, but after the central meeting at the Central Committee, they fell silent, although it was not known how they, and others, would behave at the party congress. Only an immediate party congress should have prevented their final absorption by the apparatus of the Central Committee. The change of secretaries in Moscow and other parts of the country, which had already begun, was a stern warning. I had to hurry. But the more insistently the rightists demanded the convening of a congress, the more suspicious Stalin was of this demand. Time worked for him. But then there was a way out provided for by the party charter: at the request of several party organizations,

emergency congress if the Central Committee refused to convene it. Would you find right voices for this purpose in several regional organizations? I dare say, especially in the light of subsequent events, that they would have found. But Bukharin, Rykov and Tomsy resolutely refused to take this path, lest they be accused of factionalism in the event of their defeat. They wanted to act within the framework of "legality" and bury Stalin with his own "legal" consent. They did not know Stalin well, but Stalin knew them very well. Frightening them with the bogey of factionalism and the authority of party legitimacy, Stalin acted quite "legitimately": he mercilessly cleansed the party and Soviet apparatus of obvious and potential Bukharinites with the hands of Molotov. Under these conditions, the XIII Congress of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions was convened in December 1928, at which the first open test of the strength of the rightists and Stalinists in the trade union movement took place. For the country, for the working class, it was an ordinary regular congress of trade unions. For the Central Committee, for the Stalinist majority and the Bukharin minority, the congress was the most important test of strength. After all, one must keep in mind that the Bolshevik Central Committee ruled the country after all "for the proletariat, through the proletariat and in the name of the proletariat." The state itself was called the "workers' state", and its social essence was given the formidable name "dictatorship of the proletariat". Not the dictatorship of the Bolshevik Party, but the dictatorship of the proletariat. Once Zinoviev wrote that in our country, ultimately, the dictatorship of the party, since the party is in power (Zinoviev was not then in disgrace), Stalin, during the "new opposition", found fault with this: "How is it dictatorship of the party? No, we do not have the dictatorship of the party, but the dictatorship of the proletariat. This same proletariat, in the person of its elected delegates at the local congresses, was now going to speak in Moscow about its needs and wishes. It is clear how important this was for Stalin in the light of the disagreements that took place in the Politburo. In the Central Council of Trade Unions and in its presidium, Stalin had very little influence - only one small group in the person of Shvernik, Andreev, Lozovsky, Lapse and L. Kaganovich, recently appointed here. All other members of the Council, its presidium and the leadership of the sectoral Central Committees of the trade unions were supporters of Tomsy. Such was the situation

This was evidently explained by the fact that the Politburo still concealed from the workers that their "leader" Tomsy was a "right opportunist" and a "trade unionist". This circumstance created a paradoxical situation. It was necessary to obtain from the proletariat the condemnation of the "right deviator" Tomsy and his friends in the group Rykov, Bukharin, Uglanov, but it was impossible to demand this openly, and even from such an obviously right-wing opportunist congress. The inventive masters of the Stalinist school found a way out here too: under the guise of "criticism and self-criticism", the Stalinists, one after another, took to the podium with "exposures" of the "bureaucratic apparatus" of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions, with statements about the forgetfulness of the "interests and needs" of workers by the leaders of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions, about penetration into the ranks Soviet trade unions of an alien bourgeois ideology, about the danger of a trade unionist degeneration of leaders, about the right-wing danger in trade union practice. All this was directed primarily against Tomsy and his colleagues in the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions - Dogadov, Melnichansky, Artyukhina, Polonsky, Schmidt and others. Criticism was even bolder and more frank at meetings of the VKP (b) Congress faction. Here Kaganovich directly demanded that the ~~Trade~~ ^{Work} of the Presidium of the All-Union Central Council of Unions be recognized as unsatisfactory, which was tantamount to the failure of Tomsy's candidacy for the post of chairman of the Central Council of Trade Unions. The very first vote showed that the CPSU(b) faction did not share the assessments of Kaganovich, secretary of the Central Committee of the party, about the work of Tomsy. Out of almost three hundred party delegates, only a dozen voted for Kaganovich's (Central Committee) proposal. The result was an open revolt of the "proletariat" against "their own" dictatorship. Kaganovich, who was destined for the post of chairman of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions instead of Tomsy, for the first time in his entire service to Stalin, did not cope with the assigned task. The second secretary of the Central Committee, Molotov, who was sent to help him, disavowed Kaganovich. Molotov stated that Tomsy was a member of the Politburo and was working on behalf of the party. Although he has mistakes, as everyone can have them, the proposal to evaluate the work of the Presidium of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions as unsatisfactory is wrong on Kaganovich's part, which proves that Kaganovich can make mistakes. Kaganovich received a public slap in the face, but the Central Committee's prestige was saved. Communists know how to sacrifice themselves in the interests of the Party! But the incident v

The forced retreat of the Central Committee showed that not only the Tomsk "right", but the entire "proletariat", even in the person of its communist vanguard of the congress, had become "bourgeois". He doesn't want his own happiness. He must be forced to this happiness. From now on, Stalin realized that the "parliamentary" solution of controversial issues or the parliamentary elimination of objectionable rivals is really a "bourgeois" thing. Satisfied that it had managed to correct its oversight in time and thus avoid a "civil war" against the "proletariat", the Central Committee hastened to close the congress. At the next, IX, congress of the delegates of the VIII congress, only the one dozen who voted for Kaganovich were present. But Kaganovich did not become the leader of the trade unions. The Central Committee handed over this role to Shvernik, whose only positive quality was and remains the ability to remain silent when things are too bad.

XIV. Bukharin and Tomsky

Bukharin's biography has not been written. Meanwhile, his influence in shaping the ideology and program of the October Revolution was much stronger than that of Stalin and hardly inferior to that of Trotsky, who, in fact, became a Bolshevik after the July days of 1917. The only source from which one can draw some censored information about Bukharin is D. Maretsky's literary and biographical sketch about Bukharin in the TSB of 1927. One more year, and we would not have even this information from Bukharin's pre-revolutionary biography. I take the most important dates from Maretsky. However, the real drama, and therefore the real biography of Bukharin, as a politician and ideologist, began, in fact, after 1927. Nikolai Ivanovich

Bukharin was born on September 27, st. Art. 1888. His father, Ivan Gavrilovich, was a teacher in the city elementary school. Bukharin was 17 years old when he joined the revolutionary circle of students. In 1906

In the year he joined the Bolshevik Party in the Zamoskvoretsky district, he became a professional propagandist for the party. In 1907, Bukharin entered the economics department of the law faculty of Moscow University, continuing his underground work in the party. By 1908, Bukharin was so well known in the party that he was elected a member of the Moscow Committee. In 1909, Bukharin was arrested twice for illegal revolutionary work. Arrested

for the third time in 1910, he refers to Onega, from where he manages to escape. Soon he emigrates to Germany and settles temporarily in Hannover.

In 1912, Bukharin first met with Lenin (in Krakow), with whom henceforth, despite all theoretical and political differences, he never breaks close relations. Lenin invites Bukharin to actively cooperate in the Bolshevik press (Pravda, Enlightenment). Bukharin, with the reservation of maintaining freedom in theoretical matters, accepts the invitation. In 1912, he moved to Vienna, where he continued to participate in Bolshevik emigre affairs, listened to lectures by Böhm-Bawerk and Wieser at the same time, prepared his first theoretical work, The Political Economy of Rentier, and wrote a number of other critical works against Struve, Tugan-Baranovsky, Oppenheimer, Bem Bawerka. Here, in Vienna, Bukharin first met his future assassin, Stalin, who had just fled here from exile. Bukharin, on the other hand, helps Stalin in compiling the well-known work that brought Koba-Dzhugashvili the fame of a "Marxist expert" on the national question - "Marxism and the National Question" (originally this work was called "Social Democracy and the National Question"). Bukharin not only selected and translated for Stalin quotations from K. Renner, Otto Bauer, but also literary edited the entire work as a whole, after which it was accepted by Lenin for publication in the journal Enlightenment (1913). Before the war of 1914, Bukharin was arrested by the Austrian police as a "Russian spy", but released thanks to the intervention of the same leaders of the Austrian Social Democrats whom Bukharin and Stalin scourged in Enlightenment. From Austria he was sent to Switzerland.

From Switzerland he moved through France and England in 1915 on someone else's passport to Sweden, where he contacted the Swedish Left Social-Democrats. (Häglund) and conducts international-Leninist propaganda against the war. The Swedish police arrest Bukharin as "Lenin's agent" and deport him to Norway. In 1916, Bukharin moved illegally to the United States, where he edited the émigré newspaper Novy Mir. After the February Revolution of 1917, Bukharin left America through Japan for Russia. Now, after returning from abroad, he takes an active part in

preparing the October coup, is a member of the Central Committee, leads the October coup in Moscow, becomes the editor-in-chief of Pravda, delivers a well-known speech before the Constituent Assembly on behalf of the Bolshevik Central Committee.

During the separate Brest negotiations with Germany, Bukharin sharply opposed Lenin's position, created in Moscow a "group of leftist communists" with his own organ, Kommunist, and resigned from his duties as editor-in-chief of Pravda. After the failed uprising of the "Left SRs", Bukharin again joins Lenin. Bukharin is one of the organizers of the Comintern (Lenin, Zinoviev, Trotsky and Bukharin) and a permanent member of its Presidium until 1929.

Bukharin began writing quite early, and, as Bukharin himself said, he studied German specifically in order to read the classics of German philosophy and, of course, Marx and Engels in the original. His first scientific work, The Political Economy of the Rentier, was written when he was only 24 years old. As an economist and sociologist in the Bolshevik Party, he had no competitors. In many cases he was more orthodox than Lenin. He often disagreed on theoretical issues with Lenin ("imperialism", "the theory of the explosion of the state", about the nature of the "proletarian state", "the laws of the economy of the transition period", the "national question", etc.). More than once, directly or through his wife Krupskaya (on the eve of the Sixth Party Congress in August 1917, when Lenin went into hiding), Lenin acknowledged that Bukharin was right in disputes between them.

Bukharin's efficiency amazed everyone - he edited Pravda daily from December 1917 (with a short break during the Brest crisis in 1918) until April 1929, constantly wrote its editorials, actively participated in the work of the Politburo and the Presidium of the Comintern, made numerous reports, lectured to students, edited the magazines "Bolshevik", "Prozhektor", was a member of the Communist Academy and the Academy of Sciences of the USSR (since 1928), carefully followed domestic and world literature and at the same time wrote both archacademic and archipopular books. It is clear that in the eyes of the revolutionary youth of the October generation, Bukharin was a "theoretical Hercules." Alive and lively, he was physically strong. From childhood, he was engaged in gymnastics, not leaving it even during emigrant wanderings. autumn

In 1928, when, in connection with his fortieth birthday, Bukharin was elected an honorary member of the detachment of young pioneers of Moscow and a pioneer tie was solemnly put on him, he gave the children an "honest pioneer word" that from now on he would not smoke. Of course, the weakness of tyrants to play "childishness" is well known, but Bukharin was sincere in this respect as Stalin, and therefore the Moscow pioneers knew him more as "Uncle Kolya" than as a leading member of the ruling elite in the Kremlin. With all his fanatical admiration for Marx and Engels (in matters of philosophy, Bukharin put Engels above Marx), he was, however, neither

a hard-practiced nor a "citative" Marxist. He knew Western European economic, philosophical and sociological literature as well as any university professor. Very prone to abstract theorizing in the field of political economy and sociology, he was a "seeking" Marxist of the type of Kautsky and Plekhanov ~~post-Marxist~~ popularizer of Marx ("The ABC of Communism", "The Theory of Historical Materialism") in the Bolshevik way. Hence, Bukharin's ambitions were solid - he considered himself called to modernize Marxism both in political economy and in philosophy, in relation to the conditions of the beginning of the 20th century. Economic work on this topic was begun by Bukharin under Lenin, but then postponed due to a discussion with Trotsky, and Bukharin finished his philosophical monograph on the same plane in solitary confinement at the Lubyanka, which was told to me, also in prison, by one of his camera neighbors.

Bukharin's economic work never saw the light of day after Lenin's death, except for the introduction to it, published as an independent work ("Marx and Modernity"), I think, in 1933 in the collection of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, dedicated to the fiftieth anniversary of Marx's death. But even this work, having passed through the filter of Stalin, became unrecognizable - and all the "anti-Marxist heresies" of Bukharin were simply thrown out, all kinds of gag of the vigilant censors of the Politburo (Mekhlis, Mitin, Yudin ...) were included in the author's text.

The second time I saw Bukharin was at a New Year's party near Moscow in 1928. When Sorokin and I arrived there, he was having a rather lively conversation in one of the rooms adjacent to the hall. I don't remember oh

how the conversation was going on, but I remember well how it was interrupted by a man who stumbled heavily into the room, dressed in a kosovorotka with the most bizarre patterns. Belted with a bright red sash, in long light boots, with a black, tanned, slightly Mongolian face of a stoker, he, in fact, resembled either a stoker or a squandered Tatar merchant.

The man with an imperious movement of his hand pointed to the door to the hall: -

Please, to the table! Now, from all the side doors, people moved there. Seats at a large long table were occupied without any ceremony - who, where and with whom you wanted.

The lights were turned off and candles were lit. The huge oak-rimmed wall clock showed five minutes to twelve. The fireman took the master's seat, looked at his pocket watch and said imperiously: - Comrades! Everyone got up. The noise stopped immediately.

As if in a hurry, the clock was ticking, as if testifying to the frantic running of time. The man spoke dully, listlessly, without brilliance...

- For the happiness of the peoples, for the happiness of the working class, for the happiness of the party!
For the New Year - for the new happiness! It has struck 12 o'clock. The goblets rang. It was

Tomsky. We were visiting the leader of the Soviet trade unions at his dacha in Bolshevo. A lithographer by

profession, Tomsky was a typical functionary of the pre-revolutionary Russian trade union movement. He did not receive sufficient education to become the Russian Bebel, but he was a man of great practical intelligence, self-will and determination. Not endowed with cunning by nature, but by school with diplomacy, in political

discussions, as they say, he "chopped from the shoulder." Tomsky perfectly understood and saw the intellectual superiority over himself of many of the educated leaders of Bolshevism, but he tried to reach the truth with his "working mind" and did not bow before authorities. Even Lenin, he considered too "intellectual" to understand the workers, and often

sometimes he publicly criticized him. This was the case during the trade union discussion, when, in a fit of rage, Lenin

attacked Tomsy and exiled the "labor leader" to the sands of Turkestan. The sultry sands, apparently, reduced the ardor of Tomsy, and in the new struggle against Trotsky, Tomsy casts his vote from the "province", this time in favor of Stalin. He was immediately returned to Moscow and placed again at the head of the trade unions. Tomsy justifies Stalin's hopes and calculations. The trade unions led by Tomsy become, in Stalin's terminology, the party's "transmission belt" to the working masses. The reward was not long in coming: Tomsy was introduced to the Politburo. But Tomsy was mistaken when he thought that he was brought there as a trade union leader, like the leaders of the British trade unions, in order to play the role of an independent representative of the Soviet trade unions on the board of the "workers' party". Stalin needed it both as a "working screen" and as a "working" weapon at the same time, for purposes that far from Tomsy alone was unaware of. When Tomsy realized this, he sharply turned the trade union leadership against Stalin, and for a while a new "dual power" was created in the country - workers' power in the "Palace of Labor" (the residence of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions) and party power in the Kremlin. When the official Soviet government, represented by the chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, Rykov, and the party theorist, represented by the editor-in-chief of Pravda, Bukharin, concluded a united front with the leader of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions, Tomsy, against the Stalinist wing of the Central Committee, it seemed that Stalin's days

were numbered. The whole of 1928 passed under the sign of this "dual power". On the eve of the new year, Tomsy was very optimistic, although the Politburo already had his first resignation from the post of Chairman of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions if Stalin did not abandon

the Trotskyist program of "stateization of trade unions." After Tomsy, there were no more political toasts at the evening. Bukharin made a toast in verse, in which, to the general delight of the ladies present, he paid tribute to the "fair sex". The poets did not remain in debt. Madrigals began to pour in on beauties, parodies of men, witticisms about politicians, Jewish jokes, Caucasian jokes. Finally, they offered the

"Not an anecdote, but a true story," Sorokin began in a serious tone, as if sobering up especially for this story, "but it was last year. The Politburo decided to prove to Trotsky in practice that the workers and peasants were not only devoted to the Party and its Leninist Central Committee.

but each of them is ready to die for the cause of the party. For the experiment, three "representatives of the working people" were summoned to the Central Committee from the provinces - a Donbass worker, a Tver peasant, and a Minsk Jew handicraftsman. Those summoned were taken to the top floor of the Central Committee building and brought to the balcony, where the Politburo was waiting for them in full force. Stalin turned to the worker: - In

the interests of Lenin's party, I demand from you, comrade worker, to jump from this balcony and by your sacrifice prove the devotion of the working class to our party!

The worker refused.

With the same words, Kalinin addressed his countryman peasant.

The peasant also refused. Then

Kaganovich turned to a Jewish handicraftsman, but he had not finished yet. Kaganovich his parting words, as a Jew rushed to the railing.

- Wait, - said Stalin, - for us your readiness to die for the cause of the party is quite enough, there is no need to jump, but now explain to Comrade Trotsky the motives of your heroic impulse.

- Very simply, - answered the Jew, - a terrible end is better than endless horror! From anecdotes, they

soon moved on to songs. One artist of the Bolshoi Academic Theater performed several arias from "Eugene Onegin" and "Don Carlos". Some rising star from the same theater sang Tatyana's Letter, a series of gypsy romances, of which I well remember Farewell, My Village.

By three or four in the morning the "General" arrived. To our surprise, he was completely sober and alone. Tomsy greeted him with a solemn toast. Everyone drank to his health. After a while "General", Bukharin and Tomsy withdrew into the next room. They didn't show up anymore. The guests began to disperse with an oppressive sense of uncertainty in the face of the New Year that had just arrived. Those who lived in politics guessed that

if the "General" is sober on New Year's Eve, not only happiness, but also peace will not be in that year.

The one whom I call "General" in the October days was a sailor on one of the ships in the Baltic Fleet and actively

participated in the Bolshevik coup in Petrograd. After the coup, his naval career ended, but from a junior naval officer (he seems to have been a midshipman) during the civil war, he immediately got into "generals", since there was no particular need for "admirals" then. In the Civil War, he made a brilliant career and moved into the ranks of the leading commanders of the Red Army from the Frunze school. When the latter took command of the army from Trotsky (1925), the "General" was transferred to Moscow. Preparing the removal of Trotsky, Stalin firmly believed that he would offer the post of military leader of the

country to his man, and all those who belonged to the so-called "military opposition" (1919) were his own. Behind the "military opposition" (Yegorov, Voroshilov, Budyonny, Shchadenko, Minkin), who spoke out against Trotsky in words, but in deeds against Lenin-Trotsky, stood Stalin himself. Fearing an open fight with Lenin and Trotsky, Stalin surreptitiously provoked "partisan generals" against them.

When at the VIII Party Congress (March 1919) the "military opposition", having secured a guarantee of support from Stalin, organized an organized opposition to the chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council and People's Commissar of the Navy Trotsky, Lenin sharply attacked the oppositionists and demanded that the congress condemn their views. A sober politician, Stalin quickly "reoriented" and spoke in defense of ... Trotsky at the congress! This was demanded now by his personal interests. Subsequently, Stalin atoned for this perfidy of his by nominating "oppositionists" to leading positions instead of the Trotskyists purged from the Red Army, but many of them later ended their lives in the dungeons of the NKVD.

35 Here is what Trotsky writes about this: "A special place in the Red Army and the military opposition was occupied by Tsaritsyn, where military workers grouped around Voroshilov ... In Voroshilov's circles, they spoke with hatred about specialists, military academics,

high headquarters, about Moscow... Stalin spent several months in Tsaritsyn. He combined his behind-the-scenes struggle against me with the homegrown opposition of Voroshilov and his closest associates. Stalin behaved, however, in such a way that he could jump back at any time ... As soon as Lenin fell ill, Stalin achieved, through his allies, the renaming of Tsaritsyn to Stalingrad. The masses of the population had no idea what the name meant. And if now Voroshilov is a member of the Politburo, then the only reason for this is the fact that in 1918 I forced him into submission by threatening to send him under escort to Moscow "(L. Trotsky. "My Life", part II, p. 171, 173, 175.) It is characteristic that Stalin's literature, so generous in exposing all sorts of "oppositions," always tries to tacitly evade the history of the "military opposition." expressions³⁶.

"The so-called "military opposition" spoke at the congress ... but along with representatives of the defeated "left communism", the "military opposition" also included workers who had never participated in any opposition, but were dissatisfied with Trotsky's leadership in the army." In hindsight, Stalin rehabilitated his "oppositionists", first of all, Voroshilov.

Soon Frunze died under the experimental knife of Stalin's "medicine"... Voroshilov was appointed People's Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs. When the latter attracted his people to the people's commissariat, "General" was transferred to the Kremlin, to the headquarters of the Kremlin's commandant's office through the "government guard".

By decision of the Central Committee, only those party members who, in a certain sense of the word, were "outside politics" were sent to the headquarters of the commandant's office and to the government guards. Of course, they were communists, but they had never previously joined one group or another in the Central Committee itself. The

task of the government guard is to protect not only the life and safety of the members of the government, but also its legal "status quo". The Central Committee was well aware of the experiences of the historical past of Russian security

troops, when they repeatedly became an instrument of a palace coup. The instinct of self-preservation prompted caution.

Legally, the "government guard" was subordinated through the OGPU (NKVD) to the government, but in fact - to the Kremlin commandant's office. But the headquarters of the Kremlin commandant's office was approved on a personal basis by the "Special Sector" at a meeting of the Organizing Bureau of the Central Committee, and formally - by the government on the same basis as the leadership of the OGPU. In other words, there were two OGPUs in the country, completely independent of each other: an external OGPU to supervise the people, and an internal

OGPU to supervise the government. At the same time, the internal OGPU had its own

intelligence network in the outside world, including the external OGPU itself, while for the external OGPU it was a great secret what was being done according to network of the internal OGPU, that is, the Kremlin commandant's office and government guards. Such an organization was beneficial in all respects, and most importantly, it protected Stalin from possible conspiracies from outside and, therefore, from the conspiracy of the external OGPU. "General" just belonged to the

headquarters of this internal OGPU. The same kind of "distribution of labor" was established in the Central Committee itself, especially after the death of XV. STALIN'S ILLEGAL "OFFICE" After the

expulsion of the Trotskyists and Zinovievites and before the opposition" the governing bodies of the Central Committee consisted (December 1927) of:

Politburo members: Bukharin, Voroshilov, Kalinin, Kuibyshev, Molotov, Rykov, Rudzutak, Stalin, Tomsy; candidates: Petrovsky, Uglov, Andreev, Kirov, Mikoyan, Kaganovich, Chubar, Kosior.

Organizing Bureau - members: Stalin, Molotov, Uglov, Kosior, Kubyak, Moskvina, Bubnov, Artyukhina, Andreev, Dogadov, Smirnov A.P., Rukhimovich, Sulimov; candidates: Any, Mikhailov V. M., Lepse, Chaplin, Schmidt.

Secretariat - members: Stalin (general secretary), Molotov, Uglov, Kosior, Kubiak; candidates: Moskvina, Bubnov, Artyukhina³⁷.

As has already been pointed out, Stalin did not have a solid majority in any of the highest bodies. In the Politburo, out of nine votes (I count only members), Stalin had three votes - Stalin, Voroshilov,

Molotov. Bukharin also had three votes - Bukharin, Rykov, Tomsy. Three members - Kalinin, Rudzutak, Kuibyshev vacillated between these two groups, leaning at decisive moments now towards Stalin, now towards Bukharin.

In the Orgburo, Stalin had five votes (Stalin, Molotov, Kosior, Andreev, Rukhimovich), Bukharin also had five votes (Uglov, Dogadov, Smirnov, Sulimov, Kubyak). Three votes - Bubnov, Artyukhina, Moskvina - were "neutral". In the Secretariat, Stalin had relative

37 "VKP(b) in resolutions and decisions of congresses, conferences and plenums of the Central Committee", 1933, part II, p. 455.

a different but firm majority - Stalin, Molotov, Kosior against the two Uglov and Kubiak.

Thus, in the highest organ of the party, which directed all the current work of the party and government - in the Secretariat - Stalin was the master. To the Politburo and even to the Orgburo, Stalin brought only questions that had been predetermined in the Secretariat for their approval "after the fact." Most importantly, Stalin usurped the power of the Orgburo on organizational issues. All questions of the appointment and dismissal of the highest ranks of the party apparatus, economy, army, trade unions, diplomacy, that is, questions of the competence of the Orgburo, were now decided by the Secretariat of the Central Committee. This usurpation of the Orgburo was ultimately a usurpation of the Politburo's power. The Politburo became only a screen for the all-powerful Secretariat. Members of the Politburo often learned the "news" of the Secretariat second hand.

The apparatus of the state - the apparatus of the party and administration - was selected without the knowledge of the Politburo in full agreement with the new party charter. The charter stated that "the current executive and organizational work is managed by the Secretariat". But who should lead it, if not the Secretariat? After all, the Politburo and the Orgburo meet periodically and consist of persons who are outside the Central Committee, while the Secretariat is a permanent, living and active organ of the Central Committee.

If the Secretariat was Stalin's legal authority, then the apparatus of the Central Committee, selected by Stalin himself as general secretary, was his powerful weapon in strengthening and maintaining this power. Gradually ousting the old Bolsheviks from the apparatus of the Central Committee, Stalin recreated it anew. Under Lenin

The secretariat of the Central Committee and its working apparatus had only technical executive functions. The people appointed to lead the Secretariat and the apparatus had only one task - to monitor the implementation of the decisions of the Politburo; Orgburo and plenums of the Central Committee.

Not a single independent decision not based on the directives of these bodies was taken either by the Secretariat, or even more so by the apparatus of the Central Committee. Therefore, people with a good reputation as "performers" were elected or appointed there. Stalin himself was elected there as such an "executor", though not at Lenin's suggestion, as the Stalinists later claimed, but at the conspiracy of Zinoviev-Kamenev-Stalin against Lenin-Trotsky. But having dealt with Trotsky, and then with Zinoviev and Kamenev, Stalin, preparing for the last showdown with Bukharin, imperceptibly, but radically, first of all cleared the Central Committee apparatus of the Bukharinites. In order not to arouse

suspicion among those being purged and protests from Bukharin, persons released from the apparatus of the Central Committee received large-scale appointments on the Soviet or economic lines. They were "upgraded" for a devastating downgrade. So, already by 1929, the

reorganization of the apparatus of the Central Committee ended with the creation in the Central Committee itself, as they then said of the "illegal Cabinet of Stalin" (subsequently, this "Stalin's Cabinet" received the legal name "Comrade Stalin's Secretariat" in party documents). The official resolution of the Central Committee of 1929 on the reorganization of the Central Committee and the apparatus of the Central Committee indicated that "the need to reorganize the Central Committee and the apparatus of local party organizations is caused primarily by the enormous complication of the tasks of party leaders in the conditions of the reconstruction period, especially in the field of" selection, distribution and training of personnel "38. This The reorganized apparatus of the Central Committee now had the following departments: the organizing department, the distribution department (personnel department), the department of culture and propaganda, the department of agitation and mass campaigns. Bulatov). But "Stalin's Cabinet" consisted of young fanatics, not members of the Central Committee. At first, no one attached any importance to these people. They were accustomed to be regarded as Stalin's technical employees, as servicemen dedicated to their work, without any pretense of "big politics" . They drive

minutes at meetings of the Central Committee, give information on a variety of issues, bring tea and sandwiches for those sitting, sharpen pencils for their boss. With all this, as befits lackeys, even if they are party members, they are outwardly submissive, obedient and cloyingly obliging to any member of the Central Committee:

- Would you like to call your car, Nikolai Ivanovich (Bukharin)? -

At your service, Alexey Ivanovich (Rykov)! -

Would you like a sandwich, Mikhail Pavlovich (Tomsky)?

- Yes, Comrade Stalin (to the owner)! 38 "Party construction", 1930, No

2. Such were those from whom Stalin made up his "secret cabinet".

Here are their names: Tovstukha, Poskrebyshev, Smitten, Yezhov, Bauman, Pospelov, Mekhlis, Malenkov, Peter, Uritsky, Varga, Umansky. Each of them also had an official title. Tovstukha was listed on the list of Central Committee employees as "assistant secretary of the Central Committee" (this was a purely technical position, like the head of the office - the institute of assistant secretaries also existed in the field). Poskrebyshev was the assistant to the assistant, that is, Tovstukha, in the accounting and information sector. After the death of Tovstukha, Poskrebyshev was appointed assistant secretary and head of the "Special Sector", and Smitten, Poskrebyshev's assistant "for party statistics," took his place. Yezhov was in charge of the personnel sector, Pospelov was in charge of the propaganda sector (assistant - Mekhlis). Malenkov was Poskrebyshev's deputy for the "Special Sector" and protocol secretary of the Politburo. When Yezhov was transferred to the head of the personnel department of the People's Commissariat of Agriculture (1929), Malenkov was

appointed head of the Personnel Sector. I have already pointed out that this illegal "Stalin's Cabinet" subsequently received the official-legal name: "Comrade Stalin's Secretariat" (not to be confused with the "Central Committee Secretariat"!). Any big or small issue of domestic and foreign policy, before being discussed at meetings of the leading bodies of the Central Committee, was processed and essentially foreordained in the "Stalin's Cabinet", then it was already transferred to the appropriate official departments of the Central Committee, and with additional conclusions of the departments themselves (these conclusions are only offi

"Stalin's Cabinet") the question was submitted to the decision of the Secretariat, the Orgburo and the Politburo. If major disagreements arose at the meetings of these bodies, which, of course, often happened, then the controversial issue was referred to the existing or periodically created Politburo. of the same "Stalin's Cabinet"), both in relation to the data for substantiating project, and, most importantly, in relation to its commissions, consisting subsequent implementation through the highest party organ. It turned out a vicious circle, from which only Stalin, as the General Secretary of the Central Committee, found a way out: sabotage of a decision objectionable to him. The "cabinet" selected the "cadres" of the party, the army, and the state. The "Cabinet" was primarily a "laboratory for filtering personnel." The fate and career of a party member of any rank, from the secretary of the local party committee (later to the secretary of the district committee of the party, inclusive) and up to the People's Commissar of the USSR, depended on the corresponding

"sector" of the "Cabinet". But in order to appoint new ones, it was necessary to remove the old ones, if possible without noise and scandals. This was taken care of by the "Special Sector", led by Poskrebyshev. Outwardly, it was not any "special" sector. His existence in the apparatus of the Central Committee, formerly under the name of the "secret department", was a matter of course. He kept secret documents of the party and the government and was, as it were, a simple party safe. When the "Stalin Cabinet" was finally formed, the secret department of the Central Committee simply disappeared in order to appear in the "Cabinet" under a different and even more mysterious name: "Special Sector". Yes, and it existed from now on, indeed, secretly. It was only after Stalin's final victory after the 17th Party Congress that his existence was reported. What were its functions? You will look in vain for an answer to this question in the official party literature. Unofficially, the following was known about him. The "Special Sector" was supposed to be an organ of supervision over the tops of the party, the army, the government and, of course, the NKVD itself. To do this, he had his own network of agents and a special sub-sector of "personal affairs" for all nobles, without distinction of rank. Stalin, sitting in his

office or while somewhere on vacation, had constant contact with the behind-the-scenes life of the party and government leaders in Moscow. Even the simple personal correspondence of people from the upper strata was subjected to vigilant censorship by the "Special Sector" network; no exception was made for their own like-minded people - exactly as the "black cabinet" of the tsarist secret police or Metternich did. Thus, Stalin knew what his enemy and friend were breathing in his own environment. With the accumulation of "minus points" in the personal file of the nobleman, his fate was already sealed in the "Special Sector". Decided, but not decided. For an official decision, there were also official bodies of the Central Committee, depending on the rank of the next victim: if he was a member of the Central Committee, his fate was decided in the Secretariat and rarely in the Orgburo, if he was a high official, but not a member of the Central Committee, then he was simply removed by the corresponding department of the Central Committee. If, however, Stalin saw that the case would not go without scandal, then he handed over part of the materials discrediting this or that high party member or even a member of the Central Committee to the official party court - the Central Control Commission (later the CPC). There were also their own

"irremovable judges" - Shkiryatov, Yaroslavsky, Solts, Janson, Ordzhonikidze. The entire organizational policy of the "Stalin Cabinet" was based on a tried and tested principle, which Stalin proclaimed as the slogan of the party only two years later - "Cadres decide everything!". The future biographer of Stalin, who will have access to the documents of Stalin's "Cabinet", with the greatest amazement will establish the simplest fact that not the Politburo, consisting of old Bolsheviks, but a technical cabinet, consisting of young, outwardly modest, unknown in the party and country, but the most capable performers the will of his master, directed the world and domestic policy of the USSR. And this is through "selection, distribution and training of

personnel," since "cadres decide everything." So the "Special Sector" vacated the seats, which were immediately filled by the "Sector of Personnel", first Yezhov, and then Malenkov. Is it any wonder, after all this, that people's commissars trembled in front of Tovstukha and Poskrebyshev, while members of the Central Committee crawled in front of Yezhov and Malenkov. And these persons were listed on the list of the Central Committee apparatus only as "technical employees" of the Central Committee! "Technology in the period of record

"Technique" over the Central Committee in the hands of the Poskrebyshevs and Malenkovs in Moscow sealed the fate of the party. Not chosen by the party, but appointed by the "Personnel Sector" secretaries of regional committees, regional committees and the Central Committee of the national communist parties in the field, the iron will for the sole power of the main "designer" of this entire conspiracy - such was the situation in the party when Stalin moved to "the last and decisive fight" for "Lenin's legacy".

What could Bukharin and his group oppose to him? Very few: academic memorandums addressed to the Central Committee and Platonic incantations in their correctness at its meetings.

From the point of view of "the interests of the country and the interests of the party itself", the Bukharinites appealed both to reason and to the feeling of the Party.

- In the interests of seizing all power and establishing personal dictatorship both over the party and over the country, Stalin appealed to the innermost feelings of party careerists and the organized strength of the party apparatus. Knowing his business, Stalin did not rush to conclusions. He gave the

opposition the opportunity to speak at closed sessions of the Central Committee; moreover, he deliberately provoked them to speak. Sometimes he artificially created in his opponents the impression of his own impotence ... Or sometimes he completely went into the shadows, behind the scenes, leaving behind him the opportunity to retreat if necessary. But the apparatus acted all the more persistently, the more purposefully. "It's not about Stalin, but about the diabolical apparatus in whose hands he is," said Uglanov himself in the midst of the struggle. Only Stalin could create such an impression of himself among his enemies.

Already during the struggle against Trotsky in alliance with Zinoviev and Kamenev, and then in the struggle against Zinoviev and Kamenev in alliance with Bukharin and Rykov, Stalin had not only elastic tactics, but also a strategy developed in every detail - the elimination of the entire "Leninist guard" old Bolsheviks to create their own party - the party of Stalin. Two steps, two most important and decisive obstacles to this ultimate goal, were relatively easily overcome, and they were overcome mainly not so much with the help of their authority, but with the authority in the party of Bukharin, Rykov and Tomsy.

Stalin himself contributed to this fateful struggle his combinatorial organizational genius and the amazing instinct of the greatest detective in politics. His unfortunate allies in the struggle against Trotsky and Zinoviev were also deprived of that moral and ethical advantage in the political struggle that Stalin had: absolute freedom from any morality, from any moral feeling. When, before the very eyes of these same allies, in the struggle against the "Left Opposition" (Trotsky) and the "New Opposition" (Zinoviev) Stalin used the methods of the most obvious falsification and deliberate provocation, the Bukharinites only admired the high class of Stalin's ingenuity. With the tacit consent of the Bukharinites, he resorted to the most virtuosic numbers of political Dreyfusad against Trotsky, the organizer of the October coup, and the Trotskyists on such a scale and forms that Lenin did not apply even to his political enemies. And he got away with it without a sound of protest from the Bukharinites. Stalin - "that wretched man with yellow eyes," according to the belated testimony of Krestinsky - so hypnotized his allies that they overlooked the internal revolution in the party that Stalin carried out and against them. I'm talking about the party apparatus. We have seen what was being done in the Central Committee of the Party. Even better, even more thoroughly, Stalin worked on creating his own apparatus on the ground - in the regions, territories, national republics. Beginning in 1928, there was no longer a single legally elected secretary of the party organization in the localities, as required by the "charter" of the party and the notorious "inner-party democracy." The old elected secretaries, under one pretext or another, were exempted from party work. Sometimes they were appointed, as I have already said about Moscow, to high administrative, diplomatic, and mainly economic positions, in order to get rid of them in the party apparatus. In place of those removed by the "Sector of Personnel" through the legal body of the Central Committee, the organizational instructor department sent pure-blooded Stalinists. When local party organizations, accustomed to the noise about inner-party democracy and the still nominally valid party charter, began to refuse to accept secretaries "recommended" by Moscow, the Central Committee introduced the practice (contrary to the same charter) of appointing local secretaries

above. In order to conduct them without scandal through local plenums of party committees, the Central Committee now, together with the appointed secretaries, sent one of the instructors of the Central Committee to the site. The instructors reported to the plenums that this was "the will of the Leninist Central Committee."

It was hard to argue with such a mighty "will". If, however, dissatisfaction was expressed anywhere about this new practice or against the imposition of a completely unknown person as a leader on this organization, then the "Special Sector" network quickly created a case about an "anti-party group" in such and such an organization, which usually ended with that hunters to make some noise were quickly expelled from the party by the decision of another subsidiary body of Stalin - the party collegium of the Central Control Commission. With regard to the selection and appointment of local secretaries, Stalin, as it were, was guided by Machiavelli's wise recipe

- not to appoint local people as governors. Prone to "separatism", they can easily change the "sovereign". You can't give them, moreover, and sit up in the same place, you have to shuffle them often

wat. Organizational practice of Stalin on the ground adhered to these principles very strictly.

By the end of 1928, this process of restructuring the grass-roots apparatus of the party according to the Stalinist model was also completed. From now on, the main cadres of the secretaries of the regional committees, regional committees and the Central Committee of the national communist parties consisted of people passed through the "Special Sector" and appointed by the "Personnel Sector" of the "Stalin Cabinet". In the local apparatuses themselves, beginning with the regional committee, the institution of "special sectors" was also introduced, which were managed exclusively by persons sent from Moscow by the "Special Sector" and the "Personnel Sector". Formally, the head of the "special sector" reported to the secretary of the regional committee (the regional committee, the Central Committee of the local party), but in fact he was accountable only to the "Stalin Cabinet". At the disposal of this local "Special Sector" was a special network of "party informants" outside the party committee and a highly qualified staff of workers in the very apparatus of the party committee (from 3 to 10 people) - the head himself, one or two instructors, a cipher clerk, a protocol clerk, a special typist and etc. The "special sector" did not have any rights, and does not have it now. His whole task is to organize truthful and comprehensive information for the "Special Sector" in the Central Committee. The head of the "sector" is constantly involved

in all meetings of the bureau and the secretariat of the regional committee (regional committee, Central Committee) as a recorder, having with him a "special typist", who is also a stenographer. The directive communication of the Central Committee with the regional committees passes through this "special sector" - encrypted telegrams, the secret directives of the Central Committee enter the "special sector", and he brings them to the attention of the secretary in decrypted form. The secretary of the regional committee himself transmits to Moscow his secret reports, answers, decisions through the same sector. In addition to the usual postal communications and government wires, the "special sector" also has at its disposal a separate "courier service" through the NKVD (MVD), that is, a kind of internal "diplomatic couriers" who deliver to Moscow and from Moscow to the places of the most important party and government documents. These couriers are more inviolable persons than even any minister of the Soviet government. They are provided with personal mandates signed by the Minister of State Security, guaranteeing them not only personal inviolability, but also extraordinary rights to any services from the party and Soviet authorities in the performance of their official duties. Such was the technique of organizing the party apparatus of the "Stalin Cabinet" on the eve of the open action of the so-called right opposition at the beginning of 1929.

I have already said that from the middle of 1928 the disputes between Stalin and the future rightists were more theoretical than practical. The

details of Bukharin's disagreements with Stalin on the most important issues of big practical politics in the Politburo, even in the circles of members of the Central Committee, were known to very few (on the other hand, the members of the "Stalin's Cabinet" in the person of Yezhov, Malenkov, Poskrebyshev, Pospelov and others not only knew about them, but

and took close part in them on the side of Stalin). Bukharin himself, at Rykov's insistence, refrained from bringing the dispute to the plenum of the Central Committee. Tomsy, on the contrary, was in favor of a decisive denouement or, in any case, the collective resignation of the entire "troika" in order to demonstrate his disagreement with the Stalinist course. But Stalin's goal was different to prepare the party apparatus and party activists for the destruction of his opponents in open battles, presenting the

"right opposition". The nickname "opposition" has always been in the history of the CPSU (b) that eternal desired target, against which it was always possible to mobilize both the unscrupulous party mass and the fully versed party careerists. Stalin led the matter towards this, but he led things in his own way, in the Stalinist way, that is, masterfully in the sense of conspiracy and virtuoso in the sense of provocation. We have already spoken about conspiracy, but as for provocation, I remember one very vivid episode told by "The General", which I now want to describe.

XVI. STALIN MEETS THE NEW YEAR

While Tomsy was raising a glass to the health of the working class, Bukharin was reading sentimental poems to the Soviet "grand ladies", and half-drunk participants in the New Year's ball congratulated each other on the "New Year, New Happiness" - on the other side of Moscow, at a dacha similar to that of Tomsy, a group of gray, obscure, but energetic young people quietly, dryly and busily celebrated the New Year and forged new happiness. No music, no Christmas tree, not even

toasts. Only the monotonous sermon of the "father", the apostle, the eldest of those present, quickly perceived by his most faithful adherents. Occasionally dry and businesslike questions, which are immediately followed by equally dry and businesslike answers. The seclusion of the meeting place, the mysteriousness of the situation, the anxiously businesslike faces of those present, and the oppressive silence in the large long room were in sharp contrast to the noisy and cheerful ball in Bolshevo.

It was at Kaganovich's dacha that members of the "Stalin Cabinet" gathered, including our "General". The meeting was led by Kaganovich. The "father" himself reported. The speaker drew a preliminary "terrifying" picture of the impending "extermination" of the party apparatus by the "conspirators" against the party of Bukharin, Rykov, Tomsy, Uglanov ... Stalin proved to those present that the first victim of this "extermination", according to the "conspirators", "must be here you and I, the entire party apparatus from top to bottom." Moreover, the "conspirators" want to destroy the military cadres of the party, replacing them with Trotskyists and former specialists from the tsarist army. Both objectively and subjectively, the program of the right-wing "conspirators" is aimed at restoring capitalism in the country. Precisely because such a restoration is impossible without the destruction of the Party apparatus, the first blow is directed against us. But "conspirators"

smart enough people to understand that by the normal methods of free party discussion, even at the plenums of the Central Committee or at the party congress, they cannot overcome the already established "Leninist apparatus" of the party. Therefore, the "conspirators" resort to clearly provocative tricks and techniques. Even more - they took the path of extortion and blackmail of individual members of the Central Committee and leaders of the Red Army. Taking advantage of certain shortcomings or mistakes in the past of a number of our leading comrades, the Bukharinites are preparing a blow against them as well. This is all the more easy for them to do," Stalin added pointedly, "because, in a strange way, copies of all the personal files of our cadres from the Special Sector ended up in the hands of Bukharin. When the head of personal records, Smitten, began to make excuses, declaring that these documents could not have got to Bukharin, Stalin looked inquiringly at Poskrebyshev. "Unfortunately, Iosif Vissarionovich is right," Poskrebyshev replied with aplomb. "But what to do, how to correct this error of our apparatus and at the same time neutralize the Bukharinites?"

Stalin. And he answered himself:

- So Lazar Moiseevich and Vyacheslav Mikhailovich and I agreed on the following: while the Bukharinites have not yet had time to sell the stolen documents, we must warn our people, our members of the Central Committee and the leaders of the army about the provocation that the Bukharinites are preparing against them. For this there is only one way - the employees of the apparatus of the Central Committee, admitted to work in the "Special Sector", must immediately go to the places and acquaint these comrades with extracts from their personal files, which the Bukharinites want to use against them. Stalin ended his exposition with one strict warning: "These extracts are presented to the relevant comrades not as extracts

from their personal files, but as material of the Bukharinites intercepted by the Central Committee." After familiarizing their comrades with the extracts, the delegates should take from each of them a written explanation on two questions: 1. What can this comrade say in his defense on the merits of the accusation that the Bukharinites are bringing against him?

2. If he refutes this compromising material, then
How does he explain the behavior of Bukharin's group?

The roles have been assigned. New Year's Eve is over. Directly from this meeting, the "General" came to Tomsy and outlined the whole plan of Stalin to Bukharin and Tomsy in the presence of

Sorokin. What was the reaction of Bukharin and Tomsy to Stalin's plan, Sorokin did not tell, but I vividly remember the reaction of Zinaida Nikolaevna's circle when we discussed this plan in her apartment two or three days after the New Year. We gathered quite late in the evening, but since the initiator of this meeting, "The General", was still absent, so far we were sharing our impressions of the New Year's Eve. The conversation somehow did not go well, especially since Sorokin was almost indifferent, although Zinaida Nikolaevna tried to bring him out of "balance", which she clearly did not succeed. Only "Narkom" this time was very animated and incessantly boasted of his, in all likelihood, imaginary successes on the New Year's hunt, so that Sorokin shook his head in disbelief or made a mocking grimace at each of his new successful shots. When the "Narkom", having destroyed hosts of ducks, partridges, hares and a couple of foxes, began to aim at the wolf, Sorokin abruptly cut off the "shot":

- Let's leave blank shots. Better tell me why you didn't have enough gunpowder at the Moscow asset when you had to shoot at Kaganovich?

- But I have never

hunted for two birds with one stone, as you are on the asset in the ICP, - the People's Commissar got

angry. "A hare doesn't hunt a hare," Sorokin

answered. "Stop talking nonsense," Zinaida intervened.
Nikolaevna.

Very opportunely the phone rang. Finally, the "General" appeared. "I am quite sure that Zinaida Nikolaevna, and together with her you will be indulgent to me for being late if I lead my story from the end," the "General" began. He said that he had been at a briefing meeting in the Central Committee and that at dawn on a special junkerslet to the Caucasus to indoctrinate the leaders of the region. The "general" outlined "Stalin's plan" and told who went where from the apparatus of the Central Committee to carry it out.

- The monstrous case of Beilis against the entire Leninist guard - this is the essence of the plan, - the "General" concluded his message.

"Why are you going then?" Zinaida asked in bewilderment. Nikolaevna.

- Didn't Sorokin inform you? - He simply said that Bukharin does not believe in the success of such a provocation, Rykov agrees with this, Tomsy, as always, rushes to the other extreme, and there was no talk of your trip.

- Whether I will go and where, I, in fact, found out only yesterday. - But do "ours" know

about it? - Of

course. -

- Well? "Well, what's the point of talking about that, Zinaida?" "The flowers have faded, the sheets have flown around," and we are no longer revolutionaries, - answered the

"General" and, sighing heavily, added: - Only Tomsy remained true to both the revolution and to himself, and the rest, pardon the expression,

are just women! "I think that Nikolai Ivanovich is right when he thinks that the members of the Central Committee of

the party are so smart as not to believe a cheap provocation," Reznikov intervened. - Yes, these are too shot birds to be caught on rotten chaff of Stalin, - put in his word the hunter - "People's Commissar".

- The fact of the matter is that this is not "rotten chaff" at all, but really serious accusations discrediting party members, but presented to them from our

name.

- I do not believe it, - persists "People's Commissar". Holding back the inside indignation, the "General" slowly takes out

from the briefcase printed on the official letterhead of the Central Committee extracts "from the materials of the right opposition" and begins

to read: - Belov, commander of the North Caucasian military district, was a Left Socialist-Revolutionary, corresponds with the exiled Trotskyists, alternately lives with the wives of the workers of his headquarters ...

- Andrey Andreev, secretary of the regional committee of the party, before the revolution was an activist in the Menshevik trade union, during the war he was a "defencist". After the raster revolution

stole large sums of money from the Central Committee of the Union of Railway Workers, but evaded the court. A chronic

drunkard ... - Philip Makharadze - the chairman of the government of Georgia, secretly, together with national deviationists and Georgian Mensheviks in exile, is preparing Georgia's exit from the USSR ... - Mirzoyan - secretary of the

Central Committee of the Azerbaijan Party, was on a secret service of England in the Caucasus, baptized children in the Armenian church ...

- Fabricius - Commander of the Special Caucasian Red Army, Bonapartist and Morphine addict - The list was quite long, with many juicy details that those present listened to with growing bewilderment. Under each name, a political accusation alternated with an "everyday" accusation - a drunkard, a debauchee, an embezzler, a morphine addict. In those years, such accusations looked as menacing as political ones. Having finished the list, the "General" questioner but looked at the "People's Commissar", but the last

melancholy remarked:

- You know, judging by what I personally know about some of the listed comrades, I assert that the information about them is true. "But do not forget that they were not collected by us, but by the

apparatus of the Central Committee, but presented to these comrades on our behalf, this is meanness and blackmail at the same time," the "General" tries to hammer this truth into the head of the "People's Commissar". But "People's Commissar" continues to repeat his own: - However,

the facts from this do not cease to be facts. Reznikov agrees approvingly, Sorokin and Zinaida look at each other in bewilderment, the "General" loses the gift from indignation

words.

The political discussion turned into mere swearing, which in turn drove even the stoic "People's Commissar" out of patience. It seemed that a sharp squabble between "General" and "People's Commissar", in which the parties did not spare each other personally, threatened with a general scandal. The "General's" unequivocal allusion to the political honesty of the "People's Commissar" provoked a counter-accusation of the offended:

- Telling us here about the conspiracy of the apparatus of the Central Committee and himself participating in its implementation, the "General" is playing a double game: he serves Stalin as a matter, and for us - for an alibi.

It has already caused an explosion. The enraged "General", grabbing a decanter from the table, swung it at the "People's Commissar" with all his might, but he dodged in time and the decanter smashed the head of the main culprit: a shattered marble bust of Lenin flew from the chiffonier to the floor. Frustrated by the failure, the "General" with one jump found himself in front of the "People's Commissar" at the other end of the table, intending to grapple with him hand-to-hand, but Sorokin covered the "People's Commissar" with his overweight body.

- You can approach him

only through my corpse! - Sorokin said. The "general" had reason to believe him and noticeably cooled off. Zinaida brought out "People's Commissar". Sorokin began to shame the "General". Reznikov demanded that Zinaida's already weak nerves be spared. The "general" fell silent, but it was the silence of a deeply offended person. Sorokin guessed that a storm was ahead. It was necessary to begin negotiations on a "truce" as soon as

possible. Zinaida and Sorokin took them up. The apology of the "General" first before the "People's Commissar" was out of the question. But formally, it was he who, as the instigator of the explosion, should have apologized first. Therefore, the "People's Commissar", willingly agreeing to peace, demanded that justice be observed: the "General" should be the first to give a hand. Inventive in these cases, Zinaida found a compromise - at the same time they led by the hand

towards each other: Zinaida - "People's Commissar", and Sorokin - "General". The truce took place. Vodka did the rest - it cemented the world in a Russian way: mutual outpourings and hearty toasts alternated until early morning.

By six o'clock the "General" had left for the airfield...

XVII. BUKHARIN GOES ON THE OFFENSIVE I have

already written that by the beginning of 1928 the balance of forces between the Bukharinites and the Stalinists in the Politburo was the same. Under these conditions, there was no need to talk about any opposition within the Politburo or the Orgburo. There were two groups that were identical in strength, but diametrically opposed in their views on the current policy of the party. Such a position in the supreme organs of the party was far from favorable to Stalin. The emerging struggle in these bodies was a struggle between the parties, and not between the opposition and the legitimate majority. Stalin needed at any cost, with the help of any methods, precisely the "opposition", and not the parties. This is what he was doing, and not only along the line of his

secret cabinet within the Central Committee, not only along the line of "ideological indoctrination", not only along the line of "secretary selection" at the bottom, not only along the line of replacing the Politburo and Orgburo with the Secretariat of the Central Committee, which he firmly owned, but, to use his own terminology, - "led along the entire front." While this front was passing along the above-mentioned borders, Stalin did not yet have any inner confidence that he would win the last battle on the path to autocracy. Some new reserves had to be found, powerful enough to impress the enemy. These reserves, long planned, selected and prepared (at worst!) were available - the Presidium of the Central Control Commission and the Presidium of the Comintern.

Neither by party rules nor by firmly established tradition were they judges of the Politburo and Orgburo of the Central Committee. On the contrary, since the time of Lenin, the Politburo (again, not according to the charter, but according to the unwritten law of Bolshevism) has been both the highest court and the supreme legislator for everyone. True, on paper the CPSU(b) modestly called itself a "section of the Comintern" and the Central Control Commission - the guardian of "party unity." But that was only on paper. Now Stalin decided to commit these reserves into battle, and this decision turned out to be the most effective and most intelligent of all his organizational combinations in the fight against the Rights. The reserve of the first stage for Stalin was, of course, his own home reserve - the Presidium of the Central Control Commission. The Party Rules adopted at the XIV Congress (1925) stated³⁹:

"The main task entrusted to the Central Control Commission is to safeguard Party unity and strengthen the ranks of the Party, for which the Central Control Commission assigned:

1. Assistance to the Central Committee of the AUCP(b) in strengthening the proletarian composition of the party ...
2. Struggle against violations by party members of the program, charter of the AUCP(b) and decisions of congresses.
3. Resolute struggle against all kinds of anti-party groups and against the manifestation of factionalism within the party, as well as preventing and helping to eliminate squabbles ...
4. Combating non-communist offenses: economic fouling, moral licentiousness, etc.
5. Combating the bureaucratic perversions of the party apparatus and bringing to justice those who obstruct

implementation of the principle of inner-party democracy in the practice of party organs. The main points of the

charter -1, 3, 5- directly and directly related to the practice of Stalin and his secret cabinet within the Central Committee, but it was precisely on these points that Stalin introduced his first reserve into the party battle - CCC. True, at first, he did not use the entire composition of the Central Control Commission (since out of 195 of its members elected at the XV Congress, at least half were the people of Bukharin, Rykov and Tomsky, and not even the entire composition of the Presidium of the Central Control Commission (21 people), which also sat Bukharin "Stalin used only its select head - the leaders of the Central Control Commission. In doing so, Stalin did not formally violate the rules of the party. We recall that the rules stated: the Presidium of the Central Control Commission delegates three members and three candidates to the Politburo, and five members and five candidates from the Organizing Bureau composition of the Presidium to participate in the meetings of these higher bodies with the right of an advisory vote. Subsequently, at the XV Congress, the prudent Stalin introduced very subtle, but important changes to this paragraph of the party charter. Namely: the

Presidium of the Central Control Commission delegates to Polit 39 resolutions and decisions of congresses, conferences of

plenums of the Central Committee. Moscow, Partizdat, 1933, part I, p. 223. Bureau of not three, but four of its members and four candidates with broader rights. expanding the composition of the delegation of the Presidium of the Central Control Commission to the Politburo and canceling the old clause of the charter on this score, the Stalinists deliberately did not stipulate (as it was in the old charter) that the delegation of the Presidium of the Central Control Commission enjoys the "right of an advisory vote." This was the first change. The second change, outwardly just as little noticeable, but in essence just as important, consisted in the following: in the old rules, the Presidium of the Central Control Commission was the only supreme governing body of the Central Control Commission between its plenums. As such, he directed both the Secretariat and the Party Collegium of the Central Control Commission. The Party Collegium (5 members and 2 candidates), in fact, was the highest party court, but dependent and subordinate to the Presidium of the Central Control Commission, in which, as indicated, almost half were Bukharinites.

Now Stalin made the Party Collegium independent of the Presidium of the Central Control C

The decisive significance of these changes for Stalin was later reflected in his struggle with Bukharin. To complete the picture, I will add that a completely new clause⁴⁰ was included in the Rules: "Party members who refuse to answer truthfully the questions of control commissions are subject to immediate expulsion from the Party."

Sergo Ordzhonikidze headed the Presidium of the Central Control Commission. At the head of the highest and now "independent" court of the party were - Em. Yaroslavsky, Shkiryatov, Solts, Zemlyachka, Janson. The permanent delegation of the Presidium of the Central Control Commission to the Politburo were the same persons - Ordzhonikidze, Yaroslavsky, Shkiryatov and Solts. Now, when, after the July and November plenums of the Central Committee (1928) and the fighting within the Politburo, Stalin became convinced that there really was no "opposition" in the Politburo, but equal forces fighting among themselves, he

brought his first reserve into battle. Motivated by the fact that the Politburo does not have a firm majority on the most important issues of current politics, Stalin proposed holding joint meetings of the Politburo and the obviously Stalinist Presidium

of the Central Control Commission. What measures did Bukharin's group take against such an open "organizational encirclement" (Bukharin's expression) by Stalin? If we do not talk about the ill-fated conversation between Bukharin and Kamenev, then it seems

that 40 "VKP(b) in resolutions...", Part II, p. 451.

none. And this despite the presence of an equal position in the Politburo, the sympathy and support (some - openly, others - presumably) of solid groups in the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission, the entire apparatus of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions and the Central Committee of the Unions, despite the well-known positions in the Red Army, the activity and support of leading groups party theorists and propagandists, despite, finally, the sympathy and possible support of the main population of the country peasantry. All objective factors spoke for Bukharin. But, alas, all the same, one factor was missing, which Lenin called the "subjective factor": the organization of sacrificial revolutionaries. Bukharin was too much of a theoretician for that, Rykov was a pedant, and Tomsky was the only warrior in the field. The leaders of the right-wing opposition were deathly afraid of violating the legality of the party framework, which Stalin broke so mercilessly right before their eyes. They

they were afraid of accusations of factionalism, while in their presence Stalin created his own faction - "a party within a party." The leaders of the right opposition were afraid of appealing over the heads of Stalin and his apparatus to the party masses, and Stalin, in incessant letters and instructions, not only appealed over the heads of the Politburo and the Orgburo to the party masses, but without the slightest hesitation smashed and smashed its local elected leaders in order to replace them. appointed from Moscow.

Stalin did not have the objective factors of Bukharin, but instead he had that same Leninist "subjective factor" - a dynamic organization of well-trained businessmen, capable of adventure, unscrupulous in methods, greedy for power. Their strength lay in the fact that, in the interests of the struggle for power, they were ready to do more than Bukharin and Trotsky put together: to desecrate the mausoleum of Lenin, and to anathematize Marx and Engels, if only their victory depended on it. Who does not understand this, he knows

Stalinists only according to books.

Such was the situation within the party when the first denouement came. It began with Bukharin's famous statement of January 30, 1929. Unfortunately, this most important

program document of the Right Opposition was never published in the USSR. As far as I know, it also did not get abroad. Reading this document was forbidden by Stalin even for members of the CPSU (b). Only the leading party asset, which, according to the logic of the Stalinists, has already developed

sufficient pro-Stalin immunity against "anti-party heresies", could get acquainted with it in the appendix "materials" to the verbatim report of the April joint plenum of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (April 16-23, 1929). Moreover. Even the decision of this plenum on the Bukharin group was kept secret until 1933. It was only in 1933 that both the decision of the joint session of the Politburo and the Presidium of the Central Control Commission and the decision of the said plenum on the case of the Rights were published, of course, again without Bukharin's statement of January 30 and the "platform of three" of February 9, 1929. To what extent these documents are also incomplete and obviously "cleaned up" after the fact, they show the omissions of all more or less striking quotations from Bukharin's statement.

and in this form these documents help reproduce Bukharin's statement. The main goal of

Bukharin's statement of January 30 is the personality of Stalin, and of the leading bodies of the Central Committee - only the Secretariat of the Central Committee. Prudently shielding the Politburo, the Orgburo, and the plenum of the Central Committee from criticism, Bukharin openly and with reference to data from the current practice of the Central Committee apparatus accused Stalin in essence of conspiring against the party line.

Bukharin's accusations boiled down mainly to the following points: 1. Stalin's peasant

policy was based on the slogan proclaimed by him at the July plenum of the Central Committee "tribute, that is, military-feudal exploitation of the peasantry." Stalin's goal: based on the methodical, legalized state robbery of the country's main class - the peasantry - to head for industrialization. Stalin strives for this goal in two ways: one way is forced collectivization, the other is "taxation." 2. Contrary to the repeated decisions of the party to stimulate the development of the peasant economy and raise its productivity through incentive measures, Stalin resorted to completely opposite measures:

to the practice of introducing a new "war communism" in the countryside by applying extraordinary administrative repressions on grain procurements (the indiscriminate confiscation of peasant bread in case of refusal to at the same time to produce consumer goods for the countryside, as required by previous decisions of the Party).

3. In the whole policy of the country in general, in peasant politics in particular, "congresses, conferences, plenums, the Politburo of the party decide one thing, and the Stalinist apparatus carries out another." 4. In intra-Party

politics in general, and in the organizational policy of the Party in particular, "congresses, conferences, plenums of the Central Committee and the Party Rules establish the same norms, while the Stalinist apparatus adheres to its own norms." All this led to the fact that "intra-party democracy has become a fiction, and the appointment of party secretaries from above - the law." Therefore, "there are no elected secretaries in the party, but there are party officials appointed and replaced by the Stalinist apparatus." The purpose of this selection of secretaries is to create

the Stalinist faction of selected officials in order to blow up the Leninist party from within ("a party within a party", or, in Bukharin's phrase, "secretary selection"). 5. The same

process of party bureaucratization was transferred by the Stalinists to the sphere of the state apparatus. The role of the Soviets has been reduced to that of an accessory mechanism of the party apparatus. Moreover, the bureaucratization of the state apparatus is being carried out: according to one plan with the bureaucratic party. All this "bureaucratic rebirth" of the proletarian state and the Leninist party is not proceeding spontaneously, but in an organized manner, according to the methodologically worked out plan of the "Stalin Cabinet".

6. Where Stalin and the Stalinists fail to capture and paralyze the state, party or trade union apparatus with the bureaucratic pincers of their faction, Stalin and his assistants resort to the systematic and calculated method of "organizational encirclement" to appoint "political commissars" there (All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions - Kaganovich, Council of People's Commissars - Ordzhonikidze, "Pravda" Savelyev and Manuilsky, etc.). Moreover, this is done not by the decision of the party (plenum of the Central Committee, Politburo, Orgburo), but by the decision of their own "Stalin's Cabinet" with formal registration at meetings of the Secretariat of the Central Committee. 7. The Stalinists are pursuing the same

organizational policy of bureaucratization and selection of officials through the Comintern. The selection of workers and leaders of the latter is based not on the Leninist principles for the nomination of professional revolutionaries, but on the Stalinist plan for the selection of hired officials. Devoted Party cadres of the Comintern are expelled from the fraternal parties if they display independence in their judgments and independence in their work. Not persuasion, not upbringing, but a policy of diktat - that is the style of Stalin's work in the Comintern. If foreign communists dare to criticize the personal orders of the Stalinist apparatus, then they are immediately declared "oppositionists" or "conciliators", "social democrats" or "degenerates" and are expelled from the party not through their own parties, but through the Comintern in Moscow (Thalheimer, Brandler) or, if their exclusions are connected with major troubles for Stalin personally, then they are simply recalled from their country to Moscow as "conciliators" (Ewert, Gerhardt).

8. If all this is being done by methods "normal for the Stalinist apparatus", then the other path, which Stalin now took, cannot be tolerated in any party of political like-minded people: this path is the path of monstrous provocation, falsification, extortion, blackmail of some leaders and members of the Central Committee against others, and all together - against the organizational principles and ideological foundations of Leninism. Behind the back of the party and its higher organs, Stalin is pursuing a policy of liquidating the Leninist party. This "Stalinist regime in our party is no longer bearable."

The only way to improve the health of the party and restore Lenin's policy is to immediately remove Stalin and his entire "cabinet" in full accordance with Lenin's will. Such was the main outline

of the content of Bukharin's statement of January 30, 1929. That this is so, the reader can also be convinced by comparing my exposition of this statement with Stalin's documents on Bukharin. Bukharin's statement was

addressed to the next plenum of the Central Committee. The last plenum was in November, the next plenum was scheduled for the end of January. But Stalin suddenly canceled the plenum, and Bukharin's statement was submitted for consideration by the joint session of the Politburo and the delegation of the Presidium of the Central Control Commission. The calculation was very simple: after giving the members of the delegation of the Presidium of the Central Control Commission (four people - all Stalinists: Ordzhonikidze, Yaroslavsky, Shkiryatov and Solts) the right of a decisive vote, the balance of power in the Politburo changed dramatically in favor of Stalin - 7 against 3, even if Kalinin, Kuibyshev and Rudzutak will continue to be "conciliators". And this calculation justified itself: at a

meeting on February 9, the seven came out in an organized manner against Bukharin, and out of 41 "VKP (b) in resolutions ...", 1924-1932, part II, pp. 514-530. three "conciliators" already previously trained Kuibyshev joined the seven. Bukharin's letter was declared the "platform" of all three right-wing opposition leaders (Bukharin, Rykov and Tomsky) and a slander against Stalin and the party (Stalin was first identified with the party). The meeting decided not to bring Bukharin's statement to the attention of the plenum of the Central Committee, and to forbid Bukharin himself to make such a statement at the plenum. Then Bukharin and

leave their posts in order to retain the right to present their accusations against the Stalinist leadership at the plenum. Rykov refused to join this statement. This somehow cooled Bukharin, but Tomsy began to attack Stalin all the more sharply, accusing his friend Rykov of inconsistency as well. Tomsy was supported by a candidate member of the Politburo and secretary of the Central Committee Uglanov. Taking

advantage of the resulting confusion among the leaders of the right opposition themselves, Stalin's troika (Stalin, Molotov and Voroshilov) began to "strike while the iron is hot" - it made a proposal⁴²: all sorts of gossip against

the Central Committee, Comrade Bukharin is obviously vacillating in the direction of working out a "new" line); Comintern c) reject the resignation of comrades Bukharin and Tomsy d) propose to comrades Bukharin and Tomsy loyally carry out all

decisions of the ECCI, the party and its Central Committee".

Stalin diplomatically bypassed the name of Rykov. From the Bukharin "troika" the "two" turned out, and Uglanov was not taken into account at all. Things were clearly moving towards an internal collapse of the opposition, since Rykov and on Rykov's side had many supporters in the most right-wing opposition - both in the Central Committee and in the middle links of party and Soviet bodies. Then Bukharin, Tomsy and Uglanov, in an ultimatum form, offered Rykov to sign the previously prepared draft "statement of three members of the Politburo", which was initially

taken back. ⁴² "VKP(b) in resolutions...",

Part II, p. 529. The ultimatum was harsh: either with Stalin or with us. Rykov, with a heavy heart, signed the general indictment against Stalin. Thus was born the statement of the "three" of February 9, which Stalin called the "platform of the right." Its content boiled down to the statement of 30 January. The new statement was attached to the minutes of the joint meeting of the Politburo and the Presidium of the Central Control Commission and was intended for the archive. Since it was served to the end

meeting, Stalin tried to ignore it altogether. The rightists demanded the immediate convocation of a plenum to discuss their statement. Stalin promised, but did not convene. He withstood the fight

in the Politburo - it was necessary to prepare for the fight at the plenum. This needed more time. The main thing was to

qualify the criticism of Stalin by the Bukharin group as criticism of the Central Committee, and not just Stalin and the Stalinist apparatus. It was necessary to present in the eyes of the members of the plenum of the Central Committee Bukharin's criticism and revelations of Stalin's organizational practices as slander based on "all sorts of gossip." This was done in the lengthy resolution of the joint meeting. Convinced that no matter how he dragged out the convocation of the plenum, the people of Bukharin were determined to convey their views this time to the members of the Central Committee, Stalin, in a special "appeal to the plenum" attached to the same resolution, decided to explain to the plenum why he concealed and its Central Committee, the presence of two hostile groups in the Politburo, when a few months ago (at the October plenum of the Moscow Committee) it solemnly declared: "In the Politburo we have neither rightists, nor" leftists ", nor conciliators with them." Now Stalin justified himself by the fact that disagreements did exist, but they turned out to be temporary and therefore "the Politburo of the Central Committee and the Presidium of the Central Control Commission did not find it necessary to report to the plenum of the Central Committee about the disagreements that had already been settled ...". Or in the same place: "this circumstance made it possible to oblige all members of the Politburo to declare in

their speeches at the plenum and outside it that there are no disagreements within the Politburo ..."43. In other words, Stalin twice deceived his Central Committee - the first time the July plenum, the second time - the November

plenum of the Central Committee (1928), closing Bukharin's mouth, and he himself declared that "everything is in order in the Politburo." 43 "VKP(b) in resolutions...", p. 529. Another month and a half passed before Stalin managed to convene a plenum of the Central Committee. The plenum was convened only on April 16 and lasted until April 23. Thus, five months have passed since the November plenum (and the charter required the convening of a plenum, as I already wrote, at least once every two months). Stalin decided to convene it only after all the "preparatory" work had been

"study" of the right on party assets and in the press, but also secret and individual recruitment against Bukharin of members of the Central Committee, the

Central Control Commission and the leaders of the army. It should be noted that in the Central Committee, and especially in the Central Control Commission, there was a rather large group of members who had not yet formally revealed their attitude towards either Bukharin or Stalin. The political philosophy of this group was simple: "live yourself - let someone else live" or "my hut is on the edge - I don't know anything." Accustomed to the comfortable atmosphere of the new

regime, they lived on a percentage of the old capital - on cutting the coupons of the "old Bolsheviks". Their former enthusiasm and idealism have long since disappeared in the soft down jackets of Soviet apartments. From the revolution they got everything that the most desperate of them could crave: the right to rule over a vast empire as members of its legislative body. Everything else directly and directly depended on it. For this power - imposing in its external brilliance and valuable in its internal content - they were ready to hold on at any cost, even sacrificing their own past ideals. In a word, these were people who are called in political parlance "swamp". In

such a "swamp" Stalin knew how to swim superbly. Bukharin, of course, impressed the heart of the "bog", but the sober instinct of party mammals told him that he had to hold on to Stalin. Otherwise, there is only one block from Red Square to Lubyanka. Too ominous were the memories of the Trotskyists. This "swamp" saved Stalin at the April plenum of the Central Committee. At this plenum, the Bukharinites for the first time made a thorough criticism of the Stalinist group on all the main questions of international and domestic politics. The criticism was built in the spirit of Bukharin's statement of 30 January and the statement of Bukharin, Rykov and Tomsky of 9 February. Personal attacks against Stalin were softened, especially by Rykov, but not the edge of the criticism itself. It was precisely in general criticism that Bukharin accused Stalin ... of "Trotskyism"! Such an accusation touched Stalin so deeply that he exclaimed

"And this is said by the same Bukharin who ... was recently a student of Trotsky, who only yesterday was looking for a bloc with the Trotskyists against the Leninists and was running to them from the back porch! Well, isn't that funny, comrades?"

I want to make one small but important digression here. The statement of January 30 was a bombshell for Stalin. If it explodes in the meeting room of the plenum of the Central Committee, then it can blow off the head of more than one Stalin. A possible explosion had to be prevented by any means, or at least delayed until the final concreting of one's own position. Stalin went on the defensive and persistently sought ways to compromise. The psychological gain of such a "defensive tactic" was obvious. "Bukharin declared war, I propose peace, for even a bad peace is better than a good war," Stalin said, for the information of those who continued to regard him, Stalin, as the main aggressor. But Stalin's "defensive tactics" were aggressive through and through. Under the veil of the party "peacemaker" the insidious plans of the eternal aggressor were hidden. Thus, immediately after Bukharin handed in his statement addressed to the plenum of the Central Committee, Stalin hastily created a "Politburo Commission", which worked out, apparently not without the participation of Stalin himself, the conditions for "compromise and peace in the Politburo." On February 7, this commission brings to the attention of the "sides" of the two "troikas" (Stalin, Molotov, Voroshilov and Bukharin, Rykov, Tomsky) its terms of "compromise". This document sheds light both on the dramatic nature of events and on Stalin's skill as a party tactician. Whether the Bukharinites accept the proposed compromise or not, in both cases Stalin remained the victor. In changing the alignment of forces in the Politburo and at the plenum of the Central Committee, the commission's proposals were to play a decisive role, which happened later. Having allowed this document to fulfill its purpose, Stalin later closed it in the iron safe of the Politburo. Only 20 years later, that is, in 1949, it was first published.

Here is its content⁴⁵: 44l. Stalin.

Works, vol. 12, p. 79. 45l. Stalin. Works,

vol. 12, pp. 6-7. "From the exchange of opinions

in the commission, it became clear that: 1) Bukharin recognizes the

negotiations with Kamenev as a political mistake; 2) Bukharin admits that the statements of his "statement" of January 30, 1929 that the Central Committee is in fact pursuing a policy of "military feudal exploitation peasantry" that the Central Committee is corrupting the Comintern and i

rashly, in the heat of controversy, that he no longer supports these assertions and considers that he has no differences with the Central Committee on these issues; 3)

Bukharin admits, on this basis, that friendly work in the Politburo is possible and necessary; 4) Bukharin refuses

to resign both along the lines of Pravda and along the lines of the Comintern; 5) In view of

this, Bukharin withdraws his statement of January 30. Based on the foregoing, the commission considers it possible not to submit to the joint meeting of the Politburo and the Presidium of the Central Control Commission its own draft resolution with a political assessment of Bukharin's mistakes and proposes to the joint session of the Politburo and the Presidium of the Central Control Commission to withdraw from use all available documents (transcripts of speeches, etc.).

The Commission proposes to the Politburo and the Presidium of the Central Control Commission to provide Bukharin with all the conditions that are necessary for his normal work as executive editor of Pravda and secretary of the ECCI.

The acceptance of such a "compromise" meant for the Bukharin group an open capitulation to Stalin and an admission that they were wrong in their criticism of Stalin's policy and Stalin's apparatus; the rejection of this "compromise" meant a demonstration of one's aggressiveness against the "peace-loving Stalin", especially since Stalin offered "friendly work in the Politburo" and "normal conditions for Bukharin's work in Pravda and the Comintern".⁴⁶.

Bukharin guessed the plan of a direct strike and rejected the "compromise". But he did not guess the direct blow of Stalin. And Stalin took advantage of this classically. Stating the refusal of the Bukharinites to accept a "compromise", to "reconcile", Stalin at the April plenum of the Central Committee cynically

asked "... why the comrades from the Bukharin opposition, Bukharin,

Rykov and Tomskey, did not agree to accept the compromise of the Politburo commission proposed by him February 7 of this year Is it not a fact that this compromise gave the Bukharin group a perfectly acceptable way out of the impasse into which it had driven itself...

thereby eliminate the acuteness of the intra-Party situation and create an atmosphere of unanimous and friendly work in the Politburo?

Having sharpened the question in this way, Stalin cited one quotation from Lenin's general discourses "on opportunism", then made a significant pause and, prefaced by an almost lyrical overture to the victorious march, answered his own question⁴⁷:

"Yes, comrades, we must be able to look reality straight in the eye, no matter how unpleasant it may be. God forbid (!), if we become infected with the disease of fear of the truth ... And the truth in this case consists in the fact that we have no There is one line, the line of the party, the revolutionary, Leninist line, but along with this there is another line, the line of the Bukharin group, which is waging a struggle against the party line by way of anti-party declarations, by way of resignations, by slandering the party, undermining against the party... This second cast is an opportunist line..." All blows against the apparatus of the Central Committee, all

blows against his own, not imaginary, but real "undermining and slandering", all the criticism that concerned his own person as secretary of the Central Committee, Stalin met outwardly incomprehensible, but internally very subtly calculated, stoic calmness. He even made a slip of the tongue at the very beginning of his speech⁴⁸: "I will not touch on the personal moment, although the personal moment in the speeches of some comrades from the Bukharin group played a rather impressive role (emphasis mine. - A.A.U. I will not touch on it, since the personal moment there's a little thing..."

Bukharin says that Stalin is Genghis Khan of the party, and Stalin replies that this is a trifle. Bukharin says that Stalin is a conspirator against his own party, and Stalin replies that this is a trifle. Bukharin says that Stalin is a falsifier Stalin replies that this is a trifle ... Stalin does not want to defend Stalin. Stalin is a trifle. Stalin wants to defend Lenin and Lenin's party, while Bukharin wants to divert him into the direction of "personal issues." They

want ⁴⁷ Ibid., p.

9. ⁴⁸ Ibid., p. 1.

"Replace politics with politicking. But this trick will not work with them," answers Stalin.

Such emphatic disregard for one's own person, the absence of the slightest attempt at personal rehabilitation, a contemptuously magnanimous attitude to "little things" and, at the same time, an ardent, convincing and logically quite consistent "defence of Lenin and Leninism" against an ideological attempt on the part of Bukharin - all this in itself creates a political alibi for Stalin in the eyes of the Central Committee. Stalin does not need more. Stalin did not limit himself

to accusing Bukharin of opportunism, of anti-Leninist theory. He reminded Bukharin of his "betrayal" in 1918, when, in connection with the conclusion of a separate Brest Peace with the Germans, he led the opponents of this peace, the so-called Left Communists...⁴⁹. Bukharin spoke here about the

absence of collective leadership in the Central Committee ... (italics mine. - A. A.). It should be noted that this is not the first time Bukharin violates the elementary requirements of loyalty and collective leadership in relation to the Central Committee of the party. The history of our party knows examples, how Bukharin, during the period of the Brest Peace, under Lenin, remaining in the minority on the question of peace, ran to the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries ... tried to conclude a bloc with them against Lenin and the Central Committee. , it is not known yet".

If Stalin really said - "it is not yet known!", then this was not a polemical trick of Stalin's oratory, but an ominous reminder of the fate of the "Left SRs" ("Left SRs" were shot). Politically, Stalin did away with Bukharin, he

decided to disavow him as a party theoretician as well. Stalin cited an excerpt from Lenin's Testament about Bukharin. This excerpt from Lenin said⁵⁰: "Among the young members of the Central Committee, I would like to

say a few words about Bukharin and Pyatakov. most valuable and prominent theoretician, he is also legitimately

⁴⁹ibid., pp. 100-101. The last phrase "it is not yet known" is, in all likelihood, a later falsification - an insertion into Stalin's speech in order to retroactively show Stalin's "brilliant" instinct regarding Bukharin's "betrayal" in 1918.

50l. Stalin, Works, vol. 12, p. never studied and, I think, never understood dialectics) -".

Stalin emphasized the last words and triumphed: "So, Bukharin is a scholastic theoretician, a theoretician without dialectics, and dialectics is the soul of Marxism!"

Thus, Stalin turned the "case of Stalin" into "the case of the Bukharin group." Rykov, Bukharin, Tomsky were actively supported only by a small group of members of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission (Uglov, Mikhailov, Kotov, Ugarov, Rozit, Kulikov, Stan). "Swamp" reluctantly followed Stalin. The oblast, krai, and republican party secretaries appointed and dismissed personally by Stalin and his "cabinet" demanded, as before, the immediate expulsion of Bukharin and Tomsky from the Politburo. Stalin again assumes the

pious pose of a "peacemaker"⁵¹: "Some comrades insist on the immediate expulsion of Bukharin and Tomsky from the Politburo of the Central Committee. I do not agree with these comrades. without such extreme measures. The Plenum

decides⁵²: "d) remove Bukharin

and Tomsky from their posts (Pravda, Comintern, All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions) and warn them that in the event of the slightest attempt on their part to violate the decisions of the Central Committee and its bodies, they will be immediately removed from the Politburo ...

h) circulate this resolution to all local organizations of the Party and members of the 16th Party Conference, without publishing it in the press."

Stalin, angrily scolding Rykov for violating "collegiality" in the leadership of the government and even for having his own line, Bukharin's, against the line of the party, nevertheless did not demand Rykov's punishment. Moreover. Stalin appointed Rykov as the main speaker for the five-year plan at the XVI Conference of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks that opened on the same day.

Rykov cooled off again. The more confident Stalin worked. The first victory over the Bukharin group had to be institutionalized, and

in order to do this, poten had to be removed from the party and from the leading posts of the army.

social Bukharinites.

Stalin called for a "general purge of the party",
with a direct order that it be completed by the 16th Party Congress (there were 1,500,000 members in the party at that time).

The same party conference on the report of Em. Yaroslavsky adopted a corresponding resolution. The purge was to be carried out by the apparatus of the Central Control Commission under the direction of the Secretariat of the Central Committee. The purge resolution explicitly stated:

"The ongoing check and purge of the ranks of the Party should thus make the Party more homogeneous ... The purge should mercilessly expel from the ranks of the Party all alien ... elements ... supporters ... of anti-Party groups ... "regardless of faces." .." (all italics in the quote are mine. - A. A.). The conference ended on April 29th. On the

same day, the first plenum of the Central Committee was held to approve the decisions of the conference. The plenum approved them with only one amendment: Uglanov was removed from the Secretariat of the Central Committee, and Bauman, head of the village department of the Moscow Committee, was appointed in his place. Kubiak went over to the side of Stalin through the "swamp". The secretariat of the Central Committee has now become purely Stalinist.

XVIII. STALIN AS A "NEW TYPE OF POLITICS" The plenum

and the conference ended with the triumph of the Stalinist group in the Politburo and the Stalinist apparatus in the Central Committee. For nine-tenths it was a personal triumph of Stalin himself. It was customary to consider Stalin a "gray beast" in the leadership of the Bolshevik Party and a man of "mediocre abilities" in politics. At best, Stalin was recognized as a "serviceable executor" of someone else's will. This is how Trotsky paints him. People used to see him like that under Lenin, and they continued to think of him like that even after Lenin. But Stalin turned out to be a sphinx even for his closest friends and former associates. Lenin's death was necessary for the "sphinx" to begin to take shape. The Stalinists have their own special understanding of politics, tactics and strategy. Yes, and they considered their party and consider it a party of a special, "new type." To fully understand and boldly maneuver into the darkest labyrinths

53 "VKP(b) in resolutions...", pp. 566-567.

For this specific "new politics", one indispensable quality had to be possessed: freedom from the old politics. Stalin, of course, also knew the "old policy", but he knew only "mediocre" and this was also his greatest advantage. He suffered less from the "childhood disease" of naivete in politics. He was free from all moral and ethical conventions in the political game. Trotsky did not recognize Stalin as

a party theorist either. In Marxism, as the political doctrine of the communists, he was considered an utter ignoramus. And this was also Stalin's advantage. He was free from the dogmatic fetters of Marxist orthodoxy. "There is dogmatic Marxism and creative Marxism. I stand on the point of view of the latter," Stalin said at the Sixth Party Congress, on the eve of the October Revolution.

In the "new politics" and "party of a new type" Stalin did not recognize either the romance of historical memories or the laws of historical continuity. By attributing to Trotsky his own intentions for the future (which he resorted to quite often in other conditions and on another occasion), saying that Trotsky wanted to debunk "old Bolshevism" in order to delete Lenin from history in order to assert his own greatness, Stalin himself was inwardly free from respect for rank even in relation to Lenin. In the "new politics" Stalin steered towards the "recent". Very characteristic are his words on this score⁵⁴: "It is possible that some of the clergymen will not like such a manner. But what do I care about that? I am not a fan of clergymen at all." Therefore, Stalin also recognizes the "old Bolsheviks" insofar as they are capable of becoming "new." Here are his other very characteristic words, uttered at the same April plenum⁵⁵: "If we are called Old Bolsheviks only because we are old,

then our deeds are bad, comrades. Old Bolsheviks are respected not because they are old, but because they are at the same time eternally new..."

Making a small digression, I must immediately note a well-known fact: Stalin, of course, recognized and rewarded clergymen, but those who bowed their knees only to

him alone. And when he came to power, he proved that he placed himself above Lenin

and as a theoretician. Works, vol. 12, p.

114. 55 Ibid., pp.

1-2. ka, and as a political leader. Here is an extremely vivid illustration of this. In the "Philosophical Dictionary" of 1952, published under the editorship of P. Yudin, there is an indirect comparison of Stalin with Lenin. About Lenin it says: "Lenin is the greatest theoretician and leader of the international proletariat." The same "dictionary" says about Stalin: "Stalin is a brilliant theoretician and leader of the international proletariat." Lenin is only "the greatest", and Stalin is

"brilliant"! Returning to the topic, it must be said that such an internal freedom of Stalin from Lenin's norms, traditions and "respect for rank" in relation to Lenin was also Stalin's strongest side as a "new politician." Finally, Stalin was ignorant of theoretical matters and could not be considered a theoretician in the sense of the old Bolshevik understanding of "theory". He became

a "theorist" when he received power. But in those years, Stalin himself was well aware of his insignificance in theory and did not show any external ambitions in this sense. When his countless admirers turned to him to speak out on questions of Marxist theory, philosophy, political economy, language, literature, art, he quite seriously confessed his inadequacy in the field of theory or Marxist criticism. His published writings include some of his early confessions in this regard. Thus, in a letter to the writer Bezymensky, Stalin writes⁵⁶:

"I am not a connoisseur of literature and certainly not a critic." In another letter, to Maxim Gorky, he admits even more frankly⁵⁷: "I can't satisfy Kamegulov's request. There's no time! Besides, what a critic I am, damn it!"

As paradoxical as it may sound, weakness in theory was also Stalin's strength, like a "new type" of politics. Not being in the dogmatic tentacles of Marx and Lenin and not bothering himself with the puzzling wisdom of the "scientific socialism" of the future, in which he did not believe, Stalin remained on the ground of reality. In the same reality, "socialism" meant not an end, but a means to an end - to power at any cost and with the help of any methods.

The difference between him and Lenin was also significant. Lenin came to power in the struggle against classes hostile to the party. Stalin, on the other hand, sought and achieved it in the struggle against his own party. However, the same Lenin taught (Stalin deeply believed in this) that getting power is still half the battle, the most important and most difficult task is to stay in power. For the successful solution of this problem, Lenin saw only one way: political isolation, and then the physical destruction of classes hostile to the party. Stalin completely transferred this teaching of Lenin to his own party - he could gain power relatively easily, but he could keep it only according to the same Leninist principle: by political isolation and physical destruction of persons and groups hostile to him in the Bolshevik party. So far, Stalin was busy resolving "half the battle" by seizing power. It was at the April plenum that Stalin set about

"political isolation" of his opponents in order to isolate them physically as well, when the new regime of personal dictatorship was finally consolidated. The reader may say that Lenin would have acted exactly the same as Stalin had he dealt with numerous opponents within the party. Addressing Tomsy at the plenum, Stalin declared that he, Stalin, and his group in the Central Committee were more liberal than Lenin: "Remember that Comrade Lenin," Stalin said, "because of one small mistake on the part of Tomsy, drove him to Turkestan" 58.

To Tomsy's remark: "With the favorable assistance of Zinoviev and partly yours," Stalin replied: you are mistaken if you think that Lenin could be easily convinced of what he himself was not convinced. In order to destroy the Leninist guard under Lenin, it was necessary first to destroy Lenin himself. In this guard there was only one person capable of this - Stalin. This, too, was his exclusive advantage.

All that was Stalin's advantage was lacking for Bukharin. The Stalinists were right when they saw Stalin's "genius" in all this. It remains to be added that this is precisely the "creative" character of Stalinist Marxism, as well as the secret of the all-conquering mastery of Stalinist dialectics. In this

In the Stalinist dialectics of the first years of the struggle against the opposition, terror did not yet play a decisive role. The decisive role was played

by Stalin's extraordinary ability to say the right word at the right time, and having said it, recklessly proceed to the implementation of a practical plan, even if such a course of action contradicted all the dogmas and concepts that still considered "sacred". At the same time, he acted with exact regard to the psychology of a completely new party elite rushing onto the stage. This character trait makes Stalin related to the character of his historical idol - Napoleon.

"I ended the war in the Vendee," said the latter, "when I became a Catholic. My entry into Egypt was facilitated by the fact that I declared myself a Mohammedan, and I won the Italian priests to my side, becoming an ultra-Montanese. If I ruled the Jewish people I would have ordered the rebuilding of Solomon's temple." Stalin

was not a theoretician like Bukharin, an orator like Trotsky, not even an intelligent person like Rykov. This, too, was his greatest advantage as a "new type" leader. French

philosopher and politician, later minister, Jules Simon testifies: "Two

months before his omnipotence, Louis Napoleon was nothing. Victor Hugo ascended the podium (Assembly of 1848), but is not successful ... The rare and powerful genius Edgard Quinet also does not help ... Political meetings are places where the brilliance of genius is least successful. Here only that eloquence suits the time and place, and those services rendered to the party and not to the fatherland, are considered. In order for Lamartine in 1848 and Thiers in 1871 to receive recognition, their decisive importance was needed as a driving force. When the danger passed, gratitude disappeared along with fear. "

Quoting the above words of Simon, the famous French sociologist Lebon writes: "There are intelligent

and educated leaders, but this, as a rule, harms them more than it benefits. strength and power in conviction, which is necessary

apostle. The great leaders of all times, in fact the leaders of all revolutions, were limited people and therefore had great influence. The speeches of the most famous among them, Robespierre, often surprise with their incoherence. When you read them, you do not find a satisfactory explanation for the monstrous role of the omnipotent dictator."59

This is how they will write about Stalin in decades to come, not finding in his speeches or in his "brilliant works" not only a spark of genius, but even the necessary dose of simple nevertheless, this man mastered to the last screw the gigantic state machine, in the legislative body of which there were so many contenders for the post of Lenin. I cited all those "subjective factors" that made Stalin, in my opinion, the driver of this machine. I must now add to them, running a little ahead, and one "objective factor" of the greatest importance. The same Le Bon speaks of a similar factor in politics. True, stating the phenomenon of the order that I want to talk about, Le Bon does not give an explanation for it. However, statements Taine and Spuler, which he cites in connection with this, are strikingly reminiscent of the picture of the Bolshevik party parliament of the time I am describing - the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission. "The history of the revolution

shows," writes Le Bon, "to what extent assemblies can be subject to artificial influence, which is completely contrary to their advantages. It was an unheard of sacrifice for the nobility to give up their advantages, and yet it happened on that famous night of the Constituent Assembly. Refusal from their inviolability meant for the members of the Convention a constant threat of death, and yet they did so, and were not afraid to point at each other, although they knew for sure that the scaffold, to which their colleagues were brought today, they themselves faced tomorrow. have reached that stage of automatism of which I spoke, nothing can keep them from falling under the influence that guides them. "They approve and decide what they despise," says Taine, "not only stupidities,

but also crimes, the murder of innocents, the murder of friends. With one accord and with the liveliest approval, left and right jointly send Danton, their natural

supreme driver, to the scaffold. With unanimity and with the greatest approval, left and right jointly vote for the most villainous decrees of the revolutionary ruler 59 Le Bon. Psychologic

der Massen. Stuttgart, Alfred Kroner Verlag,
1951, S.

169. 60 Ibid., pp. 171 -

174. Unanimously and with cries of admiration and enthusiasm, with passionate demonstrations for d'Herbois, Canton, Robespierre, the Convention protects the government of murderers, although its party of the center hates for murders, and Horus despises, because her ranks suffered through him. Center and Mountain, minority and majority, end up plotting their own suicide. On the 22nd of Prairial the whole Convention surrendered; On 8 Thermidor, within the first quarter of an hour after Robespierre's speech, he gave in once more." Here is Spuler's description of the 1848 meeting: "Disputes, jealousy and discontent, which are replaced by blind trust and endless hopes, have led the republican party to death. Her unluckyness can be compared to her distrust against everyone. No sense of legitimacy, no sense of order, just fear and illusion without limits. Her carelessness competes with her impatience. Her savagery is as great as her obedience. This is a feature of immature temperament and lack of education. Nothing surprises her, everything confuses her. Trembling, cowardly and at the same time unfailingly heroic, she will rush into the fire, but will bounce before the shadow. Actions and relations of things are unknown to her. Just as quickly discouraged as it is heated, it is subject to all horrors; and triumphant to the heavens or frightened to death, it has neither the necessary boundaries nor the appropriate measure. Like flowing water, it reproduces all colors and perceives any form. "Many times made analogies of events from the French Revolution with the events of the Russian one do not hit the target as much as the episodes just cited. Look at the lists of the three compositions of the Russian revolutionary convention - the Central Committee and the Central Control

Commission: 1) after the victory of Zinoviev -

Bukharin - Stalin over Trotsky in 1924

(XIII Congress), 2) after the victory of Bukharin -

Rykov - Stalin over Zinoviev in 1925

(XV Congress) and 3) after Stalin's victory over Bukharin in 1930

(XVI

Congress). Each subsequent composition of the Bolshevik convention sends to the political scaffold the leading tribunes of the October Revolution from the previous composition: Zinoviev - Stalin - Bukharin - Trotsky and Trotskyists; Bukharin Stalin - Rykov - Zinoviev and the Zinovievites; Stalin and the "old Bolsheviks" of Bukharin and the Bukharinites; Stalin and the Stalinists - "Old Bolsheviks". Then Stalin brings them

all together in one place - at the Lubyanka, in order to eliminate them physically there. The Russian marats and dantons, Saint-Justs and robespierres, the "Girondins" and "highlanders" repeated the acts of the French drama with a kind of fatal doom in order to perpetuate the nightmarish regime of French September on Russian soil after a mutually destructive massacre. The logical line of the Russian October was the same. What Lenin nurtured in an embryo, Stalin raised as a monster.

XIX. STALIN IS DECLARED "GREAT" In our

ICP, the reports of the rounds of the joint plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission were followed with the same intensity with which they follow the reports of a fortress besieged by the enemy. At first, our "reports" were very sparse and sometimes contradictory, although at the plenum there were, in addition to the leaders of the right opposition, the

leaders of the Moscow group - Reznikov, "General" and Stan. According to the established rules, every day we were informed about the course of the plenum by Yudin. Yudin's information was second-hand. He was daily summoned to the Agitprop of the Central Committee, like other leaders of the central party institutions, supplying him with official "reports" and "comments" so that he would "process" the mass of the party accordingly.

During previous plenums, we received such reports first-hand - from our professor Stan, a member of the Central Control Commission. Now Stan was deprived of this "honorable load." However, from Yudin's information, we learned why Stan, a member of the Central Control Commission, did not have the right to share his impressions of the course of the plenum with colleagues and students of the IKP, as before. It turns out that Stan spoke at the plenum with a detailed critique of Stalin and, as Yudin put it, "a philosophical justification for right-wing opportunism." What did this "philosophical justification" consist of, Yudin knew as little as we do.

Moreover, we wanted to hear about the essence of the matter from the lips of Stan himself. At one of the next "information" the meeting put the question before Yudin. But if Yudin did not know "Stan's philosophy", then he knew "Stalin's philosophy" well.

"Whoever questions the information of the Central Committee, he himself can turn to his enemies, but it is not my duty to mediate in this," said Yudin.

Yudin was a fanatic, not a diplomat (today he is already a diplomat!), and this always spoiled his business in the "lower classes", although it raised his weight in the "top". Yudin's incautious answer provoked a discussion unforeseen by the agenda. Belov, the headman of the general (preparatory) department, an old party member, the commander of the Red Army (he even wore a military uniform with regimental commander's sleepers in the ICP), quite sincerely asked Yudin: - So, what

do you think, Comrade Stan is an enemy of the party? -

I said - the enemy of

the Central Committee. - But I realized that

he was an enemy

of Stalin, not the Central Committee.

- It is the same! - So it

turns out that the Central Committee

is Stalin? - Absolutely

correct! - But then the party is also Stalin? - Absolutely correct! "In this case, I state

that Stan is not the only enemy of the party," Belov concluded. Yudin

did not object, and loud voices of approval were heard from the hall.

- I declare the information meeting closed, - said Yudin and, having collected his papers, went to the exit. Cries and questions flew after him, people besieged him from all

sides, but he safely left the

"encirclement" and disappeared. "He plays Stalin,"

someone remarked. "Yudin is a party," Belov clarified his conclusion.

Yudin's information meetings were repeated every evening, but they did not provide significant information about the course of the plenum. Of the senior courses, almost no one attended them, probably having more reliable sources than Yudin. Nor did Sorokin, who once or twice himself had a ticket for

The more limited our knowledge, the more our curiosity grew. That the Stalinist apparatus of the Central Committee would misinform the communists through their dummy Yudins was understood by everyone: both enemies and friends of the apparatchiks. Why, then, the right-wing members of the Central Committee hide from the party the "bath" that the Stalinists give them at the plenum, it was precisely the friends of the right who refused to understand. Only a month after the plenum did we learn from the "transcript of the plenum of the Central Committee" the reason for the silence of the Rights. At the very beginning of the plenum, Stalin passed one extraordinary decision. This decision stated⁶¹:

"Establish special measures, up to and including expulsion from the Central Committee and from the Party, which can guarantee the secrecy of the decisions of the Central Committee and the Politburo of the Central Committee and exclude the possibility of informing the

Trotskyists about the affairs of the Central Committee and the Politburo." The purpose of this decision was clear - to deprive any of the participants of the plenum, even members of the Politburo, from informing the party about internal party affairs, unless he had a "voucher" in his hands. Agitprop of the Central Committee. Therefore, the secretary of the institute cell, Yudin, had the right to "inform" the Communists, while Stan, a member

of the Politburo, and Bukharin, a member of the Politburo, had to remain silent. From the same transcript, we learned what the "philosophy of Right opportunism" of our professor Stan consisted of (the transcripts of the plenums of the Central Committee were received by the party organization of the ICP in one copy, and they were read in group order according to courses and departments). Stan chose an original method of "philosophizing" and, on the basis of everything that Stalin himself wrote and said about the Trotskyists during the struggle with Trotsky, argued that in Stalin's current course towards super-industrialization through military-feudal robberies of the peasantry there is nothing Stalinist - this is "the second revised and enlarged edition of Trotskyism by Stalin. "Corrections" and "additions" come down to only one thing: declaring open civil war in the countryside, slandering Trotsky and falsifying Lenin. If the Central Committee takes the path of Stalin, the counter-revolution will break our necks. In this case, the Russian revolution will be drowned in the blood of the peasant Vendée. Theoretical primitivism does not allow Stalin to see the forest for the trees, and this forest is the great peasant Russia. The Russian revolution was saved by the peasantry, but the peasantry can also destroy it. If the party is not

wants to prepare, ultimately, her own funeral, she must declare to Stalin and his like-minded people - back to the NEP. In relation to the peasantry, this means the abolition of emergency grain procurement measures, a revision of the policy of excessive taxation, freedom of cooperation, raising grain prices, providing the peasant market with manufactured goods at normal prices. This path is the path of conquest of the peasantry by the Soviet ruble. True, this path is long, difficult, but Leninist. There is another way, short and seductive, but the police way is the way of conquering the peasantry with the bayonets of the OGPU troops. Lenin bequeathed to follow the first path, Stalin wants to follow the second. But then we are not his companions.

- You are Kamenev's fellow travelers! - someone's remark was heard in this place transcripts.

"Stalin and Molotov were Kamenev's fellow travelers all their lives!" Stan replied, alluding to the work of Molotov and Stalin around the Duma faction of the Bolshevik Social Democrats and in the Pravda newspaper - the first as editorial secretary, and the second as assistant editor (the editor was Kamenev). Stan's entire speech was sprinkled with such remarks from Stalin's already rehearsed employees. It was

difficult to judge the success of Stan's speech at the plenum, but it made an exceptional impression on us. After the speeches of Bukharin and Uglanov, it was perhaps the sharpest. Tomsky's speech was coarser, more direct, but on the same plane. Rykov discussed practical issues of economic policy, almost without touching on "pure politics." Therefore, we were not in the least surprised when we learned that Rykov had been appointed speaker for the five-year plan at the 16th Party Conference at the suggestion of Stalin himself, despite the objections of his friends. Stan also participated more actively in giving remarks to Stalin when the latter was lost in the jungle of theory. Stalin's "Works" included a couple of such remarks by Stan, apparently very mutilated, and therefore unintelligible. Before bringing them here, I want to talk about the subject of the dispute. In 1916, Bukharin published an article in the Youth International magazine

in which he claimed that

social democracy must emphasize its fundamental hostility to the state. Lenin replied to Bukharin with an article stating that the theory of hostility to every state, the theory of the "explosion" of the state, is not a Marxist, but an anarchist theory. Marxists argue that, in addition to the bourgeois state, there is also a "proletarian state" to which the Social Democrats will treat as their own state, and that such a state ("dictatorship of the proletariat") is not "exploded", but it gradually withers away on its own.

(Engels. "Anti-Dühring"). Citing this discussion between Lenin and Bukharin, Stalin concluded⁶²: "It seems clear what the matter is here and what a semi-anarchist puddle Bukharin has fallen into!

Stalin: No, this is not what we are talking about now, but we are talking about the attitude towards the state in general, we are talking about the fact that, in Bukharin's opinion, the working class should be fundamentally hostile to any state, including to the working class state.

Stan: Lenin then only talked about using the state, without saying anything in Bukharin's criticism of the "explosion".

Stalin: You are mistaken, the "explosion" of the state is not a Marxist, but an anarchist formula. I dare to assure you that what we are talking about here is that, in the opinion of Bukharin (and the anarchists), the workers must emphasize their fundamental hostility to any state, and therefore also to the state of the transitional period, to the state of the working class ... "

Stan was not wrong, but neither was Stalin. The latter deliberately pulled out individual words from Bukharin's writings in order to finally declare that "Bukharin is against the dictatorship of the proletariat!" To do this, Stalin deliberately falsified Lenin too, counting with full justification on the ignorance of the majority of the members of the plenum in overly theoretical problems. On such an operation, Stan caught Stalin. But Stalin was not one of those who, being caught red-handed on the spot, raises his hands up and says: "I surrender!". On the contrary, in such cases he could

let in such a smokescreen around oneself, through which neither the thief nor the "guardian of order" who caught him could be seen. Only loud, self-confident, indignant cries of the "caught" are heard. And then you had to involuntarily ask yourself - who caught whom: a thief - a "guardian of order" or a "guardian" - a thief?

So it happened with Stalin and now. Contrary to iron facts, despite irrefutable documents stating that Bukharin

was, together with Lenin, the author

of the party program on the "dictatorship of the proletariat" in 1919;

1) Bukharin was the author, and

Lenin was the co-author of the theory of the "explosion" of the bourgeois state - Stalin argued the opposite. Caught red-handed and irritated by this, Stalin began to quote Lenin for pages, and all the quotations, as it were, deliberately spoke for Bukharin and against Stalin. When this method did

not make the proper impression, Stalin began to quote Bukharin.

This time, Stalin wanted to prove to the plenum that Bukharin considered himself, as a theoretician, superior to Lenin. This approach was purely demagogic. Continuing his argument with Stan, but addressing the plenum, Stalin asked⁶⁴: "You don't think it's probable,

comrades? In that case, listen." After this intriguing introduction, Stalin quoted Bukharin's footnote to his article in the Youth International, reprinted after the revolution in the collection The Revolution of Law. In this footnote, Bukharin wrote: "V.I. of the proletariat; on the other hand, it is clear from Ilyich's note that at that time

he incorrectly treated the proposition of the "explosion" of the state (of course, the bourgeois one), confusing this question with the question of the withering away of the dictatorship of the proletariat ... When I came from America to Russia and saw Nadezhda Konstantinovna (this was at our illegal VI Congress, and at that time V.I. was hiding), her first words were the words: "V. I. asked me to tell you that on the question of the state he now has no disagreements with you.

"Dealing with the issue, Ilyich came to the same

conclusions about the "explosion", but he developed this theme, and then the doctrine of dictatorship, to such an extent that he made a whole epoch in the development of theoretical

thought in this direction. we continue to consider ourselves 63

Ibid., pp. 74, 75, 76 - three pages in small print. 64

Ibid., p. 77. 65 Ibid., p. the opposite: Bukharin considered himself a disciple

of Lenin, paying

tribute, and in this matter even more to his teacher, but continued

are to think independently, as under Lenin, and this was just not supposed under Stalin. From now on, only Stalin had the right to freedom of thought. All the rest had to think according to Stalin. The Yudins thought according to Stalin - and climbed the mountain. The Stans and Bukharins thought in their own way and rolled into the abyss. This was the whole "philosophy of the

era!" "Playing Stalin" became the fashion of fanatics, careerists

The Party embarked on the path of the political Natural selection of accustomers began. Nowhere did this "selection" testify to its true nature so clearly as in our Institute. As soon as we learned that Bukharin had been removed from work in Pravda, and Tomsy - from the post of chairman of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions, fermentation chameleonism. immediately began among the right Stalinist

at the Institute. Many of those who only yesterday shouted the loudest about the correctness of the right or simply sat diplomatically waiting for the development of events, began to shout just as loudly about the legitimacy of the "general line" of the party and its "general secretary". Careerists with their finest instinct to catch the fluctuations of the party barometer, opportunists with their amazing gift to apply themselves to any place, opportunists with their brilliant ability to sell old and acquire new shares on the party stock exchange - all went on a campaign against their own conscience, honor and simple decency in order to to win their rights under the rising "Stalin's sun". The announced "general purge" not only in the party, but also

in all parts of the state machine (in the Soviet apparatus, trade unions, in the army) further fueled the passions of people from this breed. With the historic decision of the April plenum, Stalin heated the iron red hot. Now it was a matter of forging. And his apparatus forged.

When, a few days after the plenum and the 16th Party Conference, Secretary of the Central Committee Kaganovich gave a report to the theoreticians and propagandists of the Party at the Communist Academy, a different atmosphere already reigned in the assembly hall than in December of the previous year. Yes, and Kaganovich least of all refuted the "theories" of the Rights.

The party politically buried the right at its plenum. If you need to talk about them, then only as about the dead, but not in terms of the old opportunistic saying that "nothing is said about the dead or only good things are said." Quite the contrary, only rubbish should be said about the crappy dead. If today we are talking about them in general, it is for the edification of those hidden enemies within our party, whose ideologist was Bukharin. Turning to them, we say: your number does not come out, did not come out and will not come out. The party with an iron broom will sweep you out of its ranks. Those of them who think that in the hot battles of the Party for the construction of socialism in our country they will stand in the shadow until better times will be mistaken too. We will take such people by the collar, bring them to the fire and put them before a choice: either to fight for the cause of the party, or get out of Lenin's party.

The party has learned to read the soul of its members by their deeds. Those who begin to prevaricate in the hope of deceiving the Party will be deeply disappointed. When, disappointed, they feel the ground under them, they will not find it: they will find themselves at the bottom of the Trotskyite White Guard swamp. In this swamp there is a place for every bastard. Approximately such was Kaganovich's academic language at the meeting of "communist academics".

The defiant, threatening and victorious tone of speech testified not so much to a victory already won, but to the coming new chapter in the history of Bolshevism. Kaganovich said about this chapter in deathly silence and obsequiously intense attention of the listeners: - Our party is now stronger than ever. It is strong in that after the

death of Lenin, through a series of serious upheavals and severe

trials, she finally found her true, strong-willed and courageous leader. The leader is Comrade Stalin! These words were spoken

with such enthusiasm, and the tension at the meeting was so high that detente followed automatically - thunderous applause was heard in the hall. What irony of political struggle, what power of political chameleonism! A few months ago, the same hall, with the same audience, just as stormily applauded the mere appearance of Bukharin, and defiantly disrupted the meeting to the same Kaganovich. Now Kaganovich triumphantly took revenge on him for this.

Kaganovich spoke for a long time, spoke with enthusiasm, with conviction, spoke in slogan formulas when he asked for applause, in the language of protocol when he stated the greatness of Stalin, in a tone of command when he personified the party in Stalin. Kaganovich's order No. 1 for the theoretical front read: for the "cult of Stalin!" For the "cult of Stalin" in the party, for the "cult of Stalin" in politics, for the "cult of Stalin" in history, for the "cult of Stalin" in the country. Of course, these words were not, but the meaning was this. Until now it has been customary to talk about the "collegiate leadership" of the party, about the "Leninist Central Committee", about the "leaders of the party", about "the disciples and comrades-in-arms of Lenin." From now on, a new formula was born: "Comrade Stalin is the leader of our party" and there are no other "leaders of our party"! Then other formulas were born (albeit much later): not "the party of Lenin", but "the party of Lenin - Stalin", not "disciples and associates of Lenin", but "disciples and associates of Stalin", not "the teachings of Marx - Engels - Lenin", and "the teachings of Marx Engels - Lenin - Stalin", until it came to the point

that Lenin turned out to be only "great" and Stalin "brilliant". Stalin's greatness was initially "discovered" by three members of the Central Committee: Kaganovich, Molotov and Voroshilov, and three people on the ideological front: Mekhlis, Yudin and Mitin. It was this last trio that picked

up at the meeting the order given by Kaganovich to science to glorify Stalin. "Until now, in wide circles of the Party, it was customary to think," Mekhlis, the first speaker in the debate, said, "that the main burden of exposing the theory and philosophy of Trotskyism lay with Comrade Bukharin. Now we must state with all frankness that this is a legend created by the Bul

our party after Lenin was and remains Comrade Stalin. To Stalin, and to him alone, our Party is indebted for the smashing of all the theoretical positions of Trotskyism. The eclectic and scholastic Bukharin not only was not up to the task, but he did not even undertake it. The theoretical power and Marxist depth of Stalin's analysis can only be compared with the genius of Lenin. In order to debunk the artificial legend of Bukharin as a theoretician, we must tell the entire Party what a great theoretician it has in the person of Comrade Stalin. We all know the exceptional modesty of Comrade Stalin when we start talking about his personal merits and personal qualities. In the same way, we know that Comrade Stalin does not tolerate not only self-promotion, but also any kind of advertising about him. We Bolsheviks are not going to make advertisements in the interests of creating a new false "legend". We are only bringing to the attention of the Party that historical fact of the greatest importance, which the Bukharinites carefully concealed from it: Stalin is Lenin's only theoretical successor. The Party must finally know this truth even through the head of Stalin's simplicity and modesty, since he belongs to the Party just as the Party belongs to him! So Mekhlis spoke of Stalin as

a theoretician, about that Stalin who, two years ago, being put forward as a candidate member of the same Communist Academy, was almost unanimously voted out "due to Comrade Stalin's lack of special studies in the field of Marxism."

The reader will easily guess that the new deputy editor-in-chief of Pravda, Mekhlis, soon ceased to be such: the "modest" Stalin appointed him editor-in-chief! Yudin and Mitin proposed in their speeches an extensive "publishing plan" for workers on the "theoretical front." The plan provided for the development and publication of new philosophical works on the topic of "how Stalin raised Marxism to a new, higher level." Then the province "went to write" - economists vied with each other to prove that Stalin had developed the foundations of the "political economy of socialism" (Leontiev, Ostrovityanov, Varga, Laptev, etc.), historians found in Stalin's works the key to understanding the historical process of all mankind (Mints, Pankratova, Keen, Knorin and others). Philosophers were amazed at the "depth and universality of Stalin's

dialectical method" (the same Mitin, Yudin, Raltsevich, Rosenthal, Konstantinov, etc.). In a word, Kaganovich made Stalin into a real "party leader", stating the meaning of the coup that had taken place in the Central Committee, and the communist "academicians" made it, albeit in the rear in number, to the dignity of an infallible and omnipresent

academic god! Thus began the birth of a new glory or a new "legend". People created a god for themselves truly in their own image and likeness. They created it, and did not discover it. With all the strain of my modest abilities and with a sincere desire to comprehend the meaning of what was happening - it was absolutely not given to me. That Stalin, as a theoretician, was an empty place, it was completely clear to me. That only people who had never read either Stalin or Bukharin could compare him in this area with Bukharin - it was also clear. But how not simpletons from some Kamchatka were sitting here, but "communist academics" of Moscow, I had to look for another explanation. At that time I did not find this explanation. It was given to me much later. That new "party within the party" that had grown up over the years after Lenin's death needed a new god, a god who, being their "image and likeness", would embody their multifaceted interests - as in one monolith, their subjective the will to act - in their own person, their moral and ethical nihilism in politics - in personal immorality, their thirst for power - in their bottomless ambition. These new people needed a new god as much as God himself needed these people. Therefore, it does not matter at all how this god will be called - Petrov, Ivanov or Dzhugashvili. They need only such a god, about which each of them can say: "I am not Stalin, but I am in Stalin." So that with the same success Stalin could say to each of his adherents - "I am not you, but I am in you." If the members of this new party had taken from Stalin everything that belongs to them, then only Dzhugashvili, the son of a Georgian shoemaker who cannot even make boots, would have remained from Stalin. It is clear that no one would need such a Dzhugashvili, least of all the realist Kaganovich and the fanatic Yudin. In this sense, Stalin is an instrument of the environment, and not the environment is his instrument. This in no way means a belittling of Stalin's personal qualities. But they did not lie in those areas in which his supporters "found" them - in the field of theory, philosophy,

political economy. They lay just in another area - in Stalin's immunity to all theories, in the amazing mosaic of his criminal capabilities, in the iron purposefulness of his strong-willed brain, in the absolute absence of a moral brake. I gave an explanation of these formulations in the previous presentation. All this should be an answer to another completely natural question - why the result of the election of a new god fell precisely on Stalin, and not on Trotsky, Zinoviev, Bukharin or some other "Ivanov". Yes, being an instrument of the milieu, Stalin brutally cracks down on this milieu from time to time, acting, as he himself admitted, according to Lassalle's precept: "The Party is strengthened by the fact that it purifies

itself." But this is the self-purification of the environment from its own ballast according to the "wolf's law" - healthy people eat the weak, lagging behind, aching or getting confused between their legs. That is why the cruelty of God is perceived by the environment as the greatest mercy. But if God did otherwise, he himself would be eaten...

Let's get back to the meeting. It lasted until late at night. Up to three dozen people spoke, but there was not a single critical speech, not a single "insidious" question. All speakers agreed that the "theoretical front" was terribly behind the demands of the Party in the "reconstructive period" and that, due to Bukharin's conscious falsification of Marxism-Leninism, the attention of the theoretical front was diverted away from the concrete tasks of building the "foundation of socialism in our country". ". The meeting recognized as correct the resolution on the restructuring of the work of the Communist Academy, the revision of the program of research institutes and higher schools in the social sciences in the spirit of Kaganovich's report and the resolution of the April plenum. They also accepted the plan of Mekhlis - Yudin - Mitin - to start preparing the publication of theoretical works on how "Lenin and Stalin raised to a higher level" the teachings of Marx - Engels on communism and the proletarian revolution. This, however, did not mean that there were no ideological Bukharinites at the meeting, but they were hopelessly silent. And only when a greeting was received "to the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, Comrade Stalin," one of them shouted:

- I propose to accept greetings and the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars Comrade Rykov.

The presiding Yaroslavsky answered without embarrassment:

- You are late, I declare the meeting closed! Rykov's supporter was really "late": we had just buried Rykov, although he still formally remained the head of the government.

XX. THE PODOL'SK CONFERENCE

This Sorokin was an amazing person. Never have I seen him so triumphant as in those days, in the days of the victorious march of apparatchiks, the rapid reorientation of opportunists, the greedy grip of party careerists. I expected that the victory of the Stalinists in the Central Committee, the shameful capitulation of the Communist Academy to Kaganovich,

the "confusion" and "vacillation" in the Bukharin school in the ICP, the complete triumph of the Mekhlises and Yudins on the "theoretical front" would finally

finish off Sorokin as well. We spent the May Day holidays together. Then, at the end of May, they gathered to some of his friends who lived somewhere outside of Moscow, but Sorokin deliberately did not say where and to whom we would go, deliberately arousing curiosity in me, and I also

deliberately did not ask. - How are

things now, Ivan

Ivanovich? Sorokin

immediately replied: - It happens better, but

rarely! "But

there is a catastrophe all around, Ivan Ivanovich," I wonder. Sorokin makes a surprised face, glares at me with his penetrating eyes, as if expecting terrible news from me

about this catastrophe unknown to him.

"But ours are being beaten everywhere," I explain. In response, Sorokin burst into a laugh that was familiar to me, so that I even thought for a moment that it was probably "not ours being beaten", and that perhaps

"ours" were "not ours" at all. When Sorokin, having calmed down, asked: -

Whom do you consider "ours"? - I,

without hesitation, answered in his own tone: - Of course,

Kaganovich and Yudin! Sorokin became gloomy, as if I did not say the names of people

went up to the washbasin, spat in it, and, putting his hands back and bending slightly, began to pace the room, reasoning aloud:

- Yes, politics, like space, does not tolerate emptiness. There is a gaping emptiness at the top of the party. Stalin is forced to fill it with imaginary figures like the Kaganoviches and Yudins, taking everything that is idealistic in the party under apparatus control. I heard about the performances of Kaganovich and others at the Komakademiya. I heard how Stalin became both a "great leader" and a

"wise theoretician." But the tragedy lies in the fact that neither Kaganovich nor Mekhlis believe, absolutely do not believe what they themselves say about Stalin, starting to exalt him. The Yudins are just fools with claims to "scholarship". As politicians they are parrots, but as "scientists" they are masters of combining quotations from Marx with quotations from Lenin. Do not expect a single original thought, not a single living word from them, even about Stalin. These people are made to think in quotations and speak in clichés. - How do you evaluate the results of the plenum? I impatiently interrupt Sorokin. - Wait. This is what I'm talking about. Kaganovich's threats to crack down on the old revolutionaries and the declared purge of the entire party bring us closer

to the denouement. - The denouement took place! - Not true. - How untrue it is, if Bukharin and

Tomsky were kicked out of their posts, and

Rykov left for "disarmament".

- Rykov will also be kicked out. But do not forget that the Central Committee is under the formidable control of a man who is stronger than all the

Kaganoviches put together - this is a Russian peasant. Neither Kaganovich's "courage", nor Yudin's quotations, nor Stalin's "wisdom" will be able to knock him out. The April plenum decided to enslave him a second time. This is the historical meaning of the plenum. But will it succeed? It is doubtful if we get to the 16th Congress. "If we don't get there..." I ask. - Then the second enslavement of the peasantry will be the cause of the death of Soviet

power, and the ideas of socialism will be

discredited on Russian soil forever and ever ...

Sorokin did not believe that the right had suffered a final defeat. He admired the courageous and consistent line of Bukharin and Tomsky at the plenum. This time he was also pleased with Uglanov and Kotov, and he expressed himself very briefly about Stan - "clever girl", a word that meant the highest praise in his mouth. The condition for the rightists to remain in their posts was their recognition of the "general line". Only Rykov partly recognized it. The Stalinists left him "conditionally" for this. On the other hand, despite all the preliminary preparations and numerous "demands from the field," the Stalinists and Stalin did not dare to withdraw the Rights from the Politburo and the Central Committee.

"Moreover," Sorokin said, "immediately after the plenum, Stalin went to Rykov and drank Rykovka with him all night, talking about his friendship for him and love for Bukharin. Winners don't do that. But if Stalin imagines himself "a knight without fear and reproach," then there is reason to be afraid of new meanness on his part. In the ability to disguise this meanness with the devotion of a friend and the integrity of a person, he comes to genius. Ours will not unravel this dual nature of Stalin and the Stalinists, then the denouement will come ...

"To be with Stalin in an illegal party for two decades, to carry out a revolution together with him on decisive days, to sit at the same table in the Politburo for ten years after the revolution and after all this not to know Stalin, this is really the denouement," I say.

Sorokin noticeably perks up. I see that he is pleased with the way I deliberately sharpened and exaggerated the question of the "denouement". He only wants me to be consistent. He pushes me to this sequence. Questions pour in after questions. When I start to fake, he catches me in mid-sentence, sarcastically, scoffs or throws short phrases: - You are

parroting! - You repeat
other people's words! You say
so, but you don't think! Precisely

because Sorokin catches me in a lie, I lose my temper. This just makes him happy. He comes even more, and I'm even more angry. Sorokin calmly continues his walk around the room, but then he suddenly stops, turns to me and sharply asks: - Do you believe in the meanness of

Stalin?

- After the information of the "General" I did not even think to doubt it. -
Then remember - ceteris paribus, only scoundrels succeed in politics.
"But then, all the more, the
denouement has already taken place," I make a new

conclusion. - That's where you're wrong. There is no connection. Stalin stealthily sneaks up on her. But it can be warned in the Stalinist way, that is, to respond to meanness with meanness, and prophylactically, that is, with a surgical knife. After the last words,

Sorokin looked at me questioningly. I continued to be silent. But the words "surgical knife" cut into my mind like a sharp edge. Sorokin paused, as if giving me time to digest what was said. - A coup d'état is not a counter-revolution, - Sorokin continued explaining, -

it is only a cleansing of the party with one blow from its own meanness. This does not require the capital garrison of Bonaparte. One dagger of the Soviet Brutus and two words about the deceased in front of an indignant crowd of fanatics are quite enough: - "I did not kill Caesar because I loved him less, but because I loved Rome more!" Sorokin paused again, longer this time. I continued to remain silent, but that eloquent silence that betrayed me completely.

- Why are you turning pale, as if you just killed Stalin? - he pulls
me by the shoulder.

I am silent. Sorokin continues: -

Every friend is a potential Brutus, but to become a Brutus of the Roman class, one must be able to forget one's past, hate one's present and give up one's future, in the name of the eternal and immortal - in the name of one's Rome. No country is rich with such Brutes as ours. You just need to wake them up. But that Brutus ruined Rome, and ours will save him. And this is the immortal greatness of the Soviet potential Brutus. Sorokin developed this theme even further and

deeper, ruthlessly discarding imaginary counterarguments. I felt that, as usual, he was not trying to convince me, but himself that he was right. However, the idea of a violent palace coup against

Stalin itself was not new, especially among the youth, but the leaders of the right were strongly opposed to it. I remember how on the eve of the 16th Congress a group of "undisarmed opportunists" gathered at Sorokin's apartment. Bukharin was also invited. Bukharin was in a cheerful mood, joking with everyone, as if it were not him, but Stalin was going to be buried at the 16th Congress. The whole idyll was broken by an unpleasant question:

- Nikolai Ivanovich, when life has confirmed your most gloomy forecasts in all branches of domestic politics, and the peasants, driven to despair, voted for you with their blood, are you really going to vote for Stalin at the 16th Congress after all this? The feigned gaiety, feigned composure and mask of

political indifference disappeared from Bukharin's face. Probably, such questions have been asked him more than once in recent months. It seemed equally probable that Bukharin had no satisfactory answer to such and similar questions. He was in the position of a commander who, having brilliantly won a general battle, offered the enemy his own surrender, since he did not know about his victory. - Attacks against the Stalinists from above were unsuccessful. The party line can only be corrected from below—that was all Bukharin

could say. "But the fact of the matter is that there is no party, but there is an apparatus against which both membership cards from the lower classes

and peasant pitchforks in the countryside are powerless," Sorokin intervened.

- Moral? asked Bukharin. -
Surgery! Sorokin answered.

There was that tense silence, which it is proper to break only with a weighty argument. Such an argument was not immediately found even by Bukharin. We continued to be silent. Bukharin felt that he must answer. - A

knife in the hands of a careless surgeon can, along with an ulcer to amaze the life of a young organism as well," he said at last.

Sorokin immediately dismissed

the argument: - With a fatal ulcer, such an operation will only be an act of high mercy to the organism itself.

There was silence again. But it was again Bukharin himself who had to violate it. Now he started from afar.

"In our revolution," said Bukharin, "it is necessary to distinguish between two sides—the transient form of the government elite and the permanent content of the social system. The ideals of socialism and social justice, in the name of which we made the revolution, cannot be sacrificed to intergroup struggle at the top of the party. The inept handling of a magnificent machine does not at all speak of the vices of the machine itself. It's ridiculous to crash this car just to get rid of the driver.

Bukharin gave Sorokin and us an almost hour-long lecture in this spirit. It became clear that although Bukharin did not intend to offer Stalin a "solemn surrender" at the 16th Congress, he did not think of returning to his previous attacks against the "leader."

The severity of the inner-party struggle reached such a point beyond which the opposition had only one prospect - an appeal to the people, and the people were against the entire existing social system ("machine"). I got the impression that Bukharin was afraid of this people no less than Stalin. The ideologist of the Soviet peasantry with his most faithful slogan - "enrich yourself!" - as if he was afraid that this peasantry would not declare him their "Pugachev". Neither Bukharin nor his friends were organically capable of this.

I will return to the topic. We left Moscow quite late, but an hour later we arrived at our destination - Podolsk. We went to the apartment that was prepared for us. We were received by an elderly intelligent man of high stature, thin, black, with a Ukrainian accent, but with a German surname. Then I learned that it was an old "railroad worker", a member of the board of the People's Commissariat of Railways. Here we found the "General". At night, Sorokin and "General" went off with the "railroader" somewhere, and I went to bed.

In the morning, when I was called to breakfast, I already found a fairly large company, including some of our friends from Moscow. The society gathered on the birthday of Viktor, a member of the Central Control Commission. Anniversary Viktor was a fairly well-known person in the party. He was invited here from Moscow to be "honoured", since he began his revolutionary work here. But "celebration" was the official "legend". Actually this

there was a meeting of representatives of various Moscow groups supporting the right-wing leaders or associated with them. The conference was devoted to the results of the plenum of the Central Committee and the 16th Party Conference and the tasks of the opposition in connection with the preparations for the 16th Party Congress. The main speaker was Viktor himself, who participated in the plenum and the XVI conference. I saw him for the first time, but heard his name many times and knew that he occupied a major position in the government apparatus. He spoke very little about what happened at the plenum, but he covered in detail the entire behind-the-scenes struggle of the apparatchiks

against the Rights, mainly along the lines of the Soviet apparatus and the Central Control Commission. "After all that has happened," Victor said, "we are faced with a dilemma: either we surrender to the mercy of Stalin and his group, then we bear the same responsibility together with them for the death of the revolution, or we are moving from empty declarations to more effective forms struggle, then there are serious chances for saving the revolution and the country. If we succeed in conveying our program to the Party and the people over the head of the apparatchiks, then our efforts will be crowned with complete success. To possible objections, continued Victor, that if we choose the second path, we risk being politically and, probably, physically isolated, as happened with the Trotskyists, I answer: we will be isolated even if we take the first path, on the path of surrender. It's only a matter of time. Anyone who claims the opposite knows neither the experience of history, nor the logic of the political struggle, nor, of course, the nature of Stalin. But it is better to die consciously in the struggle for a just cause than to commit suicide as miserable capitulators. Each of those present must resolve this dilemma, fully aware of the risk he is taking. Yes, our chances are serious, but the risk is great. Whoever is capable of risking his head in the name of the chances of victory, at least no longer risks one thing - the loss of the honor of a revolutionary. Viktor spoke convincingly and with pathos, as he might have said in those years when he risked his head before another police, before . It was his reputation as a fearless revolutionary in the past that gave weight and meaning to his every word. The debate, too, this time was serious and business-like. There were two questions to be decided whether to continue the fight

against the Stalinist wing in the party, if so, in what forms and by what methods. To the first question, everyone had one answer to continue. On the second question, views differed considerably. These views, in essence, reproduced the contradictions that existed among the leaders of the opposition on this issue. There were "activists" - supporters of decisive action (Bukharin, Tomsy, Uglanov, Rozit, Mikhailov, etc.), "passivists" - supporters of waiting inaction, "as Trotsky would put it (Rykov, Kotov, Kulikov, Ukhanov, Yenukidze, etc.) Viktor belonged to the "activists." Of my friends, Sorokin, "General" and, to some extent, Reznikov were undoubtedly such. Zinaida hesitated, and "Narkom" was both a "passivist" and an opportunist at the same time.

The first was the General. Supporting the speaker's thesis about the transition to active forms, he asked Victor to "open the brackets" around this formula. Almost in the same vein, two or three people spoke. The "passivists" waited until the brackets were "opened". Sorokin and opened them, proposing a plan of action. "Sorokin's Plan" included: 1. Drawing up a detailed program of requirements

opposition to the party congress. 2.

The demand to create an Organizing Committee to convene an emergency congress, to which they are elected by direct and secret elections.

3. The tasks of the congress are not the adoption of any decisions, but the election of an inter-party center for holding a referendum in the entire party on the opposition program and on the policy of the Stalinist group.

Sorokin pointed out that his plan did not at all contradict the Party Rules, but, on the contrary, stemmed from it, which provides for the creation of an Organizing Committee next to the Central Committee to convene an emergency congress, in case the Central Committee refuses to convene it or if there is no firm majority in the Central Committee itself, or The Central Committee considers it necessary to question the Party

about the correctness of its policy. - If Stalin rejects your plan, and he, of course, rejects it, then what to do?

someone asked. "Then call him over Stalin's head," Sorokin

replied. Victor bowed his head approvingly, the "General" said "correctly!", and the stranger who asked the question made a sour face. He, too, was undoubtedly a "passivist."

Reznikov essentially supported Viktor and the "Sorokin plan" provided that it is accepted by all the leaders of the opposition.

The last to speak was the one who asked Sorokin a question. He believed that the time was not right for action. He believed that Stalin himself would break his own neck without any effort on our part, and precisely when he again began to carry out his plan of forced collectivization. Therefore, when criticizing Stalin's policy within the framework of "legality", one must wait for the development of events. As expected, "Narkom" supported him. Victor summed

up the results of the meeting in the spirit of active action and unconditionally supported the "Sorokin plan" (in all likelihood, he was also its co-author). It was decided by the majority, without a formal vote, to accept the "Sorokin plan", to bring it to the attention of the leaders of the opposition. The composition of the program subcommittee of the meeting was also outlined immediately (the commission was to be appointed in the directing center).

If Sorokin's plan regarding demands on the Central Committee was adopted more or less painlessly, with the reservation that Reznikov made, then Viktor's proposal to create an organizational subcommittee caused a clear split. Viktor, supported by "General" and Sorokin, believed that in order to coordinate the efforts of independently operating opposition groups in Moscow and outside the capital, a permanent organizational subcommittee should be established, by analogy with a program subcommittee. Reznikov, supported by a number of participants, including the "railroad worker", bluntly rejected this proposal. His arguments boiled down to the fact that by creating a permanent organizational commission, we are giving the most dangerous trump card into the hands of the Stalinists. We will be accused of creating a faction within the party and this will be enough for our immediate defeat, even without discussion and discussion on our political platform.

"You know," Reznikov assured, "that the fate of all the factions in our party, regardless of whether they were right or wrong, was the same - political isolation. We should not consciously go towards this isolation. - If you are afraid

of wolves - do not go into the forest, - said the "General".

"But there is only one morality from here," Reznikov answered, "before move into the forest with packs of wolves, you must first arm yourself.

- Writing? "The General" asked contemptuously. Reznikov irritated, he continued:

"If you consider our formulated political demands, which we are thinking of bringing to the attention of the entire party, mere writings, then I refuse to understand why we are here at all!" These demands can also be submitted without creating a separate faction within the party. No one is so interested in forming us into a separate faction as Stalin himself. He has a legitimate mandate from previous party congresses to crack down on factions, which we also signed. But the political demands of a certain part of the Party and its Central Committee within the framework of legality and the Rules deprive the Stalinists of the opportunity to treat us as an anti-Party faction. I believe that it will not only be more expedient, but also much calmer.

Sorokin, who was waiting with great impatience for the end of Reznikov's speech, asked to speak. The room was in turmoil. Chairman Viktor was also anxious, who, warning of possible harshness on the part of Sorokin, diplomatically asked him to speak briefly and only on the merits of the issue under discussion.

Sorokin accepted the chairman's advice. His speech was not harsh. He did not agree with Reznikov about the faction. "No matter how angelically we behave within the framework of legality," he said, "Stalin and the apparatus will be declared, and they are already declaring us an "anti-party faction." One must have a very low opinion of Stalin if Reznikov thinks that he is dealing with the "general secretary" of the party, who is in love with the "charter" of his party. Stalin is an apparatus above the party. This apparatus can be fought and overcome only on the same path: by creating an anti-Stalinist apparatus within the party. Having substantiated this thesis with references to how the Stalinist faction itself was created in the party, Sorokin said a few words to Reznikov personally.

- As a person, I fully understand Reznikov's arguments about calmness, but as a revolutionary, they are unacceptable to me. Reznikov, of course, is wrong. Only one Prutkov was right: "The tranquility of many would be more reliable if it were allowed to attribute all troubles to the state account."

The chairman smiled involuntarily, but those present reacted with restraint to Prutkov-Sorokin's aphorism. Reznikov did not react at all. On the contrary, it seemed to me that he was very pleased that he got rid of Sorokin so easily. But Sorokin was already punished: the meeting rejected Victor's proposal to create an organizing commission. Victor reserved the right to return to him "in more suitable conditions."

Late in the evening we returned to Moscow.

XXI. COMINTERN - SECTOR OF "STALIN'S CABINET" On

the title page of the membership card of the CPSU(b) before the dissolution of the Comintern, it was written at the very top: "Proletarians of all countries, unite!" In the middle: "Party card". At the very bottom: "VKP(b) - section of the Communist International." Since the second congress of the Comintern, when Lenin's famous "twenty-one conditions" were adopted for the admission and stay of foreign parties in the Comintern, the bottom lines of the Soviet party card have been a legal anachronism. The VKP(b) was not a section of the Comintern, but the Comintern itself was a section of the VKP(b), or rather, the international department of the Central Committee. The creation of the Comintern was prepared by Lenin back in the years of the first war from the circles of the so-called "Left Zimmerwalders", which included all the extreme left of the existing Western Social Democratic parties. These were the elements who, like the Russian Bolsheviks and the German "independents" (later "Spartacists"), stood on internationalist positions and supported Lenin's slogan "turning the imperialist war into a civil war." Even during the war, Lenin's most persistent attempts to create the "Third Communist International" were not successful. The victory of the Bolsheviks in Russia in October 1917 dramatically changed the situation. Now not only the politico-moral conditions were present (the victory of Lenin's tactics and strategy), but, most importantly, the material conditions were present. With great perseverance and an even greater guarantee of success, Lenin again put on the agenda the creation of the Comintern with the money of Soviet Russia.

By the irony of history, it turned out just the opposite of what Trotsky prophesied in 1906 when he wrote⁶⁶:

"Without the direct state support of the European proletariat, the Russian proletariat will not be able to hold on to power and transform its temporary rule into a long-term socialist dictatorship."

Lenin proved the opposite - it is possible to create a world communist movement with the state support of communist Russia. It is significant that the first decision to create the Comintern was made not by the Central Committee of the party, but by the Soviet parliament itself - the All-Russian Central Executive Committee. So, on December 24, 1917, the All-Russian Central Executive Committee issued a decree on sending a delegation abroad (from the Bolsheviks Bukharin, Radek, Berzin, Kollontai; from the Left Social

Revolutionaries - Ustinov and Natanson) with the aim of "... taking preparatory steps to convene an international conference of representatives of the left wing of the International who stand on the point of view of the Soviet government on the need to fight against the imperialist governments within

each of the belligerent countries"⁶⁷. This delegation, of course, did not succeed in making its way abroad, but in January-February an international conference of the leftists took place in Petrograd, which decided⁶⁸:

"The International Socialist Conference must be created under the following conditions:

1. Consent of organizations and parties to embark on the path of revolutionary struggle against "their" governments for immediate peace.

2. Support for the October Revolution and Soviet power. "It was only to such foreign parties and cadres that the Soviet government provided generous "state assistance." They were one of the reservoirs from which the Bolsheviks drew people of the Third International. No less important was another reservoir of the Comintern, former prisoners of war in Russia: Germans, Austrians, Hungarians, Romanians, Czechs, Slovaks, Bulgarians, etc. Immediately after the February Revolution of 1917, the Bolsheviks led among

POW

66 Our Revolution, 1906. 67

Izvestiya TsIK, No 260, 12/24/1917. 68

Pravda, 24.1.1918, 6.2.1918.

There was an energetic propaganda of "communist education", and after the October Revolution, from these groups of prisoners of war, organized according to the linguistic principle, the "Federation of Foreign Groups" of Communists under the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks was created. The "Federation" included up to nine groups (including "free foreigners", such as the "Anglo-American group"). It was led by the notorious Bela Kun. Lenin attached exceptional importance to this reservoir of communism. In his report to the Eighth

Party Congress (1919), he said⁶⁹: "I must pay attention to the report on the activities of the federation of foreign groups ... I must say that here one can see the real basis of what we have done for the Third International. The Third International was founded in Moscow at a short congress, of which Comrade Zinoviev will give a detailed report. If we could do so much at the Communist Congress in Moscow in a short time, it is thanks to the gigantic preparatory work carried out by the Central Committee of our Party and the organizer of the congress, Comrade Sverdlov. Propaganda and agitation were carried on among the foreigners in Russia and a whole series of foreign groups were organized. Entire dozens of members of these groups were wholly privy to the basic plans and general tasks of politics in the sense of guiding lines. Hundreds of thousands of prisoners of war from the armies, which the imperialists built exclusively in for their own purposes, having moved to Hungary, Germany, Austria, they created the fact that the bacilli of Bolshevism captured these countries entirely (emphasis mine. - A. A.). And if groups or parties in solidarity with us dominate there, then this is due to the summary and brief work of foreign groups in Russia, which was not visible in appearance even in the organizational report (at the congress. - A. A.), which constituted one of the most important pages in the activities of the Russian Communist Party, as one of the cells of the World Communist Party".

From these two reservoirs - the extreme left representatives of the socialist parties of the West and Asia and former prisoners of war in Russia - Lenin laid the foundations of the world communist movement at the First Congress on March 2-6, 1919 51 delegates attended the Congress, represented by the following parties: VKP(b),

Communist Party of Germany, American Socialist 69 Lenin.
Works, 4th ed., vol. 29, pp. 140-141. Diet Workers'

Party, Zimmerwald Left Wing of the French Socialists, Communist Party of Austria, CP of Hungary, CP of Poland, CP of Finland, Swedish Left Social Democratic Party (opposition), Balkan Revolutionary Federation (Bulgaria and Romania), CP of Ukraine, CP of Latvia, CP of Lithuania and Belarus, CP of the German colonies in Russia, a united group of the Eastern peoples of Russia. The English, French, Swedish, Czech, Bulgarian, and Yugoslav communist groups, the Dutch Social-Democrats, were represented with advisory votes at the Congress. group, American Socialist Propaganda League, Turkestan, Turkish, Georgian, Azerbaijani and Persian sections of the Central Bureau of Communist Organizations of the Peoples of the East; Chinese Socialist Workers' Party, Korean Workers' Union and Zimmerwald Commission. The First Congress decided to establish the Comintern and its executive bodies - the Executive Committee and the Bureau - and discussed and accepted for leadership the programmatic and tactical reports of the Russian delegation: Lenin, Trotsky, Zinoviev, Bukharin, Osinsky. The Congress closed with the adoption of the "Manifesto of the Communist International to the Proletarians of the World", which ended with the words⁷⁰:

"Under the banner of the Soviets, the revolutionary struggle for power and the dictatorship of the proletariat, under the banner of the Third International, proletarians of all

countries, unite." The composition of the Executive Committee of the Comintern from the CPSU (b) included Lenin, Zinoviev, Bukharin and Trotsky. Since then, Bukharin has been a permanent member of the Presidium of the Comintern, speaking at all its congresses with guiding reports. Stalin entered the Presidium of the Comintern only after the death of Lenin (1925), but once he entered, in his own way, in the Stalinist way, he thoroughly began to purge it of everything that was really ideological and uncorrupt in it. It is unfair and simply naive to think that from the beginning of its organization only mercenaries and "agents of Moscow" entered or entered the Comintern. In these, of course, as with any such combination, there was no shortage. However, there were also old veterans

movements that wished to see in the Russian revolution the beginning of that socialist era on earth, the tasks of implementing

70 First Congress of the Communist International. protocols.

Petrograd, 1921, pp. 189-190. to which

they dedicated themselves. There were also young enthusiasts who seriously believed in the "liberation mission" of Russian October. Both were deeply disappointed. Foreign communist parties and the Third International were effectively reduced to the role of a section of the Central Committee of the RCP(b). If under Lenin there still existed "local autonomy" for foreign parties, then under Stalin even such autonomy became pure fiction. In parallel with the purges in the CPSU (b), Stalin mercilessly purged the Comintern of all those who blindly and unquestioningly did not submit to the dictatorship of the "Stalin Cabinet" in the Comintern. After the massacre of Trotsky and Zinoviev, with the help of the same Bukharin, only those who can be called "agents of Moscow" remained in the Comintern. After all this, it was absolutely no difficulty for Stalin to debunk Bukharin's glory even along the lines of the Comintern. However, Stalin approached the solution of this problem methodically and prudently, starting as early as 1928. Bukharin, the chief leader of the Comintern (officially he was titled "political secretary" - after the removal of Zinoviev, the jealous Stalin eliminated the post of "chairman of the Comintern"), was instructed to report on the international situation at the VI Congress of the Comintern (1928). Bukharin drew up the theses of his report in full agreement with the instructions of the Politburo, including Stalin himself, and sent them to the delegations in the Executive Committee of the Comintern. Stalin decided that now the time had come to "probe" Bukharin along the line of the Comintern as well. Stalin, in his turn, sends out, but without the knowledge of Bukharin and without the consent of the Politburo, "corrections" to Bukharin's theses, by which he actually disavows Bukharin. Stalin's act, completely unexpected and unprecedented in the practice of the Politburo and the Comintern, discourages Bukharin, but achieves the goal in the Comintern: it turns out that it is not Bukharin, but Stalin - the theoretician of Bolshevism - such is the sensational discovery made by foreign members of the Comintern. What was the meaning of Stalin's "corrections"? Thinking about these amendments, I involuntarily remembered one Chechen proverb - "if a bear wants to eat its own

cub, then he first plunges him into a puddle of mud to make him unrecognizable.
" Stalin did the same. Read the story about this by Stalin himself⁷¹:

"The delegation of the CPSU (b) (that is, Stalin. - A. A.) had to be included in the theses (Bukharin. - A. A.) about 20

71 I. Stalin. Works, vol. 12, pp. 20-23. edits.

This circumstance created some embarrassment in Bukharin's position ... And so ... from the delegation (that is, from Stalin. - A. A.) came out, in fact, new theses on the international situation, which began to be opposed by foreign delegations to the old theses, signed by Bukharin ... (*italics mine.* - A. A.). I would like to point out four main amendments to Bukharin's theses...

The first question is the question of the nature of the stabilization of capitalism. Bukharin concluded that ... capitalism is being reconstructed and, in the main, is holding on more or less firmly ... The second question is the question of the struggle against the Social Democracy. Bukharin's theses said that the fight against social democracy was one of the main tasks of the sections of the Comintern. This is, of course, true. But this is not enough. ... It is necessary to focus the question on the fight against the so-called "left" wing of the Social Democracy... The third question is the question of conciliation in the sections of the Comintern. Bukharin's theses spoke of the need to fight against the right deviation, but there was not a single word about the struggle against conciliation (*italics mine.* - A. A.) with the right deviation ... The fourth question is the question of party discipline. In Bukharin's theses there was no mention of the need to maintain iron discipline in the communist parties ... "

After enumerating these "murderous" accusations, Stalin pathetically ended this part of his speech at the April plenum with the words:

"We love Bukharin, but the truth, but the party, but we love the Comintern even more. Therefore, the delegation of the CPSU (b) was forced to make these amendments to Bukharin's theses." I do not want the

reader to get the impression that I am here trying to rehabilitate Bukharin in his dispute with Stalin. It is important for me to point out Stalin's peculiar methods in polemics with opponents. Stalin deliberately exaggerated the idea of the enemy in order to declare it a heresy. He deliberately tore her apart in order to

she lost all meaning. In the same place, where neither one nor the other succeeded, he acted simply: if you please, why didn't you say about this, about that, about the third, about the twentieth ?! It seems to me that Bukharin answered Stalin very successfully and directly in his own style at the same Sixth Congress, when, announcing his ill-fated theses and referring to Stalin's "20 amendments", he declared: - I did not cover

all the questions, but it was not for nothing that Kuzma Prutkov said "Spit in the eyes of the one who says that you can embrace the immensity!"

Stalin, however, was not satisfied with the fact that once he disavowed Bukharin in the Comintern itself. It was necessary to put an end to the "glory" of Bukharin, as a theorist of the CPSU (b) and the Comintern, and in the "fraternal parties". Stalin's most faithful squires undertook this task: in France - Thorez, in Germany Telman, in Czechoslovakia - Gottwald. Telman went so far as to publicly criticize Bukharin's report at the Sixth Congress, while in the USSR itself not a single word had been uttered against Bukharin, not only publicly, but even at the plenums of the Central Committee. Bukharin was considered the true believer of the true believers. Of course, such a bold act Telman baffled Bukharin. He demanded that Thälmann's representative at the Presidium of the Comintern, Neumann, be sent immediately from Moscow, and at the same time that Thälmann himself be called to order. Then Stalin resolutely revolted against Bukharin's demand. Moreover, he accused Bukharin himself of patronizing the right in the German Communist Party. But the "secret" of Telman's courage was immediately revealed. It turned out that Stalin himself had prepared Thälmann's speech against Bukharin, taking advantage of the fact that Bukharin stood for the sanction of the coup that Evert and Gerhart carried out after the Sixth Congress against Thälmann in the Central Committee of the German Communist Party. The act of this coup dealt a grave blow to the Stalinist apparatus in Germany. Stalin's first man in the West, Telman, was accused of embezzling party money by Telman's friend, Wittorf, secretary of the Hamburg party organization, and removed from his post as party chairman. This was done by the decision of the majority of the Central Committee of the KKE. Stalin was indignant⁷² that this majority headed by Evert and Gerhart "...removed Telman from the leadership, began to accuse him of corruption and published a" corresponding "resolution without the knowledge of

and the sanctions of the Executive Committee of the Comintern... instead of turning the wheel and rectifying the situation... Bukharin proposes in his well-known letter to sanction the coup of the conciliators, to hand over the KKE 72 Ibid., pp. 23-24. conciliators, and Comrade Telman again defame in the press, once again stating his guilt" (all italics in the

quote are mine. - A. A.). Presidium of the Executive Committee of the Comintern on the abolition of the "coup" in the German Communist Party, on the restoration of Telman, removed by the party, in his posts and on the recall to Moscow "at the disposal of the Comintern" of the "conciliators" from Berlin Grateful Telman, as chairman of the largest and most authoritative "section" Comintern abroad, at the 10th Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Comintern in July 1929, Stalin reciprocated: Telman and his friends made a proposal to expel Bukharin from the Presidium of the Comintern as an "ideologist of the right deviation. "What Stalin still did not dare to do through the Politburo, "foreigner"

Telman did through the Comintern. In April 1929, Bukharin was removed from the post of political secretary of the Comintern, but was not recalled from the Comintern.

What guided the Telmans? Did they examine the substance of the accusations against Bukharin? Did Stalin show them Bukharin's statement of January 30 or the "platform of three" of February 9? Of course not. Here, too, the situation was exactly the same as that described by I. Silone about

the case with Trotsky. The Presidium of the Comintern discussed Trotsky's memorandum (on the Chinese revolution) and on the basis of this document expelled him from the Comintern. Apart from the Russian members, none of the foreign members of the Presidium of the Comintern even saw the document on the basis of which Trotsky was tried. When the representatives of Italy, Silone and Togliatti, wanted to see Trotsky's document before judging it, Telman, the presiding judge, answered quite coolly: "We ourselves have not seen this document." Silone, thinking that he had misunderstood Telman, asked him to repeat his words. Telman repeated word for word the same thing. Then Silone, whom

supported Togliatti, said that Trotsky's document, quite possibly, deserves condemnation, but without reading it first, he cannot condemn it. Now Stalin intervened in the dispute and, referring to the unfamiliarity of the Italian comrades with the internal situation in the USSR, proposed to postpone the discussion of this issue until the next day, and in the meantime "inform"

the Italians about the state of affairs. This role of "informant" was entrusted to the leader of the Bulgarian communists, Kolarov. And Kolarov played it excellently. Inviting Silone and Tolyatti to the Lux Hotel, Kolarov, over a cup of tea, outlined to the Italians the essence of the "internal situation in the USSR" quite sensibly, although somewhat cynically. The gist of his arguments boiled down to the following: firstly, I hadn't read Trotsky's document either; secondly, even if Trotsky sent me this document in secret, I would refuse to read it, because, frankly, it is of no interest to me; thirdly, we are not looking for historical truth, but we are stating the fact of the struggle of two groups ... for power in the Politburo. In this struggle, the force (the majority) is on the side of Stalin, and therefore we support Stalin, and not Trotsky⁷³. Such was the meaning of the lesson of communist political literacy,

who taught Kolarov Silone and Togliatti.

XXII. THE CAPITULATION OF THE RIGHT

OPPOSITION Exactly the same thing was done in the Comintern and with Bukharin. Stalin was also this time a force. So Stalin was right. Now Stalin's hands were untied also along the international line. Bukharin's days in the Politburo were numbered. Super-cautious in such matters, Stalin, however, was in no hurry. Seven months had passed since the April plenum and four months after Bukharin's expulsion from the Comintern, before Stalin decided to convene another plenum of the Central Committee. Finally, in November 1929, a new plenum of the Central Committee

was convened. The Plenum discussed two main questions: 1. On

the collectivization of agriculture. 2. On the Bukharin group. On the first question, it was decided to speed up collectivization and to intensify the "attack on the kulaks." I will note right away that there has not yet been any talk of "complete collectivization" and "liquidation of the kulaks" as a "class"

on the second question, published for the first time only in 1933,
read:

73 "The God that Failed", ed. by RHS Grossman, New York, Harper & Brothers,
p. 114. 74 "VKP(b) in
resolutions...", Moscow, Partizdat, 1933, pp. 611 - 612.

After hearing the statement of Bukharin, Rykov and Tomsky dated November 12
1929, the Plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks establishes the following facts:

1. The authors of the statement, by throwing accusations against the April
plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission that it allegedly
placed them in an "unequal position", are thereby seeking from the party the "right" to
oppose themselves to the Politburo, as an equal party, "freely" negotiating with the
party, i.e. e. seek legalization of the factional grouping of Right deviators, whose
leaders they are.

2. Comrades Bukharin, Rykov and Tomsky, now compelled - after the disgraceful
failure of all their predictions - to acknowledge the indisputable successes of the party
and hypocritically declaring in their statement about the "removal of differences", at
the same time refuse to admit the fallacy of their views set forth in their platforms from
January 30 and February 9, 1929 and condemned by the April plenum of the Central
Committee and the Central Control Commission, "as incompatible with the general
line of the party."

3. Throwing demagogic accusations of the Party of not fulfilling the plan in the
field of wages and agriculture and asserting that "extraordinary measures" have
pushed the middle peasants in the direction of the kulak, the leaders of the Right
deviators (Comrades Bukharin, Rykov, Tomsky) are thereby preparing a new attack
on the Party and its Central Committee.

4. Application vols. Bukharin, Rykov and Tomsky fundamentally disagrees with
the resolution of the Tenth Plenum of the ECCI, which condemned Comrade Bukharin's
views as opportunist and removed him from the Presidium of the ECCI. Proceeding
from

these facts, the Plenum of the Central Committee is compelled to qualify the new
document, Comrades. Bukharin, Rykov and Tomsky of November 12, 1929, as a
factional document, as a factional maneuver of political bankrupts... In view of this,
rejecting the

statement of Comrades. Bukharin, Rykov and Tomsky, as a document hostile to
the Party, and proceeding from the resolutions of the Tenth Plenum of the ECCI on
Comrade Bukharin, the Plenum of the Central Committee decides:

1. Tov. Bukharin, as a skirmisher and leader of right-wing deviators, should be removed from the Politburo;

2. Warn tt. Rykov and Tomsy, as well as Ugarov ... that in the event of the slightest attempt on their part to continue the struggle against the line and decisions of the ECCI and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, the party will not hesitate to apply

appropriate organizational measures to them. "This resolution was worked out by Stalin himself, but it was announced by Molotov on

behalf of the "commission" on the Bukharin case.⁷⁵ Besides what is said in this resolution of the plenum of the Central Committee, no traces of this last joint statement of Bukharin, Rykov and Tomsy of November 12, 1929, have been preserved in party literature or opposition publications. However, even a cursory analysis of the resolution of the plenum makes it possible to establish the following two most important facts:

1. The Right continued to stand on the point of view of their statement of January 30 and the "platform" of February 9, 1929 of

the year. 2. The rightists demanded "equality of rights" (Stalinists and Bukharinites). The last requirement, of course, stood in connection with the "plan" of Viktor and Sorokin, announced at the Podolsk meeting. As for the resolution's reference to the fact that the Rights, speaking of "removing" certain disagreements, conceived a tactical maneuver, here the truth was probably on Stalin's side. The Rights took into

account the experience of the struggle against the "Lefts" which they waged together with Stalin. After all, it was the rightists (Bukharin, Rykov, Tomsy), on Stalin's initiative, who prevented the leaders of the United Opposition (Trotsky and Zinoviev) from addressing the Fifteenth Party Congress, expelling them from the Party some month before the opening of the congress (December 1927). The rest, led by Kamenev, were expelled from the party by the congress itself, if only because their leaders were already listed as "enemies of the party." Stalin-Molotov-Kaganovich wanted to apply the same procedure, which had fully justified itself, to the Rightists themselves. The Rights, on the other hand, did not want to give an external reason for this. Therefore, without abandoning their programmatic views, they maneuvered tactically. They were obliged to do this by the most serious disagreements that existed in the lower mass of the right about tactics ("activists" and "passivists").

This maneuver, however, failed. Bukharin was removed from the Politburo. Rykov, Tomsky and Ugarov were warned in writing, while others were verbally warned. The fact that Stalin - Molotov - Kaganovich still did not dare, having an obvious opportunity, to remove Rykov and Tomsky from the Politburo at the same time, showed their uncertainty in the final victory. Even more scandalous, and in the history of

Bolshevism 75 I. Stalin. Works, vol. 12, p.

389. and simply unheard of, was another fact: Stalin - Molotov - Kaganovich hid not only from the country, but also from their own party the platform of the right opposition. And in this, from the point of view of their own interests, the Stalinists were right. If, following the example of the former oppositions in the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks under Lenin and after him ("Left Opposition", "New Opposition"), the Stalinists had allowed the platform of the Rights to become public, the whole country would have been

1. The right is against predatory industrialization at the expense of the standard of living of the working class.

2. The rightists are against feudal collectivization for "military-feudal exploitation of the peasantry". 3. The

rightists are against international adventures at the expense of the vital interests of the peoples of

Russia. Trotsky's program, regardless of the subjective intentions of its author, looked like a program opposite to Bukharin's, and the Stalinists willingly allowed it to be published and even to be freely discussed at party meetings. Trotsky lived on yesterday's day of the revolution and in the depths of his soul was an anti-NEP man, and Russia, having become NEP, was about to take another step towards becoming capitalist. This is where Trotsky got in the way. It was here that Trotsky broke not with Stalin, but with the country. Therefore, just as Lenin killed the internal counter-revolution with the NEP, Stalin, on behalf of the same NEP, buried Trotsky, publishing his platform for the attention of the whole country. To do so with the platform of people who wrote on their banners the magic slogan of the spirit of NEP Russia - "enrich yourself!" - the Stalinists could not. That is why they did not dare to publish the Bukharin program. On the other hand, the entire press of the country shouted: the Bukharinites want to restore in Russia the old tsarist system of capitalists and landlords! At the same time, members of the Politburo Bukharin, Rykov and Tomsky, who read this press, like all

country, kept absolute "silence", and silence, as they say, is a sign of consent. They are silent - that means they are seriously "restorers" - so the common people could argue. How was he to know that the mouths of the Rightists were artificially closed.

If in the program the Bukharinites took advantage of the correctly understood spirit of NEP Russia, then in tactics, if understood not only as the art of passive maneuvering, but also as a weapon of sudden sabotage and decisive action at the turn of history, the Bukharinites were inferior to the Trotskyists. Trotsky and the Trotskyists were resolute, sacrificial and courageous people who were not afraid to appeal to the street (demonstrations on November 7, 1927), but their "appeal" was not "consonant with the era", and therefore they lost. The Bukharinites were in "contact with the epoch," but they, no less than Stalin, were afraid of the same people, to whom they had to "appeal." Stalin was right when he christened them with a new nickname - "opportunists". But, alas, it was "opportunism" for the benefit of Stalin himself. After Bukharin was withdrawn

from the Politburo and the others were warned, the question of further tactics towards the Stalinists became acute again. Either complete capitulation, or a

transition to active action - the Stalinists did not allow any other alternative. Stalin also agreed to convene a party congress only with the complete capitulation of the right. Stalin went even further in his demands. If earlier it was possible to express - in writing or orally - at meetings of the Central Committee views that diverged from the views of the Stalinists on current policy, now such an action was considered contrary to the requirements of the party. Moreover, any member of the party - from a member of the Central Committee to an ordinary communist, who did not publicly stigmatize the "right opportunists" - the Bukharinites, was automatically included in the new category of "enemies of the party" - "conciliators". Stalin - Molotov - Kaganovich deprived the members of the party even of the advantage enjoyed by the leaders of the right - the right of "silence". The 1,500,000 party members had to publicly condemn the "platform" of the Rights, which they had never seen, in exactly the same way that, according to Silone, the members of the Presidium of the Executive Committee of the Comintern did in relation to Trotsky.

This is not enough. Everywhere and everywhere it was necessary to "reveal and expose" the "opportunists in practice," as the party directive from the pages of Pravda and Izvestia stated on the eve of the 16th Congress.

And this is not enough. Closed and open party directives demanded "mercilessly to reveal and expose the "hidden opportunists" who verbally agree with the party, formally even carry out its guidelines, but remain "opportunists" in their hearts and keep a stone in their bosom." Such was the general atmosphere in the party. by the end of 1929. In such an atmosphere, it was not easy to choose tactics that would

guarantee success, especially the tactics of active action, especially since the Stalinists, by artificial maneuvering, on the one hand, and moral and political repressions, on the other, achieved the first open split and in Central Committee members Mikhailov, Kotov, Uglanov and Kulikov at the same plenum filed an application "about a break with the Rights." The political "capitalist" Stalin very skillfully used this "capital":

On November 18, 1929, Pravda (No. 268) published statements by these four most prominent members of the Central Committee about their complete surrender to Stalin and a resolute condemnation of their previously joint program with Bukharin. Rykov, Tomsy, and Ugarov declared to the plenum that, while holding to their views, they were subject to the decision of the majority. Only one Bukharin challenged Stalin - he declared that he did not recognize the decision of the plenum of the Central Committee and would not calm down until he brought his views to the attention of the entire party. But such a course of action Bukharin condemned together with Stalin and Rykov. Rykov, and to some extent Tomsy, believed that the tactics of "waiting inaction" should be continued in the future. I am convinced that it was not Stalin, but Rykov and Tomsy, who convinced Bukharin of the need to submit an application to the Politburo of November 25, 1929, to submit to the decision of the Stalinist majority of the Central Committee. But Bukharin wrote that he completely remained with his old views. Unlike the statements of Kotov, Uglanov and others, Stalin, of course, did not publish it (such "capital" brought only negative interest), but this was quite enough to declare the victory of the Stalinists in the press.

This disintegration at the top of the opposition had an immediate effect among opposition cadres of the right.

People like Reznikov, "Narkom", stopped meeting with friends. Zinaida Nikolaevna has clearly become a "conciliator". She did not invite anyone to her place, and if anyone came to her, she would leave with the mood of a person who had just buried his beloved friend and left the cemetery - sorry for the deceased, and life is not sweet.

As if to top it all off, at the end of 1929 the Stalinists began mass publication of anti-Bukharin literature, for which they had been secretly preparing since the middle of 1928. Manuscripts of such books had long been lying ready-made in the briefcase of Stalin's Cabinet, but they were delayed until the organizational defeat of Bukharin. Now Bukharin was politically "exposed", organizationally defeated, but he had not yet been theoretically disqualified in the eyes of the party. The new "works of red professors", however, former students of Bukharin himself, were to complete the task of destroying all glory of the "theoretician and favorite of the party." These were: a collection of articles "Against the right danger and conciliation" (Moscow, Leningrad, 1929); V. Sorin. "On Bukharin's Disagreements with Lenin. A Brief Essay for Young Party Members" (Moscow-Leningrad, 1930); "Falsified Lenin" ("Notes on the book 'The Economy of the Transitional Period'") ("Leninsky Collection", vol. XI, 1929), etc. True, the Stalinists did not achieve anything by publishing the falsified Lenin. Just from these "notes" of Lenin on Bukharin's book, written in 1920, that is, a year before the NEP, the party learned how highly Lenin valued Bukharin as a theorist. Thus, where Bukharin wrote: "Finance capital has destroyed the anarchy of production within the large-capitalist countries," Lenin, emphasizing the word "destroyed," writes "not destroyed" on the side. before the revolution, Bukharin defended it against Lenin at the Eighth Party Congress (1919) in the very report on the party program, he did not refuse it even under Stalin. But now Stalin elevated theoretical views to the level of criminal crimes and therefore forced the dead Lenin to fight against living Bukharin. But here Lenin did Stalin a disservice. It seemed strange only that releasing Lenin

on the stage, Stalin did not turn off, with all the other falsifications, Lenin's general conclusion about the book: Lenin congratulated the Komakademiya on "the brilliant work of one of its members" (see the titled "Lenin Collection", vol. XI). Apparently, the old "damned disease of carelessness and rotten objectivism" (Stalin), from which Stalin himself was finally cured only after Yezhovshchina, when he began to prepare falsified editions not only of Lenin's, but even of his own old works (such is the fourth edition of the works of Lenin and the first edition of Stalin's writings, not to mention the scandalous Short Course on the History of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks).

XXIII. ACCIDENTS AND REGULARITIES IN STALIN'S CAREER Did Stalin's

biographers notice a whole chain of "random events" that each time led him out of a downright fatal situation and served as a new milestone on the paths of his impetuous career? The situation is desperate, the terrible sword of Damocles is about ready to fall right on Stalin's head, there is absolutely nowhere to go and no one to expect a helping hand from. "This time, you damned thing won't get out of here!" - enemies prophesy to him, and he not only comes out from under the sword, but with lion's strength, with a wolf's grip and with devilish cunning directs the same sword at the head of enemies, gloating spectators and even his own saviors. Now he is in the foreground in the pose of a benefactor for the survivors, in the form of an avenger against future enemies. He knows how to exploit and "gifts of fate." Randomness declares regularity, and regularity reduces to randomness. His intellectual primitiveness of a half-educated seminarian receives an aura of all-conquering greatness and all-seeing genius. If before the next "accident" "he was famous only among his acquaintances," as Heinrich Heine would say, then after it, fame itself pushes him onto a wider stage. Now he is again on the podium in front of the crowd, which, partly with admiration, partly with bewilderment, looks at his unimpressive in appearance, but unusually tenacious triumphant figure. He, who knows, like no one else, the value of the crowd and himself, majestically poses in front of the crowd and arrogantly speaks to the enemies. The crowd applauds him for his greatness, and the enemies secretly recall the words of Pericles: "The fact is that even a coward can be arrogant if a lucky chance helps ignorance!"

But how many of these "cases" must there be in order for them to determine not only the incomprehensible ascent of one person, but also the death of an entire

generation? The first Russian revolution. Even then the extremists throw the contagious slogan into the raging crowd - "rob the loot"! The Bolsheviks create detachments of partisans, terrorists and armed "expropriators" (Lenin replaces the word "robber", which cuts the ear of even the robber himself, with the almost academic foreign word "expropriator" or, in short, "ex"). Private

Dzhughashvili "accidentally" leads the Georgian "ex" and directs the robbery of the Tiflis treasury. Hundreds of thousands of rubles through the future Minister of Foreign Affairs - Litvinov - are transferred abroad to Lenin's cash desk. The police search in vain for the robbers, arresting thousands of people, including Stalin's assistant in the robbery, the Tiflis Armenian Kamo (Ter-Petrosyan). Kamo is arrested abroad, in Berlin, at the request of the Russian government, as a robber of the treasury. The evidence against Kamo is absolute and undeniable. He must be interrogated and handed over to the Russian police in order to punish both himself and his leader. In revolutionary times, tsarism knows only one punishment for such criminals: a daily court-martial, and on the second morning - a gallows. In the Berlin police presidium, intense interrogations are going on, Lenin just as intensively turns the stolen money into fiery revolutionary proclamations and throws it into the midst of rebellious Russia. Dzhughashvili, with the air of a holy simpleton and an innocent baby, walks around Tiflis during the day, spends his nights in dukhans, and begs for money ... from secret police agents. But fear at times seizes the soul: what if Kamo suddenly tells the Germans the secret of the crime in the hope of the inaccessibility of the Russian police and in pursuit of the glory of a Russian revolutionary, or, even worse, the pedants of laws and legality - the Germans - will give Kamo into the hands of a legitimate judge - a Russian government? Then you can't get past the ropes around your neck. But Dzhughashvili's fears are unfounded. Kamo is declared insane. The Germans come to the conclusion that Kamo is undoubtedly a criminal, but his madness is also certain. Under the horror of the crime he committed, he lost his mind. The testimony of a lunatic cannot have

legal force, and he himself is now irresponsible before the law. A rare sensation for world crime literature. "The robber of the Tiflis bank has gone mad," the headlines shout, and only then Dzhugashvili sighs with relief. But not for long. On one of the black days, a madman is put in solitary confinement in the Tiflis criminal prison. Now Dzhugashvili is sure: "It's all over, Kamo died, I died too!" Cultural Germans cannot keep up with our gendarmerie professors. These will knock out Kamo either spirit or complete recognition with all the details. New interrogations, new "psychoanalysis" and finally new tortures. But in vain! "If ever on this earth people went crazy, then Kamo is the king of the madmen," the police investigator decides and sends him to the lunatic asylum, to the ward of the quietly-crazed Napoleons. Dzhugashvili "accidentally" slips away from the rope⁷⁶. He refers to another crime in Siberia. But he is running. He is again exiled

away, but he again runs. So, already a total of five or six times Dzhugashvili was exiled farther and farther, and each time he "accidentally" managed to escape, and he appeared either in Baku, then in Tiflis, then in St. Petersburg. But finally he is driven to a distant land (Turukhansk exile) under "strict supervision". Escape from there was considered almost a lost cause. However, even here the "happy accident" helped the restless "refugee" again. Dzhugashvili had not yet managed to develop the route of his new escape, as he was drafted into the army, but in the meantime the revolution nailed him to the banks of the Neva in the apartments of the Smolny Palace as a member of the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party and a deputy of the all-powerful Soviets of Workers and Soldiers, but no longer as an obscure Dzhugashvili, but as the future Stalin. October. Lenin is in power. Still little known, Stalin

receives the unimportant post of People's Commissar for the Minor Nationalities of Russia. This ministry has almost no functions. And the power of "classical ministries" extends to small nations. Stalin has nothing to do. He is just a "nominal minister", and besides, the post was invented by Lenin especially for him, in order to thank him for the past, but not to allow him to get to the present. Too primitive, rude, still "ex". For the time being, let him keep an eye on others, how to manage the "loot".

Stalin is diligent, patient, loyal, like a dog "dedicated to Ilyich", cloyingly polite to the strong, inhumanly cruel to the "enemies of the revolution". This one should be given more power. Stalin is the People's Commissar of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspectorate, the guardian of the laws of the revolution. The enemy of enemies and the scourge of the new Soviet bureaucracy.

The most faithful eye of Ilyich. Civil War. Trotsky - commander of the Red Army, Stalin authorized for bread. The capitals are starving. Stalin from the Volga supplies them with bread, taken from the peasants with the bayonets of the soldiers of the food detachments and units of the Special Purpose. Stalin supplies Lenin with bread and, in

compensation, demands that Lenin supply 76 The fate of Kamo himself was tragic. Already after the victory of Soviet power, when Stalin was in the Kremlin and riding luxury Buicks, Kamo was riding a crappy bike around Tiflis and got hit by a car. He was

crushed to death. his mandate giving him power over Trotsky's Southern Front. Lenin hesitates, Stalin delays bread ("without a mandate, they don't give him bread!"). But without bread, Lenin perished. The revolution was successful because of the slogan: "Give bread, bread, bread!". The proletariat "won" and now says simply and naturally "give me my bread." And the bread is where Stalin is. There is nothing to do: Lenin sends a mandate to Stalin. Stalin sends bread to Lenin with the attachment of his "brilliant" "plan to defeat Denikin." At the same time, using Lenin's mandate, he immediately organizes a military opposition (Voroshilov, Budyonny, Yegorov, and others) against Trotsky. Trotsky demands to remove the leader of the "partisans" Stalin. Stalin is removed. It's bad, but he obediently obeys. Early. We must wait for our happiness. Not just wait, but forge it. How to forge? By the same methods as later others forged him at Stalin himself: flattery, devotion, diligence, obedience, but also meanness. Stalin modestly but defiantly declares: "Vote for Ilyich - you will not be mistaken!" (the same was repeated later on Stalin by his "comrades-in-arms"). So it was during the Brest-Litovsk crisis, so it was during the trade union discussion with Trotsky, so it was during the "workers' opposition" and the opposition of "democratic centralism." So it was always after the first Leninist blow. Yes, Stalin is not just loyal, but he is deeply devoted.

1920 Lenin is 50 years old. Stalin demands a public celebration of the date of birth of the "great leader of the world revolution." Lenin wants to show that outward brilliance, noise and solemn fanfare are alien to him. He tries to avoid it, but Stalin is relentless. Commemorative articles by Trotsky, Bukharin, Zinoviev, Stalin and others appear in Pravda. The articles give an analysis of the history of the Russian revolution in the biographical dates of Lenin. The articles are brilliant, solemn, high-style. The weakest of them is Stalin's article. Weak literary. But only in this article is the whole of Lenin unraveled: "Lenin the leader, Lenin the organizer, Lenin the ideologist." The whole of Lenin is poured out in concise, flattering, to the point of simplification, simple literary formulas. Lenin - the enemy of phrases and pictures, for the first time saw himself in the mirror. No, Stalin is not only dutiful, but he is also a talented interpreter of Bolshevism! But Lenin still does not give up. However, Trotsky's enemies are Zinoviev and Kamenev

77 I. Stalin. Works, vol. 7.

nominate Stalin for the post of General Secretary of the Central Committee in order to expel the Trotskyists from there by Stalin's hands. Lenin still hesitates, he is against it. Actually, only he knows Stalin. He even knows where Stalin is striving, while Zinoviev and Kamenev consider him simply a convenient weapon against Trotsky. Lenin has been ill for a long time, occasionally returns to the Kremlin, but has almost lost contr

XI Party Congress (1922) - Zinovievites promote Stalin as "general secretary" of the Central Committee. Trotsky considers it even below his dignity to attach any significance to this "technical" fact. Lenin surrenders, Stalin moves to the Central Committee and immediately starts the war against Trotsky. New cadres in the Central Committee. Zinovievites and Stalinists on an equal footing. Deep conspiracy and deaf struggle. The case is taking a serious turn. Stalin, Zinoviev and Kamenev even conspire against Lenin. Sick Lenin, while in Gorki, demands an account from Stalin. Stalin does not give a report. Outraged by Stalin's behavior, the Trotskyists bombard Lenin with letters, but Lenin is powerless. Stalin is already crushing his enemies in Georgia - members of the Central Committee and leaders of the Georgian government, many of whom are personal friends of Lenin and Trotsky. Lenin demands an account, but Stalin does not give it. Then Lenin sent his wife, Krupskaya, with an ultimatum, but Stalin unceremoniously

puts her out of the office, and even calls her names with obscene words. The dying and powerless Lenin writes a "Political Testament" - to remove Stalin from all posts in the party - and in addition, after "Stalin's telephone conversation with Krupskaya", a short note to the Central Committee that he breaks off all relations with Stalin. Now the fate of Stalin is in the balance - Lenin's authority in the party and the Central Committee is indisputable. The first day of Lenin's return to work is the last day of Stalin's career. But here again "accident" helped - Lenin dies, and Stalin remains. Another, though not the last, but the

most recent example. 1941 War. The triumphal march of the Germans into the depths of Russia. The fate of Stalin and the regime is in the balance. It is, in fact, a foregone conclusion: one on one with Hitler, Stalin would have died. Tragic "accident": Roosevelt and Churchill save Stalin's lucky head - on their own misfortune.

If in the future any superstitious biographer of Stalin takes up a pen, then he will establish a lot of such "lucky accidents". But I am not superstitious and I think that in this chaos of "accidents" - the greatest regularity of Stalin's criminal career. Until the end, only criminologists and psychologists can understand Stalin, but not historians and sociologists. But I cannot fail to point out here one more

"accident",
which is directly related to my further presentation.

One lucky chance in Stalin's struggle against the Rights presented itself even before he finally dealt with his enemies in the Central Committee. It was December 21, 1929. Stalin turned 50 on this day. But celebrating birthdays or even anniversaries of leaders is not customary in the party. The Lenin Jubilee was the only exception, but that was Lenin all the same. Molotov, Kaganovich and Voroshilov decided, in full agreement with Stalin's ambition, to "legalize" the new leader of the party. Until now, all members of the Politburo were called "party leaders" and were always listed in alphabetical order. If it was about some individual member of the Politburo, then they simply wrote: "one of the leaders or leaders of the party." Now, for the first time, the alphabet has also been violated and, at the same time, the "institute of leaders" has been liquidated - Stalin is publicly declared "the first disciple of Lenin" and the only "leader of the party."

"Pravda" was filled with articles, greetings, letters, telegrams about the "leader" (adjectives like "wise", "great", "brilliant" came later, as appetite developed). The initiative of Pravda was picked up by other newspapers, followed by magazines, provincial newspapers, radio, cinema, clubs, the entire propaganda machine of the party. A standard has already been established in the entire press - each article begins with a reference to the "leader" and ends with a most loyal bow to his address. The Yudins and the Mekhlises, the Vyshinskys and the Vargas skillfully challenged each other for the palm in praising Stalin. But all these "academicians" were later surpassed by the illiterate akyn of Kazakhstan Dzhambul, who in the same "Pravda" briefly and figuratively defined who Stalin was: "Stalin is deeper than the ocean, higher than the Himalayas, brighter than the sun. He is the teacher of the Universe!". All this frenzied competition in lies, falsehood and the most virtuoso flattery began officially from those days. Stalin responded to all this feigned servility with brief but impressive lines: "I am ready to continue to give for the cause of the party all my strength and abilities and, if necessary, all my blood, drop by drop." Stalin's enemies then joked - "why such modesty -" drop by drop "- would give all the blood at once!" At the zenith of this propaganda

hype - on December 27, 1929 - Stalin single-handedly and without the decision of the Central Committee pronounced the death sentence on the multimillion-strong Russian peasantry - the so-called "kulaks". In a speech at a conference of "Marxist agrarians" that day, Stalin declared: we are making a new turn in our policy and are embarking on the "liquidation of the kulaks as a class on the basis of complete collectivization." According to official statistics, there were 5 million such kulaks in the country, and at least 13 million candidates for them - "the prosperous and sub-kulakists". A real war began to exterminate the peasantry. Only when I saw with my own eyes in Central Russia and the Caucasus how this "collectivization and liquidation" was carried out, did I understand Dedoplist: "a real war is going on in the countryside, worse than civil and German!" I will not draw here either the horrors of this "war" or its consequences in the country. Much has been said about this by other witnesses. Here I only want to say how the people of the Right Opposition reacted to the "new turn".

I mentioned that Stalin's speech followed unexpectedly and without the decision of the Central Committee. In the decision on agriculture, which was adopted by the plenum of the Central Committee a month before Stalin's speech ("November plenum"), not a word is said either about "a new turn in the policy of the party" or about the liquidation of "the kulaks as a class." It is said there, it is true, that "the collective-farm movement poses the task of complete collectivization before individual regions," but there is absolutely not a single word about "liquidating the kulaks as a class," and where this part of the peasantry is spoken of, only the following is said: "to develop decisive attack on the kulak, blocking and suppressing attempts by the kulaks to penetrate the collective

farms in every possible way. But propaganda swearing at the "kulaks" did not leave the pages of Soviet newspapers, starting already from the VIII Party Congress (1919). Stalin, however, now announced "liquidation", that is, the confiscation of property and land from the five million peasantry (for a start) and their eviction to the Siberian tundra without shelter, clothing and food, and without exception - from infants to very old people. Yes

78 I. Stalin. Works, vol. 12, pp. 141-172. 79

"VKP(b) in resolutions...", pp. 594-603. but

in the dark eras of slavery and the slave trade, children, mothers, and the elderly were spared. Stalin spared no one. Such a reprisal against the peasantry was considered so incredible that at first we thought that Stalin said it for the sake of a red word or simply blurted out too much out of negligence. When it turned out that Stalin was not at all engaged in an exercise in eloquence, a very serious unrest began at the top of the party, not to mention opposition circles. Rykov and Tomsky filed a protest with the Central Committee against Stalin's "unauthorized" speech and the direct violation of the decision of the last plenum on policy in the countryside. Repentant was Uglanov, Kotov and others hastened to join the protest. Bewildered telegrams and requests began to arrive from local party secretaries and members of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission. An uncertain, almost crisis situation arose for a while, when the right, having caught Stalin "red-handed", could call him to account as a usurper of power not only of the Politburo, but also of the Central Committee. Stalin tossed between

Molotov and Kaganovich, the rank and file demanded more insistently for clarification, the members of the Central Committee considered themselves

bypassed, but the rightists limited themselves to palliative measures of "solemn protest". Nothing was heard of Bukharin. Having handed over Rykov and Tomsy to Stalin's will, he seemed to be passively taking revenge on them: here you are, suckers, Stalin. Admire and roll with him into the pit! But the more the difficulties grew, the more confidently did Stalin's strength grow. On January 5, 1930, the Politburo retroactively approves Stalin's speech and decides "on the rate of collectivization" throughout the USSR. The right abstain. Inquiries from the bottom and bewilderment of the members of the Central Committee cease. The country plunges into forced and bloody collectivization. Stalin's victory over the Central Committee is complete. How much he defeated the party and the people will be shown by collectivization and the "liquidation of the kulaks." But the outlook here is grim. Separate peasant outbursts in connection with "extraordinary measures" at grain procurements in the autumn of 1929 develop into menacing clouds of peasant riots throughout the country - in Central Russia, the Urals, Siberia, Turkestan, the Caucasus ... The second edition of the peasant revolution of 1905 takes place, but without the support of the workers of the city, with the silence of the intelligentsia, with the indifference of the outside world ... Men with pitchforks rush at the first, still outlandish for them, Soviet

tanks (the first "combat 80" VKP (b) in resolutions ...", 1933, part II, p. 792. Soviet tanks receive baptism in a war against their own people), women - on the bayonets of the Chekists, children cry hysterically over the bodies of their dead parents, and tanks, cannons, machine guns and bayonets ruthlessly and with some kind of creepy systematically "collectivize" some, liquidate others. Yes, this is indeed worse than any war that has ever been played out in the history of peoples and states.

"Operational reports" from the fronts of this war are reported to the Central Committee: the absolute majority of the peasantry prefers the physical liquidation of the forced "collectivization" that has begun.

The "wise leader" orders to press again and again, to attack, to break, to smash the "kulak sabotage". But all this is in vain and in vain. The peasants die but do not give up. True, all this is unorganized, spontaneous, without communication and sometimes insane. But every moment a new Pugachev may appear, and then the fate of Soviet power is in the hands of such a Pugachev. The country is a peasant country, the army too. Revolution too

was peasant-soldier, although it was usurped by the city, but the current revolution can take cruel revenge on the city. The realists and cowards from the Politburo have finally come to their senses. We must warn Pugachev. Now, by decision of the Politburo, Stalin makes a new statement in Pravda - March 2, 1930. Stalin's article comes out under the pharisaic title: "Dizziness from success." It turns out that the Bolsheviks were "turned" by the "great successes in collectivization", and in this "dizziness" our local organizations ("the switchman is to blame"!) began to forcibly collectivize the peasants. "This," says Stalin, "is a violation of the 'Leninist principle' of voluntariness in the collective-farm movement." On March 15, 1930, a new resolution of the Central Committee was also issued, which confirms Stalin's article and publicly announces the "voluntariness of the collective farm movement." Both documents are exceptionally important:

they certify what happened in the Village and objectively recognize the bankruptcy of the policy of the Central Committee in the collective-farm movement. "You can't

plant collective farms by force," Stalin wrote in this article and immediately asked: "And what sometimes (!) We actually do? Can we say that the principle of voluntariness and consideration of local characteristics is not violated in a number of areas?" but he answered: - No, you can't say that ... In disguised formulations, with references to "tremendous successes," Stalin tried in this article to shift his own blame onto local organizations. But even then it was known, and later it was announced officially, that Stalin's speech with "Dizziness from Success" was not a voluntary, personal initiative. It was dictated to death by the frightened Central Committee. His own associates told him bluntly:

- You yourself brewed this porridge, you yourself must disentangle it! In his second article on the same topic ("Reply to Comrade Collective Farmers"), Stalin, assuming the innocent pose of a mere executor of the will of

the Central Committee, bluntly admitted⁸¹: We do not have a Central Committee to allow in such a matter the personal initiative of anyone whatsoever. This was a profound reconnaissance of the Central Committee.

to hit the mistakes with all the force of his authority by publishing his famous decree of March 15, 1930. " Having made this

recognition of his "modest role" in the "omnipotent Central Committee", but carefully avoiding even mentioning his sole order for collectivization on December 27, Stalin still once makes a compliment to the Central Committee, without which "it is difficult to stop during a furious run and turn on the right path people rushing headlong to the abyss" 82 (emphasis mine. - A. A.) Stalin at the head of the Central Committee would have been headlong flying into the abyss if the Central Committee had not temporarily risen above Stalin—such is the meaning of this recognition. However, such a conclusion from this speech is confirmed by Stalin himself in the same

"There is a very real danger that the revolutionary measures of the party will turn into empty bureaucratic decrees on the part of individual representatives of the party ... I mean not only local workers, but also individual regional workers, but also individual members of the Central

Committee." Stalin thus ends his recognition of the main danger created in connection with the collective-farm uprisings⁸³: 81

J. Stalin. Works, vol. 12, p. 213. 82 Ibid. 83

Ibid., pp.

211-212. "The danger

here lies in the fact that they, these mistakes lead us by direct communication to the debunking of the collective-farm movement, to discord with the middle peasant, to the disorganization of the poor, to confusion in our ranks ... they tend to push us ... onto the path of undermining the proletarian dictatorship "(All italics in the quote are mine. - A. A.).

After all, all this, in fact, was what they warned against. rightist Bukharin and others.

But Stalin would not have been Stalin if he had not attributed this crime, which was obvious and indirectly acknowledged by himself (the mistakes of "individual members of the Central Committee") to the right. "Left benders are allies of right deviators," Stalin, the inimitable "dialectician," categorically declares. Let us now turn to the most "famous" resolution of the Central Committee of March 15, 1930⁸⁵.

"The information received from the Central Committee of the Party," it says, about the course of the collective-farm movement shows that ... there are facts of distortion of the party line in various

regions of the USSR ... In a number of regions, voluntariness is replaced by coercion to join collective farms under the threat of dispossession, under the threat of deprivation of voting rights, etc. reaches 15, and the percentage of disenfranchised - up to 15-20. There are facts of exceptionally rude, ugly, criminal treatment of the population ... (looting, division of property, arrests of the middle peasants and even the poor, etc.) ... (in some areas, collectivization "reaches" from 10 to 90% in a few days)... (there is) an administrative closure of churches without the consent of the overwhelming majority of the village... and the abolition of markets and bazaars in a number of places..."

What happened after that in the countryside was a disastrous illustration of the failure of Stalin's policy. Here are data from various Soviet sources that demonstrate the scale of this failure better than any reasoning⁸⁶: ⁸⁴ Ibid., p. 212. ⁸⁵ "CPSU

in resolutions ...",

ed. 7th, part II, pp. 549-550. ⁸⁶ V. Mertsalov. The

tragedy of the Russian peasantry. "Sowing, 1950. Years and

months Collectivization of all peasant farms in the USSR"% June 1928

1.7 July 1929

3.9 October

1929 4.1 January

(20) 1930 21.0 March

(10) 1930 58.1 April

1930 37 .0 May

1930 28.0

June 1930 24.0

September 1930

21.0 The Central Committee owed all this "dizziness from success"

to its "wise" leader. But the leader came out unscathed. The goal of Stalin's article and the resolution of the Central Committee - a temporary rejection of the policy of forced collectivization and the accelerated mass liquidation of the "kulaks" in order to save the situation - was achieved. Stalin's policy failed ignominiously, the bulk of the peasantry withdrew from

collective farms, the village calmed down. But the politics of the right also failed ignominiously. Opportunities unprecedented in the history of Stalinism - the chance to overthrow the Stalinist regime by force - were missed in the most unforgivable way. At a time when all the forecasts of the rightists were decisively justified, at a time when almost all of Russia responded to the Arakcheev policy of Stalin-Molotov-Kaganovich with peasant riots, at a time when Stalin himself, having lost his head, rushed from side to side, at a time when the Red The army, that is, the same peasants in Red Army greatcoats, refused to shoot at their brothers, in conditions when panic reigned in local party organizations, and in the Central Committee itself, confusion and uncertainty - in these conditions, the only correct policy would be the policy of a demonstrative break with Stalin's Central Committee, policy of appeal to the people. True, later, at his trial in March 1938, Bukharin declared that he was deceiving the Central Committee by submitting a statement of loyalty in order to prepare and lead peasant uprisings in the country against the Stalinist regime. This was a monstrous untruth put into Bukharin's mouth by the Chekists themselves. But something else is true. Among the rank-and-file members of the opposition, among the Moscow groups, there were people ("activists") who demanded from their leaders vigorous action to overthrow Stalin, taking advantage of the peasant riots and the bankruptcy of the Stalinist

politicians.

How did leaders respond to these demands? The reader already knows how Bukharin answered this. I will also point out another feature, not new, but very characteristic of Stalin's policy, the ability to maneuver between "carrot and stick." Each repression of a wide scale in the USSR was always accompanied by certain material handouts. So it was now. But the goal of handouts this time was different - if it did not work out with a whip, then to lure the peasants with a "carrot" into the very collective farms against which they had so resolutely and so far successfully rebelled. In the article cited above, "An Answer to Comrades of the Collective Farmers," dated April 3, 1930 (by the way, the collective farmers did not ask Stalin any questions - they were invented by Stalin himself for his favorite form of "presentation") Stalin speaks quite clearly about this "carrot"⁸⁷:

"The other day, the Soviet government decided to exempt from taxation for two years all socialized working cattle on collective farms (horses, oxen, etc.), all cows, pigs, sheep and poultry, both collectively owned by collective farms and in individual ownership of collective farmers.

The Soviet government decided, in addition, to postpone by the end of the year the payment of debts of collective farmers on loans and to remove all fines and judicial penalties imposed on the peasants before April 1, included in the

collective farms. She finally decided to make a loan collective farms this year in the amount of 500 million rubles.

Immediately, for even greater clarity, Stalin adds: "The peasants who left the collective farms will not receive these benefits." But how can these peasants also receive such magnanimous and generous "favors" from Stalin? Stalin directly

answers: "Only by returning to the collective farms can they ensure that they receive these benefits." I do not want to prejudge my further presentation, but I must say in connection with this that Stalin deliberately kept silent - the decision of the Central Committee on these benefits for collective farmers and those returning to collective farms was adopted along with another decision, still not published, but strictly enforced 87 I. Stalin. Works, vol. 12, p. 222.

on the application of a series of tax and economic repressions against those "poor and middle peasants" in the countryside who refuse to voluntarily join the collective farms. In short, the whole point of "peaceful" repressions was to ensure that the stubborn peasants clearly realized and declared: "It is simply impossible to live outside the collective farm!" Although the collective farms are still "paper" ones, the very fact that they are nominally on the collective farms frees the peasants from a number of high taxation and taxes, and they also receive credit (in money, loans, agricultural implements, etc.). A completely different situation has arisen among the individual peasants - today they are nominally free, but tomorrow they are just as doomed to the yoke of the collective farm, like the current "leaders". Therefore, Stalin was right when he wrote in the same article: "The peasants make a mistake when they leave the collective farms." Ultimately, the peasants themselves soon realized this "mistake" of theirs. cruel

reality dealt a mortal blow to the illusion of the possibility of remaining outside the collective farm. It became clear that there were only two paths: one path - to the collective farm, with broad promises of a "happy life"; the other way is to Siberia, where the ruthless NKVD is in the truest union with harsh nature. There was no third party.

Such a scandalous failure of the policy of collectivization, which was clearly foreseen and about which the Bukharinites unsuccessfully warned, caused the greatest confusion in the ranks of the party. Everyone saw and felt that the articles of the resolution of the Central Committee were simply lightning rods against an atmosphere that was electrified to the limit both in the Party and in the country. It would be hard to find in the party a little bit thinking! the person who would not repeat the words of M. I. Kalinin, which he said, according to L. Trotsky, on another occasion: "Stalin can lead our cart

into such an abyss from which none of us can get out." But that was precisely the other characteristic

feature of Stalin, that, having once led a party cart into some kind of abyss, he came out of there through the corpses of those whom he harnessed to it with an iron hand in his time. This is what Stalin did this time as well. Despite the fact that the peasantry was revolting all over the country, despite the fact that the mass of the Party was in open opposition to the policy of the Central Committee, despite the fact that even the most orthodox members of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission in the localities demanded that the state of emergency be discussed at the Extraordinary Congress of the Party, Stalin - Molotov - Kaganovich did not even bother to convene a plenum of the Central Committee. They did not convene a congress or a plenum of the Central Committee precisely because of these same circumstances.

Meanwhile, the deadline for the next plenum of the Central Committee was already approaching. The party statutes stated that "the Central Committee has at least one plenary session every two

months"⁸⁸. The last plenum was November 10-17, 1929, now January has already passed. But not only January passed, but almost eight months passed before Stalin and the Stalinists decided to convene a plenum of the Central Committee, in which they were in an absolute majority at the last, November plenum, when they smashed the Bukharinites only because they warned against the dangerous "abyss".

Stalin, of course, was right in refusing to convene a plenum. Now the last fanatic in his own circle saw that